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ABSTRACT
This thesis first examines the overall development of the
EEC-China trade and economic relations. It then analyses the changing
Chinese economy, the non-market economy theory, its application and
implication in EEC-China bilateral trade relations. It is suggested
that China is no longer a traditional NME after ten years of reform;
its economy is in a transitional stage changing from an NME towards a
mixed economy.
The thesis then reviews the 1978 EEC-China trade agreement. It
is found that this agreement provides a highly restrictive MFN
treatment between the parties, because China is not a member of the
GATT, and is classified as an NME. The thesis analyses the legal
framework and problems under the 1978 agreement, and its nature and
possible legal effect both in the Community legal system and in the
Chinese legal system. It then goes on to look at the Community
internal regulations which govern imports from China.
The thesis also reviews the 1985 economic cooperation agreement
between the EEC and China. It analyses the background and development
of the agreement; the areas for cooperation and the investment clause.
The cooperation agreement, it is submitted, is more an expression of
political goodwill rather than a comprehensive economic cooperation
framework such as the home convention.
A particular area, namely, antidumping, is separately discussed.
This is not only because China is one of the principal targets of the
EEC antidumping proceedings, but also the EEC employs a special set of
rules against imports from China, as well as other NIlE countries.
Trade in textiles is also special interested. It consists of major
European imports from China, and as such has a special legal regime.
The analysis suggests that trade in textiles between the EEC and China
has become more restrictive since 1979.
Finally, both the impacts of a single market in 1992 and China's
efforts to rejoin the GATF are discussed. It is suggested that the EC
should continue to be committed to free trade in theory and more
importantly in practice, and to remove existing restrictions on
imports from China; whereas China should continue its economic reform
and gradually open up its own market to the EC.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine legal aspects of Trade and Economic
relations between the European Economic Community ("the European
Community", "the Community" or "the EEC") and the People's Republic of
China ("China" or "the PRC") 1 . Unlike the trade between the Community
and the United States, which accounts for a significant part of the
world transactions, EEC - China trade currently accounts for less than
2 per cent of the Community's total volume of imports and exports2.
The economic exchanges between them are also at an early stage of
development. However, research on this area is not unimportant.
First of all, on the one hand, the EEC for a long time has been the
largest trading group in the world, and on the other hand, China has
begun to grow into a major world trading partner. Since the late
1970's, in an attempt to modernise and develop its economy, China has
pursued an open policy, under which links with the EEC as well as
other developed Western countries have been encouraged. Since then,
China's trade and economic relations with other countries have
increased rapidly. It has, for example, improved its international
trade position in terms of the world's total volume of export from
32nd in 1978 to 17th in 1983 and 16th in l988.
2Table 1: China's Trade 1950-1988 (US$ billion)4
I	 11950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988I	 I
lTotalII.13 3.15 3.81 4.25 4.69 14.75 37.82 40.37 39.30 40.73 49.78 59.21 73.80 83.78 102.801
Sources: 1950-1985	 Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade, 1986
1986	 Beijing Review Vol. 30 No. 9 (2 March 1987)
1987	 People's Daily (Overseas Edition) 15 January,
1988
1988	 People's Daily (Overseas Edition) 31 August, 1989
Secondly, the trade and economic exchanges between the EEC and
China are growing steadily. The total volume of all imports and
exports between them in 1975 was 1.8 billion ECU, a figure which had
doubled to 3.6 billion ECU in 1980. In 1985, the value of trade
increased threefold over 1980 figures, reaching 10.3 billion ECU. The
Community is China's third largest trade partner (behind Hong Kong and
Japan, but ahead of the United States, occupying 13.5 per cent. of
China's total volume of international trade in 1987 (see Table 2
below). Investments in China from the Member States are also
increasing; the Community has been undertaking various cooperative
projects in China6 . All of these demonstrates the increasing
importance of EEC-China economic relations.
3Table 2: Trade between China and the Community (1971-1988)
(1971-1985: ECU million 1 1986-1988 US$ billion)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 I
I	 I
ITrade	 740	 787 1151 1529 1820 2033 1654 2419 3421 3613 4177 4378 5695 5535 7304 11.60 11.05 12.871
IVolwuie	 I
Sources: 1971-1985 Eurostat and MOFERT
1986	 People's Daily (Overseas Edition) 22 November,
1987
1987	 Beijing Review 25-31 July, 1988
1988	 China Economic News (No. 8) 27 February, 1989
Thirdly, China is classified as a "State-trading country" on the
one hand and is actually a developing country on the other, legal
aspects of trade and economic relations of such a country with the EEC
are particularly interesting to be discussed. For example, how are
economic exchanges conducted between them? What is the legal machinery
for the bilateral trade? What legal problems are they facing and how
should they deal with them?
Finally, China is applying to resume its seat in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GAl'T"). Trade and economic
relations between the EEC and China are bound to have an impact on
China's rejoining the international trade club. On the other hand,
the consequences of China rejoining the GATT will inevitably reshape
and restructure the trade and economic relations between them. A
preliminary analysis of this interaction could be helpful to consider
the future legal structure of trade and economic relations between
the EEC and China.
4A. EEC - China Relations before 1975
1. Relations in Early Years
Although there were no diplomatic relations between the Community
and the People's Republic of China until l975, China, however, has
started trading with Western Europe since early 1950's during the US
embargo. In 1953, China negotiated a 30 million pounds trade
arrangement with a commercial delegation from the UK, which later
formed a well known body - the 48 Group 8 . In the same year a barter
arrangement with France had also been concluded9 . In 1957, a trade
and payment agreement was concluded between the governments of China
and Denmark . And in the early 1960's, China also purchased over ten
whole plants from Member States of the Community. However, these
trade relations were very much limited. For 15 years between 1958 and
1972, the trade volumes between them had not been substantially
changed. (See Table 3 below)
Table 3: Trade between EC and China before 1972 (million ECU)
1958 1960 1963 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Total I 547
	 566	 318	 774	 872	 762	 802	 809	 759	 787
Sources: Eurostat and MOFERT
Several factors were responsible for that. First of all, there
were very cold political relations between China and the Western
Europe generally. When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949,
China joined the Soviet bloc in the post-war international community
5consisting of two major contrasting groups, whereas most Western
European countries were under the wings of the USA l2 . Under such
circumstances a large volume of trade and economic exchanges between
China and Western Europe were hardly possible. When the Korean war
broke out, the United States imposed an embargo on China. It made
trade between China and Western Europe even more difficult.
Secondly, both sides were more concerned with domestic tasks. As
far as Western Europe was concerned, it was a stupendous task to
rebuild Western Europe after World War II, which would badly need help
from the Americans. For China, decades of civil war and Japanese
occupation had severely damaged the economy, all of its attention was
paid to rebuilding the political structure and the recovery of the
economy of that country. Admittedly, domestic preoccupations have
rarely restrained nations from becoming actively involved in
international affairs. In China's case, especially, international
trade and international help was badly needed. But the fact was that
China adopted the "leaning to one side" policy at that time 13 . Large
volumes of trading and economic exchanges were only conducted with the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.
Thirdly, the Soviet Union's influence on China on this issue
throughout the 1950's should not be forgotten. Right at the beginning
of the establishment of the European Economic Community, the Soviet
Union publicly denounced it' 4 , and this was promptly backed by other
Eastern bloc countries 15 . Under this circumstance any attempt on
China's part to establish further economic relations with the
6Community would have been tantamount to public defiance of Moscow -
something the Chinese wished to avoid at the time. China needed more
economic assistance from the Soviet Union to rebuild the country which
the Community could not give.
Fourthly, when China split with the Soviet Union at the end of
the 1950's, there was a possibility for a change in the relationship
between China and Western Europe, but this opportunity was not taken
up by the two sides. Isolated in the world, China then introduced a
"self-reliance" policy ; international trade and economic exchanges
17
were restrained to a special low level
	 (see Table 4 below).
Table 4: China's Trade 1956-1966 (US$ billion)
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Export 1.65 1.60 1.98 2.26 1.86 1.50 1.50 1.65 1.97 2.23 2.34
Import 1.56 1.51 1.89 2.12 1.95 1.45 1.12 1.27 1.55 2.02 2.25
Total	 3.21 3.11 3.87 4.38 3.81 2.95 2.62 2.92 3.52 4.25 4.59
Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1984
Fifthly, in theory, the Chinese policy-makers and economists had
always considered foreign trade as subsidiary to the domestic needs,
and never regarded foreign trade as an integrated part of the national
18	 .
economy until the 1980 s . In reality, China s capacity to trade
with the EEC countries was limited. For one thing, the foreign
currency needed for such transactions was scarce; for another, China's
capacity to pay for imports through exports was severely restricted by
the lack of exportable items. For yet another, because of the
7"self-reliance" policy, it was not feasible for China to use foreign
credits on a large scale.
Finally, the Chinese ideological framework in general at that
time also played a weighty role. Having pushed the country to the left
arid adopted a policy of self-reliance coupled with an isolationist
stance towards others, in particular Western countries, in 1958, the
Maoist leadership could hardly afford to adopt even a neutral attitude
towards the Community. Clearly the further development of economic
relations with Western Europe beyond those very low level relations
already established would damage even the image of the leadership
itself.
In summary, there were serious practical, political and
ideological obstacles to the development of trade and economic
relations between the Community and China in the early years.
2. Relations During the Early 1970's
The real chance of improving bilateral relations between the
Community and China came only in the early 1970's, when changes
happened on both sides. On the EEC side, it had become a major
international economic centre from the 1970's, especially after
Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the Community in 1973. On the
Chinese side, even more dramatic changes had happened. Domestically,
the fever of the "Cultural Revolution" was over, the moderates, headed
by Zhou En-Lai, then Chinese Premier, reasserted themselves, and
19
wanted to rescue the economy from crisis . This created an
8opportunity for increasing trade with the Community. Internationally,
China resumed its seat in the United Nations in October 197120,
followed by the dramatic visit of President Nixon in February 1972,
which started the long process of normalisation of Sino-American
relations. The favourable international situation brought up the
possibility of developing the trade and economic relations between
China and the EEC.
First, a number of Member States of the European Community
established diplomatic relations with China at that time 21 , notably
Italy (November 1970), Belgium (October 1971), West Germany (October
1972) and Luxembourg (November 1972). This provided the basis for
further development of trade and economic relations between China and
the Community, and effectively removed the obstacles for establishing
diplomatic relations between China and the Community. Also, both
China and the Community took a new view towards each other. China had
not only regarded the Community as a major economic centre in the
world, but also an important political power, which might eventually
achieve military independence from the US. On a number of occasions
it was fairly clear that China had begun to support Western European
integration, especially political integration in the early l97Os.
These were supported by favourable references to European integration
in the Chinese Press 22 . The Community also took China more seriously.
The European Council had its first favourable discussion on China and
the European Parliament advised the Commission to take all appropriate
initiatives to strengthen relations with China23.
9Economic factors also played an important role. Although the
Chinese initially regarded the Community as of political rather than
economic importance, the Community, however, clearly regarded China as
an economic partner rather than a political ally (against the other
superpowers). Both sides were interested to improve trade relations
between them. Trade between EEC and China in the early 1970's grew
smoothly24 , increasing from 787 million ECU in 1972 to 2046 million
ECU in 197625. The Community looked on the Chinese economy, at least
in the 1970's, as offering major prospects of a vast market. If the
Community did not act in time this market would inevitably be lost to
the Japanese who were already active in China, and to the Americans
who were actively involved in developing relations with China. The
Chinese market was considered to be so important that reports were
published by the Community institutions regarding the vast size of
China, the richness of its raw materials, the impressive level of
growth, and the potential capacity of the country effectively to
absorb goods from other countries 26 . The basic estimates made the
Community, pressed by Western European business circles, strengthen
its determination to improve direct relations with China.
B. Establishment of Official Relations
There had been some contacts at various levels between Commission
departments and Chinese representatives unofficially even before 1975,
but there was no special machinery for relations between the Community
and China at that time 27 . The visits to Peking in the early 1970's by
the Forefgii Ministers of EEC Member States provided the opportunities
for the leaders in the EEC and China to discuss the
10
possibility of developing direct relations between the EEC and
China28 , but there was no clear direction until the visit by high
29
ranking Commission officials to Peking in 1975
The Community's initiative of concluding a trade agreement with
China in 1974 played an important role in the establishment of
official relations between the EEC and China. During its debate on 7
May, 1974 concerning relations with State-trading countries, the
Council had reiterated that from then on, any trade negotiations
should be led by the Community30 . Since the trade agreements made by
Member States of the Community with the countries in question would
expire at the end of 1974, the Council decided in September 1974 that
the Community should make the point that it ws ready to negotiate new
agreements with the various State-trading countries 31 . In November
1974 the Commission forwarded a memorandum to China (and other
State-trading countries) accompanied by an outline agreement laying
down broad provisions for the conclusion of a possible trade agreement
between the Community and China 32 . No other State-trading country
33
replied but only China responded positively . This brought about the
possibility of establishing official relations between the EEC and
China.
The visit to Peking by Sir Christopher Soames, then
Vice-President of the Commission, on May 4, 1975, as mentioned above,
should be discussed in more detail. China was very cautious to start
relations with the Community, so the invitation given to the
Vice-President was private at first. The Commission accepted the
invitation, but informed the Chinese that it was not possible for
11
Soames to accept it in his private capacity, since he was the
Community's Commissioner. The invitation, the Commission insisted,
had to be official in order to permit him to go to China 34 . After
initial hesitation, China officially invited Soames through the
Chinese Embassy in Brussels 35 . It was during this visit that China
expressed: (1) its decision to establish official relations with the
EEC and to send an Ambassador later; and (2) its readiness to
negotiate an appropriate trade agreement between the two parties to
replace the bilateral agreements with the Member States that were due
36
to expire at the end of 1974 . Clearly Soame s visit was a milestone
in EEC - China relations, it created the appropriate basis for the
start of speedily expanding trade and economic as well as political
relations.
The crucial issue between China and the Community was the issue
of Taiwan. The firm and very consistent opposition that Peking had
formulated since 1949 to any "two Chinas" solutions had led the
Chinese leaders to become very vigilant towards nations or
International organisations with which they had decided to develop
relations. When the Community decided to improve its relations with
China, it was the first issue that had to be dealt with. Because the
Community had concluded a textile agreement with the "Republic of
China" (Taiwan) as late as October 1970, which had expired on
1 October 1973, it is quite understandable that China was particularly
cautious on the attitude of the Community towards Taiwan. During
Soames' visit to China, the Taiwan question was therefore repeatedly
raised. The EEC delegation initially gave an informal assurance that
the Community considered the Beijing Government as the only government
12
of China, and that it had no relations with Taiwan 37 . However, the
Chinese side insisted that the Community must formally and publicly
declare its support of China's position that Taiwan was an integral
part of China, and Beijing the sole government entitled to represent
the Chinese state38 . The EEC delegation was reluctant to make such a
declaration on the ground that it had no legal mandate to make any
declaration that involved territories 39 . Soames further explained
that matters such as the recognition of States did not come within the
responsibility of the Community 40 . A compromise was finally reached
as Soames publicly stated that the EEC had no official relations with
nor had it entered into any agreement with Taiwan, and that this was
in conformity with the positions taken by all the Member States of the
41Community
It is interesting to observe that if the public announcement made
by Sir Christopher Soames is regarded as recognition of government,
the Community nevertheless keeps separate trade relations with Taiwan;
and that is acceptable to China. The Community's recognition,
therefore, is more a political declaration. Both China and the
Community recognized the de facto different jurisdictions between
mainland China and Taiwan. The Community maintains "unofficial"
economic relations with Taiwan42.
C. EEC - China Trade and Economic Relations Since 1975
Trade and economic relations have been rapidly developing since
43
the establishment of official relations . There have been two
13
periods of rapid trade expansion between the EEC and China since
1975. The first came in 1978 when China started to introduce the
ambitious "four modernisations" programme45 , and when China and the
Community concluded a trade agreement in 197846. The second time was
in 1985 and 1986. China at that time increased its sales to the
Common Market and imported a huge amount of products from the
Community resulting in large deficits in 1985 and l986.
When the "Cultural Revolution" came to an end, the Chinese people
found themselves facing economic difficulties again, the economic
development was far behind other countries and the national economy
48
was near to collapse . In order to overcome these difficulties the
four modernisations (ie, modernisation in science and technology;
modernisation in industry; modernisation in agriculture and
modernisation in defence) programme was adopted as a national policy.
This policy inevitably results in opening up to the outside world and
importing more equipment, technology, management skills, capital and
others. This brought the opportunity for the Community to intensify
economic relations with China. The Trade Agreement concluded between
them in 1978 and the textile agreement in l979, brought the
possibility for the Community to expand its trade share in China. The
bilateral trade increased by more than 46 per cent. in 1978 and more
than 41 per cent. in l979°.
Since the beginning of the 1980's, however, there has been an
overall deceleration of EEC-China trade relations. Though the
absolute trade figures continue to increase, the growth rate in
14
51bilateral trade has slowed down . This general stagnation may be
attributed to a wide range of temporary factors, for example, to
China's policy of economic readjustment 52 , to the European recession,
and/or to the confusion generated by China's decentralisation and
recentralisation of foreign trade system in 1980 and 1983
respectively, as a result of which European businessmen do not know
"whether they should go to the provinces or to the centre, and which
organisation they should address in order to obtain the quickest and
most effective results"53.
Although bilateral trade did not increase as expected during that
period, other economic exchanges and relations have steadily
developed. In the period from 1979 to 1983, investments in China and
loans from the Member States of the Community totalled
US$1,603 million (or 7.4 per cent. of the total amount of foreign
capital utilised by China during that time), of which US$718 million
were direct investments, while US$885 million were loans 54 . Economic
co-operation also took place between the Community and China,
basically within the fields of agriculture, energy and light industry.
Such co-operation had cost ECU 16 million to the end of 1983 under
various budget headings of the Community55 . With the background of
increasing economic co-operation between the Community and China, the
1978 Trade Agreement eventually proved to be an insufficient
framework, and the new Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement was
56
therefore concluded in 1985
15
The re-increasing of bilateral trade came only at a time when the
Community had gradually recovered from the recession and especially
when China had readjusted its economy and started to speed up the
process of economic reform, and introduced the economic reform not
only in the agricultural countryside but also in urban industry57.
Bilateral trade reached US$7.3 billion in 1985, a 42.2 percent
increase over 198458 and over US$11.6 billion in 1986, increased 39.2
percent over l985. To the end of 1988, EEC-China bilateral trade
reached as high as US$12.87 billion, seven times the bilateral trade
volume in 1975 when they decided to establish official relations60.
Trade with the EEC now represents a substantial part of China's trade,
the EEC becomes one of China's top trading partners, in front of the
United States, but behind Hong Kong and Japan.
Moreover, the Community has also become the leading supplier of
61high technology and equipment to China . According to Chinese
statistics, in 1986, China's imports of high technology and equipment
from the Community accounted for 51 per cent, of China's total imports
62
of such high technology and equipment from the outside world . In
1987 and 1988 the Community continued the be the biggest supplier of
high technology and equipment to China 63 . Apart from trade, economic
co-operation has also speeded up after the conclusion of the 1985
Co-operation Agreement. The cooperations are conducted mainly in
areas of agriculture, energy and science and technology, and personnel
training. In agriculture alone, the Commission provided 6.2 million
ECU each year from 1984 to 198764, and 8.60 million ECU in 198865
The establishment of an EEC-China biotechnology centre in Beijing was
16
agreed in early 1988, with the Community aid totalling 80 million ECU
over five years66 . Private direct investment from European companies
also increased steadily. To the end of 1987 investment in China by
67European companies reached US$1.75 billion . A number of Chinese
companies also invested in Europe68 . As a result of the
intensification of trade and economic relations, the Community decided
69to establish its diplomatic representation in China . The Delegation
of the Commission of the European Communities was therefore
established in May 1988, to handle the rapid expansion of bilateral
trade and economic activities between the member countries and
China70 . There are signs also that the Community was looking towards
increased official commitment71.
Despite intensifying trade and economic relations between the
Community and China, the development of these exchanges is
nevertheless unsatisfactory to both parties. On the one hand, Europe
in the early days expected China to be a major outlet for their
products which has proved to be an unrealistic dream. The Community's
trade with China is just over one per cent. of its total external
trade72 . On the other hand, the Chinese have always complained about
European protectionism which has restrained further the development of
bilateral trade. Trade with the Community represented 12 per cent. of
China's total imports and exports in 1985 and 15.8 per cent. in 1986;
but this figure is far behind China's trade with Hong Kong and
Japan73 . China has also run successive trade deficits on a large
scale with the Community74 . This in return has substantially limited
China's ability to buy more from Europe. Thus far, trade and economic
17
relations between China and the European Community are admittedly far
below the potential. This is, of course, not merely because of the
problems of the legal framework governing bilateral trade and economic
exchanges. Many factors contribute to the unsatisfactory reality of
bilateral trade; these factors will be dealt with in this thesis to a
certain extent but the focus of this thesis is primarily on the legal
framework and legal problems in EEC-China trade and economic
relations, mainly trade relations. And the discussion covers






























































(1) In 1975, China established official relations with the European
Economic Community and in 1983, the relations officially expanded
to include also the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and
the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), re, the whole
Communities. This thesis discusses the relations and legal
problems between China and the EEC mainly. Sometimes, however,
the relations between the ECSC or the EAEC and China will also be
discussed.
(2) Eurostat 1986, 1987.
(3) Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade by
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT), Vol. 1 (1984). And GAT'F, International Trade
88-89. Volume I P85.











































































































































(cont'd...)	 Export	 Import	 Balance	 Total
Sources: 1950-1985: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade 1985
1986: Beijing Review Vol. 30, No. 9 (2 March 1987)
1987: People's Daily, 15 January, 1988
1988: People's Daily, 31 August, 1989
(5) See Eurostate 1980-1987 and Supra 3, Vol. 1 (1984); Vol. 2 (1985)
and Vol. 3 (1986); Also see Vol. 4, International Trade (1988)
Beijing p61.
(6) The European Community ranks as China's third largest investor,
after the US and Japan, among developed nations. EC nations
invested US$1.46 billion in 167 projects in China from 1979-1987,
compared with US investment of US$4 billion in 427 projects and
Japan's US$1.9 billion investment in 417 projects.
(7) See Bull.EC. 5-1975, point 1.2.03. Also see Vol. 8 Peking Review
No. 2, May 16, 1975 pp5-6. The visit to Peking paid by Sir
Christopher Soames, then Vice-President of the Commission, 4th
May 1975, established official relations between the European
Economic Community and China.
(8) People's Daily, 8 July, 1953 and 8 July, 1988.
(9) II Compilation of Treaties and Agreements of the People's
Republic of China (1953). A similar arrangement was also
concluded between China and West Germany in 1957.
(10) Ibid. Vol. VI.
(11) Chinese Economy Post Mao. A compendium of papers (submitted to
the Joint Economic Committee of the United States) Vol. 1, Policy
and Performance (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).
(12) Vol. 5 Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung p247. Beijing; also see
Kuang-Sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernisation in China
1860-1980 H.K. The Chinese University Press 1984, p119.
(13) Ibid.
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(14) See Declaration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry of 16 March, 1957.
Text in Europa-Archive. 11 December, 1957. p9924 FF.
(15) "Declaration Commune des représentants des partis communistes des
6 pays et de la CECA et du Marché Commun". Cahiers du Communisme
4. (1959), pp4O4-408. Harish Kapur, China and the EEC: the New
Connections 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers p5.
(16) Supra. 12
(17) The stagnation of China's international trade during this period
has contributed to its isolation internationally, also to its
internal economic difficulties and adjustment.
(18) Gon Fen Chang, Some Aspects of Foreign Trade Strategies, in
Essays on International Trade, Vol 2 pp42-48, also Wang Shao Xi,
Functions of Export Trade, Ibid, pp56-66.
(19) Gao Fang, Ten year's History of Culture Revolution 1986.
Beijing, p480.
(20) Vol. 13 Peking Review No. 45 (1971) p3. United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2758, 1976th plenary meeting, 25 October,
1971. General Assembly Official Records; 26th session,
Supplement No 29 (A/8429) p2.
(21) Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the

























Source:	 China Official Annual Report p380, by New China News
Photos Co. & Hong Kong Kingway International
Publication Ltd.
(22) Peking Review (1971) Nos. 1, 24, 27, 37.45; (1972) No 7; (1973)
No. 29 etc.
(23) European Communities, European Parliament Working Documents
1976-t978.
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(24) Trade between EEC and China between 1972-1976 (million ECU):










Sources: Eurostat. and MOFERT.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Supra 23, plO.
(27) OJ No. C145/27 22.1.1974
(28) Harish Kapur, p28
(29) Vol. 18, Peking Review No. 2, May 11 (1975) p5. Visit by Sir
Christopher Soames, then the Commission's Vice President,
detailed discussions, see below.
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Non Marketing Econony Theory and EEC - CHINA TRADE
The European Community has always been in a dilemma as how to
treat China in bilateral trade relations. In some cases China was
treated as a developing country, in others it was treated as a
non-market economy (NNE) country or sometimes referred to as a
1State-trading country . In its trade agreement with China the
Community has avoided clarifying this question, but the trade
agreement was concluded not only on a non-preferential basis, but also
on a presumption that China was a non-market economy 2 . Consequently
the trade and economic relations between the EEC and China have been
characterised by increasing restrictions and confrontations 3 . The
Chinese economy is no longer a traditional NME but it is not yet a
free market or even a mixed economy. It is in a transitional stage.
This chapter will briefly examine the chaning Chinese economy, the
norm of non-market economy and its application and implication in
EEC-China bilateral trade relations.
A. The NME Theory and EEC-China Trade Regime
The term "non-market economy" (sometimes also used as
26
"State-trading country") is commonly used to describe countries where
goods and resources are allocated by government planning agencies
rather than by prices freely set in the market 4 . Thus, people, not
market, balance supply and demand. In general, the socialist
countries are regarded as having non-market economies, while the
developed Western countries are viewed as having market economies5
China, as a socialist country, has therefore been categorised as a
non-market economy by the European Community in bilateral trade
relations 6 . The latter imposed extensive quantitative restrictions and
other restrictions over imports from China on the basis that China is
a non-market economy7.
However, categorisation of free market economy and non-market
economy is over-simplified. It is neither a accurate description of
the economic reality in the different countries concerned, nor a
sufficient ground to enable the legal framework of bilateral trade
involving parties in question to be built on such hypothesis.
To better understand the problem of confusion and misuse of the
concept of the NME, a brief discussion of this concept is necessary
and helpful. The black or white categorisation of a country as either
free-market or non-market is based upon simplistic theoretical
distinctions defined as follows:
In a market economy international trade is driven by the
independent decisions of buyers and sellers acting out of economic
self-interest. Prices set by the market are used for allocating
27
scarce resources. These scarce resources are in turn channelled into
their most efficient uses by the market forces of supply and demand.
Consequently, prices act as rationing and signalling mechanisms by
which goods are traded consistently with buyer preferences8
In a non-market economy, by contrast, international trade is
regulated by State planning and control which set the prices and
output of goods, with scant consideration given to factors such as
cost and efficiency. Resources are not regulated by a market, but
instead by central planning, the NME government does not interfere
with the market process, but instead replaces it9.
In addition, the NNE is said also to have other characteristics,
such as:
prices do not reflect relative scarcity nor are they related to
market forces'°.
productive resources are allocated in accordance with the central
plan, with incentives encouraging compliance with the plan.
Profit does not have the same meaning in an NME country as it
does in a market economy, given that NME enterprises are not profit -
maximising. Instead, through central planning and the incentive
structure, NIlE enterprises carry out the central planner's
11directives
28
NNEs are also characterised by their inconvertible currencies.
The basic rationale for currency inconvertibility is that
12
convertibility would disrupt central planning
Finally, centrally planned economics conduct foreign trade
through State trading organisations which have a trade monopoly over
product groups. This bureaucratic shield hinders manufactures'
ability to respond to demands from foreign purchasers for their
products13.
It must be pointed out that the market economy picture described
above may fit into classic types of capitalist society. Since J.
Keynes, there has been no pure free market economy without
interference from the government. Today the economic realities in
various countries show that no country fits the definition of either
free-market economy or non-market economy in its pure form. Rather,
there are different degrees of government control over the economic
structure of the countries, and different numbers and types of
enterprises coming under the direct control and ownership of
14government . On the other hand, there are different levels of market
orientation in various countries, varying from a market economy
country, to a country with mixed economy, and to socialist countries
reforming their economics systems towards more market orientations.
The economic structure in most, if not all, countries (including
those labelled as free-market economies) is shaped by government
control in one form or another. These controls may be applied
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directly in the form of State ownership and/or mandatory planning, the
government assuming direct control over an enterprise or a sector and
making all pertinent decisions about production and/or pricing'5.
Controls may also be applied indirectly through guidance planning, the
government controlling the economy by using taxation, interest rates,
the money supply and credit controls to promote particular economic
objectives. Within this framework, private or independent enterprises
plan and operate based on their assessment of market forces and profit
16
maximisation . It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the
governments of Western countries often exercise those extensive direct
controls over certain sectors; in the EEC for example, the Commission
exercises considerable control over the output and pricing decisions
17	 .
of steel companies . In the United States, and indeed all major
industrialised countries, the government is deeply involved in the
decision of production and pricing in agricultural products 18 . In
developing countries, these direct control have been exercised even
more extensively. Most developing countries maintain a monopoly or
substantial monopoly of their international trade; a large number of
governments in developing countries are involved directly in the
decisions of production and pricing of, among others, commodities
which are vitally important to the countries concerned'9
It is fair to say that although these countries are labelled as
free market economies, the governments of these countries exercise
different degrees of direct or indirect control over the economies.
There is no absolute pure market economy in this sense. The
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difference only exists in different degrees and extent of market
orientations, and degrees and extent of government controls.
As far as socialist countries are concerned, the Europ"an
Community has labelled them as State-trading countries (or non-market
economy) without any distinction. Such general conclusion does not
accurately reflect the economic reality in these countries any more.
Some countries such as Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania and Bulgaria
have retained a more orthodox socialist economy. Although there are
some market-economic activities and some market mechanics have been
introduced in these countries, these activities are very limited, and
20
no substantial changes in their economic systems have occurred
These countries may still be correctly labelled as non market
economies. Others, however, have been undertaking fundamental reforms
in their economic systems. The reform of the economic systems in
these countries is reflected in the relocation of government controls
over the economy, the introduction of a market-type mechanism into
their economy and market force being allowed to play increasingly more
and more important roles. The reforms involve areas of state
21. These
planning, enterprise, management, foreign trade system etc
countries, particularly Yugoslavia, China and Hungary, are now in the
middleway between a traditional non-market economy and a free market
economy, towards the direction of mixed economy22.
To summarise, concepts of non-market economy and free market
economy have been used to distinguish two different types of economic
systems. In economic reality, however, a free market economy also
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exercises, sometime or somewhere, direct governmental controls over
the economy, whereas a non-market economy may, on the other hand, have
certain degrees of market orientation. The over-simplified concept
fails, in particular, to address the economic reality in countries
like China, whose economy is in the middle way towards a mixed
economy. Consequently, a legal system based on such concept has
declined China's status as a developing country, and threfore
deprived it the right it ought to enjoy. It is not an accurate
concept to describe China as a non market economy, the legal system
based upon this is unfair and discriminatory.
B. The Reforming Chinese Economy
The history of the Chinese economic system may be divided into
two different stages since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.
Before the economic reform, it was a typical non-market economy; but
since 1979, the traditional system has been changed gradually towards
a mixed economy23 . This part of the chapter will briefly examine the
changing Chinese economy, analyse the nature of reform and the
unresolved problems, with emphasis on China's foreign trade system.
Before the economic reform in the PRC, the traditional
characterisation of China as a non-market economy may have been
.24	 ,
valid . The country s economy was rigidly and centrally controlled
by the government. The Chinese Communist Party resolution recognised
that the Chinese government exercised excessive and rigid control over
the enterprises; no adequate importance was given to commodity
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production, the law of value and the regulatory role of the market;
25
and there was equalitarianism in distribution . In the traditional
Chinese economy before 1979, the allocation of resources was decided
by the State planning, not by market forces. The enterprises were
conducting production according to the mandates from the government,
not according to the indication from the market. All prices were
artificially set by the government without reflecting the supply and
demand in the market. In the foreign trade sector, the State had
absolute monopoly (only 12 state-owned companies were empowered to
engage in import-export business) 26 . All these carry the
characteristics of a non-market economy.
The economic reform has changed this rigid economic system, and
this economic system is still in the process of reforming. The
objective of the reform is to establish a new system of planned
commodity economy of Chinese style according to the Chinese
government 27 . In the author's view, it is a mixed economy with a
combination of planning and market force.
For the purpose of the present thesis discussion, economic reform
in China has been undertaken in the following ways:
(a) to reform the planning system by allowing certain sectors of the
economy to operate according to make forces rather than by
mandated planning;
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(b) to reform the price system, so that prices are influenced by the
market rather than set by the State;
(c) to reform the enterprise system of ownership and management
method, by separating enterprises from the State so they
ultimately function independently, without direct administrative
control;
(d) to reform the foreign trade and investment system by reforming
the foreign trade planning system, breaking down the State
monopoly in foreign trade, and by relaxing foreign exchange
control; and
(e) to establish Special Economic Zones where not only are foreign
investors offered better terms regarding investment, but also
offering experience of allowing market forces to play dominant
roles in these areas28.
1. State Planning and the Market Force
Before the reform, China's economy was dominated by mandatory
planning. Such a system has been regarded as not adequate or
sufficiently efficient to keep step with reality 29 . The reform
programme therefore has two general aims. First, to reduce the number
of products dominated by mandatory planning, by placing greater
reliance on guidance planning and/or on the operation of the market.
Second, by allowing the mandatory planning still to apply to a limited
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number of products essential to the national economy while at the same
time taking consideration of market forces. The result of planning
reform is not only a reduction of the scope of mandatory planning but
also an increase of attention to economic information and forecasting
and to the influence of market forces on all types of planning.
2. The Price Reform
Of all the reforms, price reform is perhaps the most difficult to
implement. In keeping with an economy dominated by mandatory
planning, prior to the reform, prices were set by the central
government reflecting neither the value of commodities, nor the
relation of supply and demand. China gradually introduced floating
prices, allowing prices to be floated within the margin fixed by the
30State; and free prices decided by the free market . The price reform
focused on reducing the scope of State-determined uniform price levels
and on increasing the use of both floating prices and free market
prices. However, dramatic price increases over a short period,
without attendant cost of living adjustments might have an undesirable
political backlash which might in some way have weakened the reform.
The price reform has therefore slowed down 31 . At present, free prices
and State-set prices are both playing important roles in the Chinese
economy (the so called "two-track system"), but with State-set prices
playing a more dominant role in most areas of China32 (except in the
Special Economic Zones where market economy plays a dominant role, the
free market prices therefore also play a dominant role) 33 . It is
submitted that the only hope for the Chinese economy is to move
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further towards a more mixed economy. To this end, the price reform
should be continued to the effect of less State-set prices and more
free market prices.
3. Reform of Ownership and Management System
The complete dominance of the central government over the economy
before the reform meant enterprises were essentially owned and
operated directly by the State. There was no line separating
administration from enterprise; only one form of socialist ownership,
"ownership by the whole people", received continuing ideological
34
support
The economic reform has largely made business enterprise an
independent economic and legal entity "responsible for its own profit
and loss and capable of transforming and developing itself and acting
as a legal person with certain rights and duties"35.
The economic reform has also separated ownership of the
enterprise from the power to operate the enterprise, fortifying its
36independence from the government . In practice, this has been
implemented through reforms in the management system. In State-owned
enterprises the director (manager) responsibility system has been
introduced instead of previous system of Communist Party Secretary
being responsible for running the enterprise 37 . The director is given
broad powers to manage and is expected to take full responsibility for
the success or failure of the enterprise38 . Although the State still
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retains legal title, the enterprise is entrusted with full rights to
possess, utilise and to a certain degree dispose of assets. The
enterprise has broad decision-making powers over all aspects of its
business, including planning, production, pricing, marketing, labour
relations, financial management, and internal structuring39
The reform also promotes changes in the ownership structure by
encouraging the expansion of various kinds of economic entities
40
consisting of different form of ownership . While the State-owned
enterprises remain the mainstay of the national economy, private and
mixed forms of ownership have expanded41 . Also, foreign investment
has been encouraged, with the result of establishing over 19,000
foreign investment enterprises in recent years 42 . In addition a large
number of the State-owned enterprises of various sizes have been
leased or contracted out for operation by collectives or individuals
responsible for profits and losses 43 . Adding to the growing
diversification of economic actors, a number of enterprises from
different regions, including private enterprises have combined,
forming lateral economic associations with different and mixed forms
44
of ownership
4. Establishment of Special Economic Zones
In 1979, China decided to establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces 45 . The SEZs were designed to serve
as "windows for technology, management, knowledge and foreign policy",
37
and as experimental ground for the economic reform and development of
the PRC46.
At present, there are five SEZs, including Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and
Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, and the
whole Hainan Province. The characteristics of the SEZs are as
follows:
(a) a more favourable climate for foreign investment is created
including the preferential tax treatment, better public
facilities and so on;
(b) the manufactured goods are intended to be exported; and more
importantly,
(c) the operation of the SEZs is in a manner similar to a free market
economy.
The market forces play a dominant role in the SEZs. Foreign
invesment enterprises (joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries), whose
outputs in Shenzhen, Zhouhai, Shantou and Xiament account more than
half of the total industrial outputs of these four Zones 47 , together
with other Chinese enterprises in the SEZs have their freedom in
operating their business.
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5. Reform of Foreign Trade System
Traditionally, China's foreign trade system has been highly
restrictive and protective ever since the establishment of the
Peoples' Republic. The main characteristics of such system include:
(a) State-monopolised foreign trade, only state-owned enterprises,
not any other enterprises, were empowered to undertake foreign
trade business;
(b) very few (12 national import and export companies to the date of
1978) companies were designed to undertake foreign trade business
in a clear intention of ending internal competitions;
(c) there was an absolute separation between the domestic market and
the international market, no contacts between domestic
manufacturers or other end-users and the international market,
and no relations between domestic prices and international
prices;
(d) there was a mixture function of foreign trade enterprises of
administration of foreign trade and managing the business. It
not only would sign the trade contract, but would also ensure
license and make foreign trade plan (which would then be a part
of national plan);
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(e) the foreign trade enterprises were not run for profits, but to
fulfil the targets set by the State plan, and sometimes to
implement foreign policy48.
This traditional foreign trade system, largely copied from the
Soviet Union, has been fundamentally changed since the 1979 reform.
The reforms on the foreign trade system have mainly been undertaken in
the following areas:
(1) The reform of the foreign trade planning system
China regards the import-export plan as an important means of
macro-economic guidance and for the smooth development of foreign
trade. Before 1979, the import-export plan was compulsory in nature,
it attained legal effect, and had to be fulfilled. Through the
import-export plan, the government could directly control foreign
trade49 . Since 1979, the totally mandatory foreign trade planning has
been replaced correspondingly by mandatory planning, guidance planning
and adjustment through market forces. A guidance plan has no legally
compulsory nature, and it functions by economic levers. Up to 1984,
there were over 3,000 items of products under a mandatory foreign
trade plan, such items have now been reduced to just over a dozen as a
result of continuing economic reform 50 , all others are either under
guidance plan or under adjustment through market forces.
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(2) Reform of Foreign Trade Monopoly
China's reform on the foreign trade system began mainly by
decentralising the management of foreign trade. Instead of the highly
centralised management by national foreign trade enterprises under the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, foreign trade enterprises of various levels
have been established in order to break foreign trade monopoly51 . Up
to 1988, over 5000 import-export corporations had been approved by the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) 52 . In
addition, some large and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises are
empowered to engage in exporting their own products and importing raw
materials for their own use53 . Joint ventures and foreign
subsidiaries are also entitled to export their products and imports
capital goods 54 . State foreign trade monopoly by a few national
import-export corporations has been changed. Various business
channels have emerged in the course of foreign trade reform.
(3) Reforms of Foreign Trade Administration
While decentralising the foreign trade operation, the Chinese
government decided in 1984 to further reform the foreign trade system
to improve macro-economic control and the administrative system, ie,
to rationally regulate foreign trade mainly by making use of exchange
rates, customs duties, taxes and credits55.
The MOFERT and its subordinate departments (or commissions) of
the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities exercise
40
administrative control over foreign trade. The MOFERT is the
functional department of the government of the country in charge of
56
external economic relations and trade . It is responsible for making
and amending regulations; drawing up long-term and annual
import-export plans; organising bilateral and multilateral trade
negotiations; concluding trade agreements; approving the establishment
of foreign economic and trade enterprises; exercising import and
export licensing system, and engaging in international market research
and exchanging and disseminating information. The local departments
of foreign economic relations and trade administer and supervise
foreign trade of the area under their respective jurisdictions in
accordance with the authorisation of MOFERT57 . Establishment of
provincial and municipal foreign trade enterprises should be approved
by the department of foreign economic relations and trade of the
province concerned with prior consent from and reporting to the MOFERT
for recording purposes.
(4) Reform of tariff system
Instead of direct control of foreign trade, China gradually
starts to employ economic levers, such as customs duties, to
indirectly regulate foreign trade. In order to encourage export, and
ensure to the import of the high technological products which China is
unable to produce, or is insufficiently supplied domestically, China
adopts a principle that duty-free or low duty rates shall be applied
to the above-mentioned products, whereas to those products which can
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be produced domestically or which are not essential for the national
economy and people's livelihood, higher duty rates shall be applied
China also adopts a system of two sets of import duty rates, that
is, a set of minimum duty rates and another set of general duty rates.
The minimum rates apply to the imports originating in the countries
with which China has concluded trade treaties or agreements containing
most-favoured-nation clauses; whereas the general rates apply to
imports originating in the countries with which China has not
concluded such trade treaties or agreements59.
It is submitted that although China's policy of its customs
tariff may be consistent with its level of economic development, the
reform on the tariff system should go further to enable it to be
consistent with GA'fl provisions as China is applying GATT membership,
particularly if China wants to apply a customs tariff commitment as a
major commitment for exchange of the membership.
(5) Licensing Systeii
The reform of the licensing system is also under way. First of
all, as the licensing is a more viable measure than, for example,
foreign exchange control in international trade, and is commonly used
in the international community, China now is using licensing to
regulate foreign trade, which was not necessary during the period when
a State foreign trade plan had the nature of a mandatory order which
had to be obeyed. China regards the licensing system as an important
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means to ensure the smooth development of foreign trade. It applied
import licensing to 42 kinds of commodities, the value of which
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accounts for about one third of the total value of China s imports
Secondly, although China's licensing system is not an automatic
one, no general and specific quotas have been imposed on the imports.
The insurance of license depends on the availability of foreign
exchange, and the foreign trade policy and plan.
Thirdly, the MOFERT is the State body responsible for issuing
import licenses. Nine items are restricted to be issued by the MOFERT
itself only61 . All other products, if import licensing is required,
the MOFERT, its special commissioner offices in Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Tianjin and Dalian (four most important ports in China), and
provincial departments of foreign economic relations and trade may
issue the licenses. The decentralised administration of licensing may
help to relax foreign trade control 62 . Some parts of China are
adopting the practice of auctioning its quoted licences in textiles
which gives foreign trade companies a chance to compete for the
licences.
As an administrative means, the licensing system has functioned
as a barrier to international trade and although there are no specific
quotas for particular products, the Chinese government administers the
license rather arbitrarily. It is desirable to further limit the
number of items requiring import end export licences in order to
enable China's foreign trade system to be consistent with its more
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marketlised economy, and also to be consistent with the GATT
provisions.
(6) Foreign Exchmge Control
China exercises centralised control over its foreign exchange.
That is because of China's developing economy, and its shortage of
foreign exchange. Since 1979, however, China has gradually reformed
its foreign exchange system. First, the system of total allotment of
foreign exchange by the State has been replaced by a retention system.
In 1979, the State began to grant foreign exchange quotas, within
which foreign exchange can be purchased by those local authorities and
enterprises that have sold their foreign exchange earning to the State
Administration of Exchange Control or its branch offices, in
proportion to the amount of their sales according to the State
regulation. They keep foreign exchange quota accounts respectively
with SAEC or its branch offices and can purchase foreign exchange from
a State bank to meet their needs within the specified scope of usage.
This measure helps strengthen the vitality of enterprises, enlarge
their decision-making power regarding importing from abroad and bring
63their initiative into full play
In line with the foreign exchange control rAform, some sort of
foreign exchange dealings have been permitted. Because of the foreign
exchange retention system, some enterprises might have surplus foreign
exchange quotas, while others might be in need of foreign exchange.
To facilitate the flow of surplus foreign exchange quotas between
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enterprises so as to invigorate the economy, enterprises with surplus
quotas are permitted to sell the surplus to those enterprises that
need foreign exchanges. However, direct dealings of foreign exchange
between enterprises are restricted, and the selling and buying shall
be conducted through SAECs or the Bank of China 64 . Eventually foreign
exchange adjustment centres have been set up across the country.
Foreign investment enterprises and selected State-owned enterprisc's
are allowed to buy and sell their foreign exchanges at the market
65	 . .
price in these centres . Those qualified enterprises can use their
RMB currency to buy hard currencies if they so need. The
establishment of foreign exchange adjustment centres has greatly
relieved griefs of foreign exchange shortage in some enterprises.
However, China's foreign exchange control system is still highly
central controlled, although it is acceptable to the IMF according to
China's level of economic development, it shall nevertheless be
further reformed. For example, more enterprises and individuals shall
be allowed to enter into the foreign exchange market in order to
enable them access to foreign exchanges. Because the Renminbi
(Chinese currency) is a non-convertible currency, the exchange rate of
the Renminbi is fixed by the SAEC. Such a system should also be
further reformed in accordance with the reform of whole economy.
The above analysis shows that China is no longer a traditional
non-market economy country; market force now plays an important role
in distribution of resources, and in its international trade.
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C. Classification of China as a Non-Market Economy by the EEC
In the EEC international trade framework, China has been
classified as a non-market economy country (or State-trading country).
As discussed above, the concept of non-market economy is not an
accurate one in describing the economic system in China any more.
This over-simplified classification fails to address the situation of
the changing economic structure and system for countries like China.
The international trade system based on such hypothesis is unfair and
unrealistic. The fundamental core of such classification is that it
hides the reality that China is a developing country. The Community,
therefore, deprives China of the rights she ought to enjoy as a
developing country.
The Community's method of deciding NNE has further compounded the
unfairness of the treatment towards China. The Community institutions
had neither set the criteria of the NNE, nor said anything publicly on
the irrationality of the NtIE; what the Community has done in deciding
which country is a non-market economy is simply to produce a list of
countries which give no definitions or clarification at all. In such
a way the Community had as early as 1970 singled out 12 countries as
66State-trading countries . In 1974, when the trade agreements between
Member States of the Community and the countries concerned were due to
expire at the end of 1974, the Council of the Community decided to
make the point that it was ready to negotiate new agreements with
State-trading countries, by forwarding an outline agreement to the
countries involved 67 . In its anti-dumping regulations, the Community
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again simply referred to countries which had been addressed by
Regulations of (EEC) No. 1765/82 and 1766/82 as State-trading
68
countries
The Community's approach of enumeration has the advantage of
relieving the Commission from the burden of having to determine in
each case whether it considers certain countries to be non-market
economies. But such an approach has obvious disadvantages insofar as
the interested countries are concerned. First, there is a lack of
objective criteria and careful analysis of a particular economy; the
decision is arbitrary, without granting the country concerned a chance
to discuss or contest. Secondly, it is less flexible and less
adaptable in reflecting changes in the economic structure and system
of the countries concerned. This is particularly true taking into
consideration changes in the economic structure and system in China
over the last ten years. Consequently, this rigid approach and
inability to respond to changes in the countries concerned has made
the Community become increasingly apparent of protectionism and
discriminatory against China. The failure of recognising China's
changes in its economic structure in the EEC side not only discourages
trade and economic relations between China and the EEC, but may also
discourage China's further development towards a more market
orientated economy.
International trade law, particularly that applied by the
European Community, has so far failed to develop rules to deal with
countries such as China. There is little rule in the GATT to deal
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with State-trading countries, and there is no objective criteria in
international trade law to define what is a non-market economy and
what is a free market economy in international trade. It leaves,
therefore, great discretion for the Community to decide how to deal
with China. By putting China into the category of non-market economy,
the Community is able to accord China with less favour than even
non-member developed countries despite the fact that China is a
developing country. By adopting the approach of enumeration, the
Community has failed to respond to China's changes over the last ten
years.
The classification of China as a non-market economy is, of
course, not a purely legal or economic issue. It is also a political
issue. That explains why Yugoslavia has been classified as a free
market economy, but Hungary or China has not. Only the change of
policy by the governments of the Member States of the European
Community would change the Community's position in this regard. Such
a decision would certainly reflect a general policy choice rather than
a decision based on legal arguments. Until the Member States consider
that, China will still be classified as a State-trading country, and
thus continue to be treated with unfavorable discrimination.
D. Conclusion
The concept of non-market economy is not an accurate description
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of the economic reality in the countries concerned, nor has it
sufficient ground to enable the legal framework of international trade
involving the parties in question to be built on such hypothesis.
The over-simplified concept fails, in particular, to address the
economic reality in countries like China, which is a developing
country on the one hand, and is undertaking economic reform on the
other. By reforming its State plan, ownership and management of
enterprises and the foreign trade system, China is on its way to a
more mixed economy.
The Community's methods of deciding NNE have further compounded
the unfairness of treatment towards China. By enumerating the
countries as NMEs, the Community does not give the countries concerned
a chance to contest; such a way also lacks flexibility in responding
to the changes taking place in China.
By categorising China as a NME, the Community is able to accord
China with less favourable terms in bilateral trade than other
non-member countries, therefore, depriving the right China ought to
enjoy as a developing country.
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LEGAL REGIME UNDER THE 1978 TRADE AGREEMENT
After more than two years of discussion and negotiation a trade
agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's
Republic of China (the "Agreement") was concluded on April 3, 1978.
The Agreement outlined the general legal framework for Sino-EEC
bilateral trade relations. Although the scope of the Agreement was
limited, and certain key issues had not been addressed, it represents
the first occasion on which the EEC and China have made an effort to
establish a legal regime for bilateral trade. In fact, the Agreement
represents a breakthrough. For the Community, this is the first trade
agreement to be concluded with a State-trading country; the political
and economic importance should not be underestimated. For China, the
European Community is not only an increasingly important and reliable
trade partner, but also an increasingly important balancing power
outside the super-power poles. The Agreement ensured the healthy
development and rapid increase of bilateral economic exchanges. It
was the most important development following the establishment of an
official relationship between China and the European Community in
1975. This chapter will analyse the principal features of the
Agreement in the context of the legal regime which governs it,
comparing this Agreement with trade agreements between China and other
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countries, and trade agreements between the Community and other
countries. The discussion, among others, includes a consideration of
the MFN clause, the balance of trade provision, the safeguard clause
and the establishment of the Joint Committee.
A. The NFN Clause
1. History
The concept of the Most-Favoured-Nation (the "MFN") clause was
not new to the Chinese. In the course of their attack on the Chinese
Empire in the last century, the Western nations, led by Great Britain,
as well as Russia and Japan, used the unilateral MFN clause to gain
privileges and concessions, such as the granting of territory through
.1
lease arrangements and extraterritorial jurisdiction . This was
regarded by the Chinese people as a malevolence perpetrated against
China2 . However, the MFN clause has been utilised by the People's
Republic of China in the l950s, 1960s and early 1970s, to circumvent
discriminatory policies by some countries 3 , in particular to surmount
4
the embargo imposed upon China by the United States , and further to
expand foreign trade from the late 1970s.
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2. Features of the Clause
In the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement, a IIFN clause was
incorporated, enabling parties to accord each other the MFN treatment.
Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement provides:-
"In their trade relations, the two Contracting Parties shall
accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters
regarding: -
(a) customs duties and charges of all kinds applied to the import,
export, re-export or transit of products, including the
procedures for the collection of such duties or charges;
(b) regulations, procedures and formalities concerning customs
clearance, transit, warehousing and transshipment of products
imported or exported;
(c) taxes and other internal charges levied directly or indirectly on
products or services imported or exported;
(d) administrative formalities for the issues of import or export
"5licences.
According to the Agreement, the MFN treatment between China and
the Community does not cover the privileges extended to other
countries under international commodity agreements; advantages
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accorded to states which, together with the Community or China, are
members of a customs union or free trade area; and the special
treatment towards the territorial neighbourhood6.
2.1 Restrictions
This MFN treatment clause is highly restrictive compared with the
GATT MFN obligations, which include "any advantages, favour, privilege
or immunity." 7 The exclusion in the MFN clause of favoured treatment
to other members of customs union or free trade area, or to
neighbouring countries has effectively prevented China from
benefiting, not only from the GATT member benefits, but also from all
advantages and favours t)le Community has granted to, for example, ACP
countries under the Rome Convention8 , EFTA countries 9 and
Mediterranean countries' 0 . Since all main trading countries,
including industrialised countries and developing countries (except
some Eastern European countries), are included in various global or
multilateral or bilateral arrangements, by which these countries get
one or another trade advantage, China is in fact being put in a most
disadvantageous position in trading with the Community". Although
China demanded, in the negotiations, that the European Community MFN
treatment should be extended to China in the same way as to the GATT
countries, the Community has successfully persuaded China to accept a
less open MFN treatment clause on the ground that China was not a
member of the GATT12.
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The scope of the MFN clause in the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement
is narrower than that of the 1974 China-Japan Trade Agreement 13
 and
the 1979 China-USA Trade Agreement' 4 . In the 1974 China-Japan Trade
Agreement, for example, in addition to the MFN treatment in areas as
provided in the EEC-China Agreement, Article 2 also ensures the MFN
treatment reciprocally in connection with the exemption of tariffs,
domestic taxes and other surcharges for six categories of commodities
brought only temporarily into the territory 15 . The China-Japan Trade
Agreement also grants the MFN treatment to the commodities of the
other signatory party in transit whenever the said commodities are
transported by the other party through the territory of the party
concerned to the territory of a third party' 6 . Furthermore, in
respect of matters concerning payments, remittances and transfers of
funds each contracting party agrees not to treat juridical and natural
persons of the other party less favourably than juridical and natural
persons of any third country'7.
The MFN clause contained in the 1979 China-USA Trade Agreement
ocvers the same ground as that covered in the EEC-China Trade
Agreement. However, it also includes "all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting all aspects of internal sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of imported products." 18
 The
China-USA Trade Agreement also provides that, in the event of either
contracting party applying quantitative restrictions to certain
products originating in or exported to any third country or region, it
shall afford to all like products originating in or exported to the
other country treatment which is equitable to that afforded to such
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third country or region 19 Moreover, the agreement incorporates a
provision to the effect that the contracting parties agree to offer
reciprocal concessions with regard to trade and service, particularly
20
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
In comparison with these two agreements, the most striking
restriction in the EEC-China Trade Agreement is that, notwithstanding
the MNF treatment, the European Community is still imposing a
discriminatory quantitative restriction on a substantial number of
products originating in China 21 . The MFN treatment, coupled with a
substantial number of imports subject to quantitative restrictions,
ironically has, therefore, been completely diluted and extremely
limited.
In its trade agreements with other developing countries, the
European Community has taken a more sympathetic and liberal attitude,
not mentioning the generous trade advantages to 66 developing ACP
countries. In trade agreements with two leading developing countries,
India and Brazil, for example, the European Community has accorded a
full scale of GATT MFN treatment 22 , without adding a special list of
products which are subject to quantitative restrictions, and which are
discriminatory only to each of them. Even in the Trade Agreement with
Romania, a country which is also classified as a State-trading country
(concluded in 1980 in industrial products), a special reference to the
GATT provisions was made in order to enable Romania to enjoy the GATT
23
MFN treatment subject to the conditions in the Accesses Protocol
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The limited scope of the MFN clause in the EEC-China Trade
Agreement is, on the face of it, because of China's non-membership of
the GATr. But in reality it reflects the Community's worries about
the possibility that China can produce massive amounts of low-priced
products with its rich natural resources and very cheap labour and
particularly because of China's economic system, and the difficulties
faced by the Community producers in penetrating the Chinese market
even with the I'IFN treatment.
2.2 Reasons for the Restrictions
The Community's hesitation and restriction is in some ways
understandable. Indeed, the Community has good reasons to restrict
the MFN clause to the extent which is acceptable to it, because the
operation of the MFN clause in relations between a market economy and
a non-market economy is not a simple matter.
The MFN clause was devised to frustrate discrimination between
goods of different origin competing in essentially free markets by
assuring equal treatment as regards customs, taxation and cost of
transportation, inasmuch as these matters are controlled by
government. The MFN clause presumes a comparable level of government
intervention in counterpart countries so that imports from countries
covered by the clause would have a fair chance to compete. But the
clause works differently in a typical non-market economy country
where, instead of the market force, imports and exports are controlled
by the plan which determines types, origin and distribution of goods,
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thus in practice minimising the element of competition . Although
China is now reforming its economic system and is moving towards
having a mixed economy, when the EEC-China Trade Agreement was
negotiated and concluded, however, China was a typical non-market
25
economy
Theoretically, the control of the Community (and its Member
States) over matters of commerce was less pervasive than that
exercised in China. The Chinese government, to some extent, was able
to control the sale, distribution, storage and use of the goods
imported from the Community, whereas in the Community, these same
aspects of trade operations were the responsibility of the Member
States' buyers and importers. The Community and the Member States
were generally unable to prescribe methods for storing, use, sale or
distribution of Chinese commodities.
Furthermore, when the tariff on imports from China was reduced in
the Community, the likely consequence (provided other conditions
remained constant) was that importers and buyers in the Community
would increase their purchases from China. By contrast, decisions on
imports in China were not only affected by tariff reduction, but also
by the State plan, the availability of foreign exchange and sometimes
even by political considerations 26 . All the above discussions show
that the European Community has sufficient grounds to take a more
restrictive attitude towards China. However, the Community in this
regard has failed to address two important issues. First, China is a
developing country. Some measures adopted by China in its economic
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operation, and particularly in its foreign trade operation, are not
27far different from what other developing countries are doing . To
accord China the same treatment as to the USSR is actually depriving
China, as a developing country, of the rights she ought to enjoy in
international trade 28
. Secondly, over the last ten years, China's
economic system, including the foreign trade system, has undergone a
drastic change and to a certain extent the foreign trade monopoly has
been broken. The Chinese government has not been able to control
foreign trade to the same degree as it did before reform. Chinese
exporters and importers must be business-minded and look after their
commercial interests themselves. Ironically enough when China
decentralised its trade in silks to allow producers and local traders
to trade rather than the China National Silk Import and Export
Corporation to have a monopoly as it traditionally had done since
1949, it was the Europeans who protested to China and requested the
Chinese Government to recentralise the silk trade in order to get more
and more of the scarce resources and to keep the price stable29.
Legal mechanics adopted in the Trade Agreement (and the subsequent
Trade and Co-operation Agreement) have so far failed to respond to
these changes. The mechanics, based on the Community's proposal, are
a combination of an old approach and a new form of compromise.
2.3 Different Forms of the Commitment
As early as 1927 a model form of commitment to purchase specific
amounts of particular commodities over a fixed period, as a supplement
to the !IFN clause, was introduced in the Soviet-Latvian Commercial
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Treaty . This model has been applied in other agreements, for
example, in the 1975 US-Soviet Union Grain Agreement 31
 and the 1980
US-Chinese Grain Agreement 32 . But more often than not, in the trade
agreements between the market economy countries and the non-market
economy countries, a general MFN clause on the framework of tariff
matters will be included, plus a general promise from the non-market
economy to increase or promote bilateral trade. There is normally no
inter-governmental determination of what will constitute the bilateral
trade33 . This is the approach adopted by the China-USA 1979 Trade
Agreement34 . By contrast, the China-Japan long-term Trade Agreement,
concluded in the same year as the EEC-China Trade Agreement, has
followed a different route 35 . This agreement is based on the spirit
of the China-Japan Communiqué of 197236 and the China-Japan Trade
Agreement of l974. The agreement provides for each party to sell
$10 billion of specified goods to the other and to buy $10 billion of
specified goods from the other over the period between 1978 and
381985 . What made the agreement a breakthrough is the commitment by
39
each side to make the scheduled purchases from the other . The
agreement was not, however, inter-governmental, although it was signed
on both sides by government-related officials. The agreement
nevertheless had the clear support of the two governments 40 . The
relationship between the business world and the governments of the
Member States of the Community, or the Community itself is far less
close than the relationship between the business world and the
government of Japan. It is almost impossible for the Community to
conclude a trade agreement of this kind with China. It is also beyond
the competence of the Community to make a concrete commitment to buy
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and sell specific commodities in specified amounts over a fixed time
(except in relation to textiles, which will be discussed later).
Arguably, such practice is also inconsistent with GAIT principles. It
will be one of the concerns for the GATT contracting parties in
negotiating China's membership. It is submitted that such practice
should be abolished or conducted within the GATT rules once China has
resumed its membership in the GATT.
Thus, in the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement, a general framework
with a highly restrictive MFN clause is adopted. The Community in
this respect acts on the quantitative restriction of goods imported
from China on similar lines to the quantitative restriction against
other State-trading countries, notwithstanding the MFN treatment
clause in the Trade Agreement 41 . A clear provision to prevent
discriminatory quantitative restrictions, which was included in the
1979 China-USA Trade Agreement42 , does not appear in the EEC-China
Trade Agreement. Instead, the European Community promises to strive
for an increasing liberalisation of imports from China. "To this end
it will endeavour progressively to introduce measures extending the
list of products for which imports from China have been liberalised
and to increase the amount of quotas"43.
As discussed above, a simple MFN clause with a tariff concession
in a trade agreement between a non-market economy and a market economy
may not work in the normal way. In return for the limited NFN
treatment and the commitment to a progressive liberalisation of
imports and raising the ceiling of quotas from China by the Community,
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China promises to give favourable consideration to imports from the
Community. "T this end the competent Chinese authorities will ensure
that Community exporters have the possibility of participating fully
in opportunities for trade with China."44
3. Implications and limitations of the NFN clause
3.1 Implications
There was an allegation that "the most-favoured-nation clause
cannot achieve an increase in trade" when it involves non-market
economy countries45 . This allegation seems questionable. It is not
supported by relevant experiences. First of all, the MFN treatment
does help to increase trade between the parties concerned. The
reduction of tariffs not only enables the importers in the market
economy countries to import more, but also enables the foreign trade
corporations in the non-market economy country to import more
(although this increase may prove to be modest) subject to other
conditions such as the availability of foreign exchanges. Secondly,
in a decentralised non-market economy country, such as China, the
monopoly on foreign trade is decreasing. Corporations involved in
foreign trade are independent legal persons which must learn to be
business-minded and responsible for their own profits or losses 	 So
tariff reductions on imports matter increasingly. Indeed, these
corporations are always on the lookout for foreign suppliers with more
competitive commercial conditions. Thirdly, even though the
government of a non-market economy country plays a more prominent role
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than that of a market economy country in respect of bilateral trade,
an MFN treatment clause demands a certain approach. This should
create a better chance for increasing bilateral trade than if MFN
treatment were not required.
The NFN treatment between the European Community and China is
therefore not only politically important for both parties, but also
important for improving bilateral trade relations and economic
co-operation.
The most significant effect of the MFN treatment as set out in
the Agreement will be the removal of existing discriminatory tariff
barriers. This will have striking implications for at least some
products. The MFN treatment also paves the way for further
development of bilateral trade and economic co-operation between the
EEC and China. Since the Trade Agreement was concluded, there has
been an enormous increase in trade between the Community and China46
3.2 Limitations
The MFN treatment clause as such nevertheless has limitations.
Its economic importance is diluted by its restrictive nature and by
the fact that the Community still imposes quantitative restrictions on
many Chinese products. As far as Chini is concerned, the control of
foreign exchange is a more effective way of controlling foreign trade.
European exporters, therefore, will still face difficulties in
entering the Chinese market. On the other hand, the removal of the
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discriminatory tariff by the Community may have only a modest overall
effect on the level of Chinese exports to the EEC at this stage, since
China is still a developing country. The large bulk of these exports
will no doubt continue to consist of raw materials, primary products
and semi-manufactured products, to which tariffs are not a significant
obstacle. Similarly, Chinese manufacturers may continue to find it
difficult to penetrate the EEC markets, even after the MFN treatment
is provided, unless the Community removes its restrictions on imports
from China and provides more favourable terms for imports from China.
The commitments made by both sides in Article 4 of the Agreement
may also prove to be contentious47 . On the EEC side, it promises to
strive for an increasing liberalisation of imports from China, but
how, when and to what extent? All these are left to be decided by the
European Community. Action is then taken unilaterally. The Community
may increase quotas and introduce measures extending the list of
liberalised products substantially as it did during the first two
years after the Trade Agreement48 . However, it is open to the
Community to do little about the quotas and the liberalisation of the
products. This was the 1980-1983 EEC trade policy towards China. On
the Chinese side, it promises to give favourable consideration to
imports from the Community but, again, what does this mean? According
to the agreement the "favourable consideration" commitment is
unilateral, and this is borne out by China's trade policy. In 1980,
for instance, when China faced difficulties in its internal
re-adjustment, it reduced the rate of growth of trade with the
Community.
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The provisions of Article 4 seek to avoid possible disadvantages
to the contracting parties in bilateral and multilateral trade
relations and to increase trade. The inclusion of Article 4 was
hailed as "the first time such a clause has been incorporated in a
"49trade agreement.	 However, the commitment under these provisions
involves basically unilateral action and allows great elasticity.
What is entailed very much depends on the balance of payments and the
economic environment generally of both sides and on the bargaining
power in future negotiations. In this regard, the Agreement has
failed to provide a more concrete, less unilateral, and therefore more
meaningful commitment to promote trade between them. A provision like
this is far from legally binding (see discussions in the next
Chapter). The operation of bilateral trade depends on each party's
goodwill, on the one hand, and on the discussions and negotiations in
the annual Joint Committee meeting established under the Agreement, or
through other channels, on the other.
Furthermore, the arrangement in Article 4 throws international
trade back to the stage of bilateralism and barter, which is
inconsistent with the MFN spirit and also contradictory to the GATT
principles. It places other trading partners with China in a
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the European Community if the
promise of "favourable consideration" has to be fulfilled. As China
is now applying for membership of the GATT, such an arrangement will
be reviewed in accordance with the GAI'T principle of non-
discrimination. Indeed the whole Trade Agreement will be reviewed
under the GATT rules. The real battleground for establishing a more
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committed, legally binding trade regime in trade with China is on the
negotiating table in the GA1"I. The arrangement in the EEC-China Trade
Agreement, therefore, is a temporary transient one.
Conclusion
1. The MFN treatment in the Trade Agreement is the cornerstone
of the EEC-China bilateral trade. The granting of such treatment has
both economic and political importance. It aims to expand trade and
economic relations, and to strengthen good political relations. It
has achieved its aims in such a way that it has promoted bilateral
trade and economic relations and it has strengthened both parties'
economic and political relations.
2. However, the MFN clause in the Trade Agreement is highly
restrictive. It excludes, for example, the favourable treatment to
other members of custom union or free trade area, or to neighbouring
countries. Because of the very nature of the Community's trade
policy, the Community granted advantages to EFTA countries, to ACP
countries and to Mediterranean countries, but because China is not a
member of the GATT, she has effectively been excluded from all these
trade advantages that the Community grants to its trading partners.
China is, therefore, in a most disadvantageous position in trading
with the Community.
3. Furthermore, apart from the relatively disadvantageous
position vis-a-vis other trade partners, even more strikingly, the
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Community still imposes discriminatory quantitative restrictions on a
substantial number of imports from China. The MFN treatment,
therefore, has been completely diluted and extremely limited.
4. The ironic discriminatory application of MFN treatment is, on
the face of it, because of China's non-membership of the GATT. But in
reality, such a policy reflects the Community's worries that China may
be able to produce massive quantities of low-priced products with its
rich natural resources and very cheap labour, particularly because of
its economic system. Thus, the restrictive application is not only
for economic reasons, but also for political reasons.
5. In order to remedy the situation, the European Community
promises to introduce measures extending the list of products not
subject to quantitative restrictions, and to increase the amount of
quotas. China, on the other hand, promises to give favourable
consideration to imports from the Community, and to ensure that
Community exporters have the possibility of participating fully in
opportunities for trade with China. Such an arrangement, it is
submitted, is subject to unilateral action on both sides, and allows
great elasticity. In the end, the discussions and negotiations in
annual joint committee meetings may play a decisive role in annual
trade arrangements. Furthermore, such an arrangement is inconsistent
with the GATT principles. Once China joins the GATT the whole
arrangement has to be reviewed. In this respect such an arrangement
is temporary. The real battleground for establishing a more committed
trade regime with China is on the negotiating table in the GATT.
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B. Balance of Trade Clause
The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement also incorporated a special
clause to attain balance in their trade. Article 3 of the agreement
stipulates that the two contracting parties will make every effort to
foster the harmonious expansion of their reciprocal trade and to help,
each by its own means, to attain a balance in such trade. It is
agreed that should an obvious imbalance arise, the matter must be
examined by the Joint Committee, which will be established in
accordance with the agreement, so that measures can be recommended in
order to improve the situation50.
China's foreign trade strategy was and still is to maintain its
capacity to be able to pay for its growing import requirements through
increased exportation51 . Since China is a developing country, export
accounts for China's main foreign exchange earnings; and because the
Chinese currency is not convertible, foreign exchange earnings, to a
large extent, decide its ability to import. From the establishment of
the People's Republic in 1949 till 1984 China managed to maintain a
52
basic balance in its imports and exports . However, its trade with
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the European Community suffered a chronic deficit . China,
therefore, seeks a remedy in the Trade Agreement. The Chinese
delegation at the negotiations for the agreement proposed that, in
addition to the formal inclusion of provisions aimed at balanced
trade, a separate clause should be added under which a corrective
mechanism would automatically and promptly come into effect to restore
54
the balance whenever necessary . The Community did not accept this
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proposal. In the Community's view, there is no absolute balance of
international trade. Trade surpluses or deficits are the natural
result of market operation; it is the proper function of market
competition. The EEC-China Trade Agreement will not disrupt the
market operation. Furthermore, all developing countries are running
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trade deficits and China should not be an exception . The result of
negotiation is a compromise, the final provisions in the Agreement are
considerably diluted. Firstly, there are no precise rules to prevent
imbalance and, secondly, no binding obligation for the contracting
parties to reverse an imbalance. Each of the parties is to attain a
balance of trade "by its own means"56.
This clause has attracted favourable attention from both sides57.
However, the effect of the clause is very limited. Bilateral trade
during the first five years after the Trade Agreement was roughly
58balanced , but from 1984 to 1986 China incurred an enormous trade
deficit with the EEC. China's deficit in trade with the Community was
ECU 298 million in l984, but in 1985 the amount was as high as
US$3,346.2 million and in 1986 it reached US$5,464.8 million60.
The demand for the balance of trade clause in the Trade Agreement
was also inspired by the Chinese experience of trade with Japan. The
trade agreement China concluded with Japan in 1974 did not provide any
61balance expansion machinery . Subsequently, China has suffered
62	 .	 .
serious trade deficits with Japan . This lesson led China to insist
on a balance of trade clause in the 1978 Trade Agreement with the EEC
and with the USA in the following year63.
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The balance of trade clause in the Agreement is, again, a result
of compromise. It was incorporated on China's insistence. Although
its legal and actual effect may be doubtful, it nevertheless serves
two functions: first, it gives either party a ground to demand the
other party to do something, for example, to increase imports from the
other party in order to attain a trade balance; more importantly, it
also gives the contracting party a solid ground to attain a trade
balance "by its own means", which may include reducing imports from
the other party, as China did in 1987, to reduce its trade deficits
vis-a-vis the European Community64.
It is submitted that in respect of trade balances in general, the
Community's view is more acceptable: there is no possibility (and no
necessity) to keep an absolute balance of international trade.
However, as far as the EEC-China trade reality is concerned, the
Community imposes quantitative restrictions on imports from China on
the one hand, and the Community enjoys a chronic trade surplus on the
other. This is by no means a fair trade practice. The balance of
trade clause under such circumstances may seem to be necessary. But
the solution, in the author's view, is not to further improve the
balance of trade clause to the extent required by the Chinese
negotiators, rather, it is necessary to review the whole MFN clause,
to revoke the discriminatory quantitative restrictions and to allow
the market mechanism to have full play. The relative balance of trade
after competition is more healthy. The balance of trade set by the
Chinese government or the Commission through administrative means is
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inconsistent with the GATT rules, and is against the principle of
comparative advantages.
The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement also confirms that the
contracting parties will do all they can to improve the structure of
their trade in order to diversify it further 65 . As China is a
developing country, its main exports will initially be primary
products, and its imports, manufactured goods. Trade diversification
will be beneficial not only for the short-term development of a
balance in bilateral trade, but also for promoting China's economic
development. It, in turn, serves to develop bilateral trade relations
on a more stable basis. But this provision is no more than an
expression of goodwill. Under the provisions, the Community does not
undertake, in a legal sense, anything at all. Whether the bilateral
trade can be further diversified largely depends on the performance of
Chinese exporters and, indeed, on China's industrial development.
C. The Safeguard Clause
Not infrequently the safeguard clause becomes the centre of the
contention in bilateral and multilateral or global trade
arrangements 66 . This was also the situation in the context of the
EEC-China Trade Agreement. Only after hard negotiation and
compromises on both sides 67
 has a much diluted safeguard clause been
concluded in the agreement.
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1. The Conclusion of the Safeguard Clause
It is the Community's practice to include a safeguard clause in
agreements with non-members following the GATT "escape clause"
model68 . As China is not a GATT member, and is classified by the
European Community as a State-trading country, the Community simply
could not accept any sort of trade agreement without a safeguard
clause. On the other hand China at first resisted the inclusion of a
safeguard clause which would permit the Community to take necessary
measures in the event of an emergency 69 . China considered that other
methods might be available to limit imports from the Community in case
of necessity, whereas the Community regarded it as vital to have a
safeguard clause in the trade agreement with China in order to
re-introduce quotas or take other measures in case of emergency. Of
course, under the regime of the MFN treatment, the Community maintains
quantitative restrictions on imports from China; it does not give up
the right to re-introduce the quotas on products which have previously
been liberalised, if necessary. But, with a safeguard clause, the
Community's position is consolidated. At the Community's insistence
in negotiation a safeguard clause was finally included in the
Agreement70.
Instead of a GATT-modelled safeguard clause, Article 5 of the
Agreement sets up an obligation, at China's insistence 71 , that there
should be "friendly consultation" before any safeguard measure is
taken with regard to any problems that may arise in the implementation
of the agreement. There is, however, an exception "where the
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situation does not admit any delay". In this event, either
contracting party is entitled to take measures, but must endeavour as
far as possible to engage in friendly consultation before doing so.
It is also provided that when such measures are taken, the general
objectives of the agreement should not be prejudiced72.
2. Bilaterality and Flexibility
2.1 The European Community has striven for a selective application
of Article XIX of the GATT, against Japan particularly, since the
negotiations of the Tokyo Round73 . Because of resistance from all
developing countries and some developed countries of the GAU members,
the Community's intention of including a selective safeguard code
under the GATT law has not been fulfilled74.
The safeguard clause in the EEC-China Trade Agreement, however,
is by any standards bilateral and selective, as the Trade Agreement is
bilateral and China is not a member of the GATF. The safeguard action
taken especially against China in accordance with the safeguard clause
could not, therefore, be challenged according to the MFN and
non-discrimination principles under the GATT rules. This is an
advantage to the party who has strong economic power; in the present
case it is the European Community who benefits from such a safeguard
clause.
In the negotiations with the GATT on the issue of China resuming
its seat in the GATT, the European Community, joined by the United
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States, is pushing China to accept a selective safeguard clause in
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exchange for the GATT membership ticket . Such selective safeguard
clauses have been included in the Accession Protocols of Hungary,
Poland and Romania when they negotiated their admittance to the
GATT76 . Such clauses may legalise existing bilateral safeguard
clauses such as the one incorporated in the EEC-China Trade Agreement,
but will considerably reduce the importance of China's resumption of
the GATT seat.
2.2 The safeguard clause clearly gives a free hand to either party
to take protective measures as a last resort; it leaves various issues
open. Some of these issues are crucial. The result of this is that
the contracting parties find themselves with great discretion to
decide whether or not to take any action.
(a) First, the legal nature and effect of the pre-consultation
is vague. On the one hand, the consultation may be regarded as merely
a formality, since there is no obligation whatsoever to reach
agreement through the consultation. On the other hand, the
consultation procedure per se is somehow in doubt, because there is no
clear criterion for "situation does not admit any delay." In fact,
the Community's internal common rules in implementing the Trade
Agreement had totally ignored the requirement of consultation. It
authorised the Member States to take protective measures without
bothering to consult (see discussion in Chapter V). Furthermore,
there is no provision as to the medium through which the consultation
should take place. It may be presumed that the consultation is to
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take place within the Joint Committee established under the
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Agreement . However, the Joint Committee normally meets only once a
year. Moreover, the safeguard clause, like the constitution of the
Joint Committee in Article 9 of the Agreement, contains no detailed
procedural rules for the consultation. Freedom to regulate procedure
will thus belong to the party who initiates action; a factor which may
well weaken the function of the consultation.
In sum, the requirement for pre-consultations is intended to
prevent the arbitrary application of the safeguard clause. However,
in the context of the whole safeguard clause and the Agreement, the
pre-consultation requirement resembles a guard dog without teeth. More
specific provisions relating to the consultation are required and,
more importantly, clarification is needed of the legal nature and
effect of the consultation.
(b) Secondly, the safeguard clause fails to address a vitally
important issue, namely, the criteria relevant to the invocation of
the safeguard. Because there is no definition of "where the situation
does not admit any delay", the discretion, as discussed above, lies
with the party who wants to initiate the action.
Under the GATT law, for example, the appeal to the safeguard
clause is subject to strict conditions in order to prevent an all too
easy resort to protectionist measures 78 . Thus the injury threshold
(serious injury) in Article XIX is higher than the one applied in
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anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigation (material injury)
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pursuant to Article VI
The lack of details of the safeguard clause will allow the party
easily to trigger the safeguard action. It is in the Community's
interests to give itself great discretion in taking safeguard action
in order to prevent any possible market disruption by low-priced
Chinese products.
There is only one reported case involving protective measures.
This concerned beach slippers which originated in China and were
imported into France. According to information supplied by France,
the importation of beach slippers from China increased from 600,000
pairs in 1979 to 3,600,000 pairs in 1981, the market share of these
imports in France rising from 9.3% in 1979 to 36% in 198180. The
average price of Chinese beach slippers is about FFr5.50, while the
average ex-factory price of French beach slippers is around FFr9.8081.
The production of French beach slippers fell from 10,400,000 pairs in
1979 to 8,500,000 pairs in 1981, and the employment in the industry,
concentrated in the North-West of the country, fell from 2,500
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employed in 1979 to 1,900 in 1981 . The Commission concluded from
the above information that "significant injury" was being suffered by
French producers, and that a critical situation existed in respect of
which any delay would cause injury which would be difficult to remedy.
Immediate intervention was required in the interest of the
Community83 . Thus, the criterion applied here was "significant
injury", caused by the increase of imports and consequent rise in the
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market share of Chinese products and the fall in domestic production
and employment. In its internal rules the Community uses the term
"substantial injury" as a criterion84
 justifying safeguard action.
In fact, the criterion resembles more the injury threshold applicable
in the Community's anti-dumping proceedings. The injury threshold
applied in the safeguard action relating to Chinese products was lower
than the one established by the GATT which requires a proof of
"serious injury". Of course, it is arguable that there are not many
differences between "serious injury" and "substantial injury";
particularly when either party applies the protective action rather
arbitrarily as the Community did in the above-discussed case.
(c) Thirdly, it is unclear what measures may be taken by a
contracting party engaged in protective action. In the GAU it is
stipulated that the measures include the suspension of obligations, in
whole or in part, and the withdrawal or modification of the concession
granted by a contracting party under the GATT85 . These measures
generally include reversing tariff concessions, ie, increasing customs
duties and introducing quantitative restrictions 86 . In the EEC-China
Trade Agreement, if the Community were to take protective action, it
could, for example, reimpose quantitative restrictions, tighten
existing quotas or increase customs duty - the general commercial
measures available under Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. The safeguard
action taken against China in the matter discussed above, by the
European Community involved the reintroduction of quantitative
restrictions on beach slippers originating in China to be imported
87	 .into France . As far as China is concerned, the possible measures
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available to it include issuing import licences, foreign exchange
arrangements and limiting the purchase authority to specific companies
or specific products88
(d) Finally, the safeguard clause in the EEC-China Trade
Agreement does not mention the legal right of retaliation. In
contrast to this, the GATT safeguard clause entitles the affected
contracting parties, when a contracting party proposes to take
safeguard action, to retaliate, by suspending the equivalent tariff
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concession or other obligation under the GATT
In the event of unilateral action pursuant to the safeguard
clause in the EEC-China Trade Agreement, should the other party have
the right to retaliate? The right to retaliate is not expressly
granted by the safeguard clause in the Trade Agreement; nor is it
expressly excluded. In the only reported safeguard action taken by
the Community, China has not sought to retaliate. In practice,
however, the affected party can usually find a way out if it wants to
retaliate.
The omission of provisions relating to a right of retaliation
again reflects the interests of the European Community because of its
great economic strength vis-a-vis China. Such a practice may even be
regarded as the Community's tactics. However, China, as the biggest
developing country also holds a certain bargaining power It is not
without means of economic retaliation. For example, when the USA
unilaterally decided to lower textile quotas to China in 1983 after
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the failure of negotiations for a second China-USA textiles agreement,
China, in return, shifted its purchase order of US grain to Australia
and Canada and the US farmers lost $500 million of sales90.
3. Effectiveness of the Safeguard Clause
In cases where the European Community or a Member State takes
unilateral action without pre-consultation, (as happened in the beach
slippers case), is it open to an individual (for example, the French
importer), to invoke the safeguard clause in defence of such action
where there has been no pre-consultation? As the above discussion
indicates, the legal nature of the pre-consultation procedure is very
vague and the operation of the safeguard clause is highly flexible.
It may be concluded from EEC case law that there is little chance of a
positive ruling from the European Court of Justice on the legal effect
of the pre-consultation requirement (for more discussions see next
chapter) 91 . Moreover, since there is no specific definition of "where
the situation does not admit any delay" in Article 9 of the Trade
Agreement, it seems that the contracting party is entitled, in the
last resort, to take unilateral measures.
On the other hand, consultation is a necessary part of safeguard
action. The parties are required to endeavour, as far as possible, to
engage in friendly consultation, even in an exceptional situation
where the contracting party is entitled to take unilateral action. In
the beach slippers case, for example, the consultation was held late,
which resulted in China undertaking to respect the quantitative limits
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set by the European Community for imports of the products in question
92into France within a fixed time
4. Implications of the Safeguard Clause
The safeguard clause forms an important part of the EEC-China
trade mechanism and legal regime at least in theory. However, its
practical implications and effect is limited under the current legal
regime, because other restrictive measures are available to both
parties. This issue may be discussed from two angles.
4.1 First, as far as China is concerned, it may invoke the safeguard
clause to protect its domestic industry if necessary. But such an
instance is rare, because many other measures are available to China
to protect its market. As a developing country, the GATT rules will
allow it to protect its infant industries. Also, the GATT permits
developing countries to take measures to alleviate their domestic
difficulties, and in particular, difficulties in balancing
international payments 93 . Although China was not (and still is not) a
member of the GATT, such principles, as general principles, should
also be applicable in EEC-China trade. Chine may invoke these
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principles to take appropriate measures as it did in 1979 and 1980
Moreover, although the Chinese government may not have the control
over foreign trade that it had before the economic reform, it
nevertheless still has considerable persuasive power to affect foreign
trade. To sum up, China may not need a safeguard clause in trade
relations with the European Community as it suggested in the
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negotiations. The safeguard clause has therefore little practical
importance for China.
4.2 From the European Community's point of view, the safeguard clause
is more important than it is to its Chinese counterpart. Because of
its enormous economic strength, the Community may utilise it as a
weapon to control and regulate trade and economic relations with
China. And because of China's export potential, the Community needs
the safeguard clause to protect its industry and market if necessary,
never mind the underlying political implications for such a clause
because of China's socialist system. This explains why the Community
insisted on the inclusion of a safeguard clause in the Trade
Agreement.
However, further analysis may show that, in reality, the
safeguard clause is not as important as it is at first suggested under
the current EEC-China trade regime.
Under the Trade Agreement, apart from the safeguard clause, many
measures are available to the European Community to control imports
from China. These measures include: quantitative restrictions;
anti-dumping measures 95 ; and the special commercial policy
instruments 96 . These measures, together with the safeguard clause and
limited NFN treatment, make up the EEC's legal mechanism in trading
with China. Where the quantitative restriction system operates in the
bilateral trade relations generally and the contracting party can
adjust the quotas and introduce or reintroduce quotas whenever
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necessary, the importance of the safeguard clause is minimised. This
is the position of the Community, which is using the safeguard clause
together with the quantitative restrictions measure in administering
trade relations with China. In practice, therefore, resort to
safeguard action is rare 97 . Generally, adjusting or reimposing
quantitative restrictions seems to be a more direct way of achieving
the purpose. Indeed, in the only reported case of safeguard action,
the Community eventually reimposed quotas to the products in
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question
As a supplemental measure, however, the safeguard clause has its
own function. Reintroducing a quantitative restriction to a
previously liberalised product may involve tough negotiation in the
annual Joint Committee meeting. Once quotas have been fixed for a
certain period, however, the safeguard action seems a more appropriate
way of tackling the problem.
It is submitted that once other measures exercised both by China
and the Community have been excluded, for example, no more
discriminatory quantitative restrictions, then the safeguard clause
shall play a far more important role. A safeguard action, consistent
with the GATT rules is more acceptable and a more appropriate measure
for the European Community or China to pursue. In this regard, the
Trade Agreement will be reviewed to ensure that the discriminatory
quantitative restrictions will be revoked; the Chinese government will
further dismantle the overall control over foreign trade; and more
importantly, the safeguard clause will be redrafted so that it
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provides a more clear criterion for enabling the parties to take
safeguard action, and a detailed procedure for parties to pursue such
action.
Conclusion
1. The safeguard clause applies bilaterally between China and the
European Community. It is inconsistent with the GAU safeguard rules
and the general principles of the GATT. Such bilaterality is in the
Community's interests. The Community, together with the United
States, is pressing China to accept a selective safeguard clause in
China's negotiations with the GATT to resume its seat in the GATT.
Such a clause will minimise the importance of China's joining the
GATT, thus it should not be incorporated into the Resumption Protocol.
2. The legal nature and effect of the pre-consultation provisions in
the safeguard clause are unclear and the lack of detailed rules as to
procedure under the safeguard clause render the pre-consultation
requirement of little effect. The European Court of Justice is very
likely to give a negative ruling on the legal effect of the
pre-consultation requirement.
3. As a last resort the contracting party may take unilateral action
to protect the domestic market. There are, however, no clear criteria
for the application of the safeguard clause, no provisions relating to
specific measures which may be taken and no express right of
retaliation. The parties, therefore, have a high degree of discretion
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in the taking of safeguard action. This is clearly in the interests
of the European Community, as it has more economic strengths vis-a-vis
China. With this strong bargaining position the Community woild be
able to control and regulate trade with China.
4. China may apply the safeguard clause to protect its domestic
market and industries, but there are many other methods available to
China to protect its market. The safeguard clause is, therefore, more
important for the European Community than for China. However, the
Community still imposes quantitative restrictions on imports from
China. Other protective measures are also available to the Community.
Under such a legal regime the importance of the safeguard clause is
reduced or even minimised.
5. It is submitted that other trade measures which are
discriminatory, should be abolished. Then the safeguard clause will
play a more important role. Such safeguard clause should be redrafted
to the extent that it gives clear criteria for the application of the
clause and more detailed procedures for safeguard action.
D. The Joint Coninittee
Article 9 of the agreement provides for the setting up of an
EEC-China joint committee for trade, comprising representatives of the
European Community on the one hand and representatives of China on the
other.
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The tasks of the joint committee include:-
(a) monitoring and examining the functioning of the agreement;
(b) examining any questions that may arise in the implementation
of the agreement;
(c) examining problems that could hinder the development of
trade;
(d) examining the means and possible opportunities for the
development of trade; and
Ce) making recommendations99
In the event of obvious imbalance in bilateral trade, the joint
committee will study ways of remedying the situation 100 . The joint
committee also has a duty to keep a close watch on the implementation
of the undertaking by China to give favourable consideration to
imports from the Community, while the Community is to aim at
increasing the liberalisation of imports from China10'
The European Community has established different kinds of joint
institutions in agreements concluded with different non-member
countries. These agreements may be roughly divided into three,
namely, association agreements, free trade agreements and ordinary
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trade (and economic co-operation) agreements. The emphases and the
functions of the institutions thereby established are different91.
An institution established under an association agreement plays a
more important role than the others. Under the Lomè Convention, for
instance, three principal institutions have been established, namely,
the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, the ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors
and the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly. The Council of Ministers has
responsibility for reviewing the operations and achievements of the
Convention arrangements and for taking and implementing broad policy
decisions, which are binding upon all member countries on both
sides' 02 . The Committee of Ambassadors is responsible for ensuring
the day-to-day operation of the Convention, for generally keeping
under review the functioning of the Convention and the development of
its objectives and for supervising the work of committees, working
groups and other bodies 103 . The Consultative Assembly has the power
to establish, on an ad hoc basis, its own contacts "with economic and
social circles and is encouraged to submit to the Council of Ministers
any conclusion and make any recommendation it considers
appropriate" 104 .	 In the third Lomè Convention, a quasi-parliamentary
body called the Joint Assembly is substituted for the former
Consultative Assembly. Amongst the tasks assigned to this body is
that of arranging regular contacts and consultations with
representatives of economic and social sectors in the ACP States and
in the European Community in order to obtain their views on the
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attainment of the objectives of the Convention
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Clearly, the ACP-EEC economic integration goes much further than
the economic relations established under the free trade agreements, or
the ordinary trade and economic co-operation agreements. The European
Community bears, to a certain extent, the responsibility for improving
the economies of its former colonies and territories and for helping
their inhabitants to improve their living standards. On the other
hand, the Community wants to maintain as great an influence as
possible in those countries. 	 These tasks (and others) cannot be
handled by a normal joint committee, like the one between China and
the Community, but need more substantial institutions. The
institutions can in some circumstances make decisions which will bind
106both the European Community and the ACP countries
With regard to free trade agreements, the institutions
established are generally joint committees which are responsible for
the administration of the agreements. For this purpose the joint
committees have the power to make recommendations and decisions in
specific events. These decisions are implemented by the contracting
parties in accordance with their own rules. The joint committees also
have responsibility, when appropriate, for holding consultations107.
By comparison with the institutions established under the Lomè
Conventions, joint committees established under free trade agreements
have far less power, although in rare cases the joint committee can
make decisions.
As far as ordinary trade agreements are concerned, the joint
committees established thereby play rather limited roles. They can
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usually make recommendations but cannot make decisions which are
binding on the contracting parties 108 . The normal functions of this
type of joint committee in the Community's trade agreements are more
or less the same. These functions are to ensure the proper
functioning of the agreement, to devise practical measures for
achieving the goals pursued in the agreement, to examine any
difficulty likely to hinder the development of trade and economic
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exchanges and to make recommendations	 . Some of them expressly
provide for consultation within the framework of the joint committee,
such as the 1976 EEC-Canada commercial and economic co-operation
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agreement	 and the 1980 EEC-Romania Trade Agreement in industrial
111products	 . However, some do not, such as the 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement.
The EEC-China Joint Committee meetings have been held every year,
as planned, to handle matters of implementation of the agreement. In
the resolution passed by the European Parliament in 1978 the joint
committee was regarded as playing a decisive role in fostering closer
relations with China 112 . This is true because the Agreement itself is
only a very general framework; it needs to be implemented. The
provisions in the Agreement require the parties to negotiate and
consult under the Joint Committee. The quantitative restrictions by
the European Community, for example, seems to be decided by the
Community unilaterally, but the Chinese parties, through the Joint
Committee, have repeatedly required the Community to speed up the
revocation of such restrictions. The Joint Committee is therefore to
become a forum for negotiation in this regard. Problems arising from
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bilateral trade have also been tackled through the joint committee.
The joint committee meeting has discussed ways of expanding trade and
of curing the imbalance in the bilateral trade 113 . Six joint
committee meetings were held under the 1978 Agreement. That joint
committee was then replaced by the joint committee established under
the 1985 Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement to supervise a
wider range of matters, including trade and economic co-operation114.
At the working level the joint committee meets to discuss the
practical problems of bilateral trade. Its members are usually
officials in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade from
China, and officials from the Directorate-General in charge of
external relations of the Commission and representatives of the Member
115States
To further the closer economic and political relations it was
proposed by the Commission to China in April 1983 that there be
regular contact and consultation at high level between the two
parties 116 . The Chinese government accepted this proposal and high
level consultation between top officials of the Commission and the
117leaders of China have been held periodically . The consultations
have covered matters relating to the economy of each party and
possible ways of developing relations between the parties and to the
118
world s major political and economic issues
	 . This consultation
arrangement reflects a mutual desire to strengthen and deepen
bilateral economic and political relations. It has facilitated a
direct channel of communication at a higher level.
92
E. Other Issues
This Part of the Chapter will discuss certain aspects of the
legal regime governing EEC-China trade, such as the price clause, and
also certain issues which are not included in the legal regime, but
are nevertheless very important to bilateral trade.
1. The Price Clause
The Agreement contains a price clause specifying that "trade in
goods and the provision of services between the two Contracting
Parties shall be effected at market-related prices and rates.flU9 it
also provides that payment for transactions between the contracting
parties shall be made in accordance with their respective existing
laws and regulations, in currencies of the Member States of the
Community, Renminbi (the Chinese currency) or any convertible currency
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accepted by the two parties concerned . These two provisions are
related to the problems of China's economic system: China is
classified as a State-trading country by the European Community. With
respect to the latter provision, ie, the currency issue, the Community
intends to, through this provision, tackle the problem of the strict
foreign exchange control exercised by China. However, the currency of
payment for transactions is to be decided by the parties involved in
the particular transaction and no party would be willing to accept
worthless currency. China's practice with regard to the currency of
payment in respect of trade has generally been for settlement in US
dollars or the currency of one of the contracting parties, including
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the Chinese Renminbi (and its counterpart), depending on what is
acceptable to the parties involved. Thus, this provision does no more
than express general practice in this area.
With respect to the former provision, ie, the price clause, the
problem seems more complex. It is clearly a protective measure
designed to prevent the Chinese selling in the Common Market at a low
price. Initially the Community proposed a clear legal device that
would have had the effect that each party would endeavour to ensure
that the prices of its exports were not lower than those prevalent on
the market of the other which sounds like fixing a Community price for
Chinese products. But since the inclusion of such a provision would
have made the Chinese goods non-competitive in the Community, the
Chinese negotiating team insisted on scaling down its restrictive
scope by proposing a contentious formula for transactions being
effected at a "market-related price" instead121.
"Market related price" is a very vague term. It could mean the
market price in the Community or in China. In each party's view, its
own market price will be regarded as the "market related price" for
imports and exports. In my view, however, it should refer not to
prices in the Chinese domestic market, nor in the European market
alone, but to prices in the international market because using either
party's price may not be fair, particularly in cases of unequal levels
of economic development and economic strengths, and different economic
systems.	 However, even the international market price may not be a
fair indicator in the current circumstances, because prices in the
94
international market fluctuate and are difficult to ascertain in
practice. Without the clear criterion of international market prices,
prices in the European Market, which are more closely related to
international market prices, will eventually be referred to. Another
vague factor is that the price clause in the agreement requires only a
the "market related price", which is not necessarily a price equal to
prices prevalent on the international market. In certain cases it
could be higher or lower than the price prevalent on the international
market, provided that it is not unreasonably far away and is
"related". It is difficult to state when the European Community is
entitled to claim that import prices have not been set in accordance
with this provision. This is a matter to be decided in negotiations.
It is also very interesting to see how such a clause works.
Because this provision not only lacks any substance as to what is the
"market-related price", it also lacks any practical procedure as to
how to decide it, and when it is identified, what follow-up measures
should be taken. The textile agreement concluded in the following
year had detailed provisions to control the price (see discussion in
Chapter VIII), but this was a provision no longer acceptable to the
Chinese, who claimed that such a provision was discriminatory. The
price provision was revoked in the 1984 textile protocol122.
The inclusion of such a price clause derives from the system of
price setting in China. Before 1979, for thirty years the Chinese
government set product prices at a fixed level. Prices were not
decided by market forces but by State plan in order to comply with
95
orthodox Marxism, maintain the stability of society in general and to
make sure that the basic necessities are affordable, and scarce or
luxury goods were highly priced. The frozen internal price in China
was therefore artificial, and did not reflect the market at all.
However, the State monopoly in international trade enabled the
government to separate completely the domestic market from the
international market. With a massive low paid labour force and its
rich natural resources, plus the possibility of government subsidy in
one way or another, China is able to produce very low-priced products
against which no European products can compete. When the Agreement
was negotiated in 1978 the European Community was very concerned about
the potential market disruption. At its insistence a price clause was
included.
Reactions from the Community and from China towards the price
clause in the Agreement are somewhat different. As far as China is
concerned, the clause is regarded as a tool utilised by the Community
to protect its market against imports from China'23 , whereas on the
Community side, the European Parliament "welcomes the existence of a
price clause provided for in Article 7 of the Agreement which will
enable the Community, through the Joint Committee, to refuse to admit
goods exported at prices fixed, for political reasons, below those
obtaining on the market, a practice that causes serious disturbance to
,,l24the Community market.
The price clause sounds very reasonable. But it has failed to
recognise a basic principle in international trade, ie, comparative
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advantages. Obviously, both the EEC and China obtain their own
comparative advantages. That is what international trade exists for.
However, if the party to the transaction cannot sell at its most
competitive price, the comparative advantage theory then loses its
whole sense. In this regard the price clause in the Trade Agreement
functions as a protective tool. By using this tool, the Community may
be able to stop the products in question entering into its market
through the Joint Committee or even refuse the entry of such products
unilaterally. Furthermore, the price clause in the Agreement stands
side by side with the Community's anti-dumping rules. On the one hand
the Community may use this clause to press China to stop exporting
low-priced products, or even refuse the importation of such Chinese
goods. On the other hand, it can start anti-dumping proceedings to
125deal with the low-priced imports from China
2. Promotion of Contacts and Exchanges
Under the Agreement, both parties undertake to promote visits by
persons, groups and delegations from economic, trade and industrial
circles, to facilitate industrial and technical exchanges and contacts
connected with trade and to foster the organisation of fairs and
exhibitions and the relevant provision of services. As far as
possible each must grant to the other the necessary facilities for the
above activities126.
This provision is very special in a trade agreement. Such a
provision may not be necessary in trade agreements with other
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countries in different situations, for example, between the European
Community and India, because there are no political or legal barriers
to prevent business, travel or market development between them. It is
designed particularly to tackle the practical problems in trade
between the European Community and the People's Republic of China.
First of all, the provision encourages authorities on each side
to welcome businessmen from the other. Since 1949 China has closed
its door to Western countries. Before 1978 it was very difficult for
businessmen from the West to travel to and within China. Similarly,
for political and other reasons, it was very difficult for Chinese
businessmen to come to Europe. Under such circumstances there was
little chance of developing trade. It is to the advantage of both
sides, therefore, to make the primary conditions for trade favourable.
Secondly, this provision is designed to promote contacts and
exchanges in business circles. Because of the lack of contacts and
exchanges following the creation of the People's Republic of China,
each party is unfamiliar with the other's market. Without close
contacts and frequent exchanges, however, it is impossible to develop
bilateral trade.
To comply with its international obligations China has gradually
created facilities for businessmen from Western Europe and has
increased its business contacts and exchanges with the Community127.
For their part the institutions of the European Community facilitated
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trade with China In particular, the following activities have
been undertaken to promote contacts and exchanges with China:-
Ci) Training Scheme: In order to promote contacts and exchanges
the European Community has developed various training schemes for
China. It awarded a number of grants at the beginning of 1979, mostly
to post-graduate research students, for both short-term and
longer-term courses of specialist study at Community universities'29.
The Community also provides training for interpreters, statistical
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experts and customs officials from China . The largest project for
training Chinese personnel is the EEC-China Business Management Centre
in Peking. The Commission has allocated ECU3.5m from its programme
for non-associated developing countries to this project for the period
1311984-1988	 and has also announced the extension of its financing of
132
the project beyond 1988
(ii) EEC-China Business Week: Under the aegis of the Commission
and the Chinese government, the EEC-China business week has been held
three times since 1981133. The EEC-China business week brought
thousands of executives from Community industrial and banking
companies and Chinese decision makers in the economic and trade fields
face to face in order to promote direct contact, improve the knowledge
of business opportunities in each other's market, overcome obstacles
in bilateral trade and eventually promote trade and other economic
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exchanges	 . This sort of activity is not prescribed by the
Agreement, but it fits into the framework constructed by the Agreement
for the promotion of contacts and exchanges. The regular holding of
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the business week is a special way to help the development of
bilateral trade. It is expected to last for some time.
3. Protection of Intellectual Property
The Agreement is silent on the issue of the protection of
intellectual property. As China did not have a patent law until
135	 .	 .	 1361985	 , and still has no copyright law
	 , the protection of
intellectual property is a matter of major concern to Western
businessmen doing business with China. At the insistence of the US
side, the China-USA Trade Agreement in 1979 included a clause for the
137protection of intellectual property
However, the concept of using trademarks in China to identify the
source of manufacture is by no means new. At the Museum of Chinese
History in Beijing today, products with clear trademarks of
manufacturers dating back to the Song Dynasty (AD960-1279) can be
found on display 138 . It was in 1904 that the government of the "Last
,,	 .	 .	 .	 39Empire - Qing Dynasty - promulgated China s first trademark law
Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the
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PRC s first trademark law was passed in 1950
	 , to be replaced in
141	 .	 1421963	 , and more recently in 1983
	 . The trademark law creates the
possibility of protecting trademarks in China. China also seeks to
protect trademarks in other countries and has negotiated various
trademark agreements with Western countries. This provides the basis
for mutual protection of trademarks with these countries. Most of the
Member States of the European Community (nine out of twelve) have
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concluded trademark agreements with China 143 . These agreements
generally recognise the rights of nationals of each contracting party
to apply for trademark registration in the territory of the other on
the basis of reciprocity 144 . They also provide reciprocal protection
for these trademarks145.
As far as patent law is concerned, China provided limited
protection to Chinese and foreign patents pursuant to the 1950
Provisional Regulations on the Protection of Inventors and Patent
Rights, but this law was repealed in 1963 and replaced by the
Regulations on Rewards for Inventions passed in the same year146.
This statute has provided hardly any protection to foreign patents.
There was thus no satisfactory patent system in China at the time of
the negotiation of the EEC-China Trade Agreement, so the subject was
not included in the negotiation agenda. However, after more than five
years of debate, the modern patent system was eventually established.
The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted on ?larch
12, 1984 and came into effect on April 1, 1985147. Furthermore, China
decided on November 14, 1984 to join the Paris Convention and since
148
March 19, 1985 has been bound by the provisions of that Convention
Foreign patent rights are thus now protected.
Copyright law in China has not yet been born but is in the final
stage of gestation after a few years of discussion and preparation. A
new Chinese copyright law may be expected very soon149.
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From the discussion above, it is clear that the 1978 EEC-China
Trade Agreement does not include any provision for the protection of
intellectual property. This is not surprising, because at the time
the Community started to negotiate the Trade Agreement with China, it
was not absolutely sure that the Community would have competence in
matters concerning intellectual property. The Community, therefore,
did not even include the intellectual property issue in its proposed
agreement outline. On the other hand, at that time the issue of
protecting intellectual property in China appeared not to be as urgent
as it was later. That issue, therefore, was shelved. Such a
pragmatic approach may have facilitated the conclusion of the
agreement but causes problems in its implementation because it merely
avoids the issue rather than resolves it. During the lifetime of the
Trade Agreement (1978-1984), the protection of intellectual property
was always of concern to the Community businessmen trading with (and
150investing in) China . The problems were alleviated only after the
introduction of a patent system in China in 1985.
4. Arbitration
Another omission in the Agreement is that there is no provision
for arbitration, unlike the 1979 China-USA Trade Agreement, which
incorporates an arbitration clause stipulating that when disputes
cannot be settled promptly by friendly consultation, conciliation or
other mutually acceptable means, "the parties to the dispute may have
recourse to arbitration for settlement in accordance with provisions
specified in their contracts or other agreements to submit to
102
arbitration. Such arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration
institution in the People's Republic of China, the United States of
America or a third country." 151
 Furthermore, "the procedure of the
relevant arbitration institutions are applicable, and the arbitration
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
recommended by the United Nations, or other international arbitration
rules, may also be used where acceptable to the parties to the dispute
and to the arbitration institutions." 152
 Each contracting party is
obliged to seek to ensure that arbitration awards are recognised and
enforced by its competent authorities where enforcement is sought, in
153
accordance with applicable laws and regulations
	 . Similar
provisions are also included in the trade agreement between China and
154
Japan
It is argued that the arbitration issue is normally decided by
the parties concerned in a particular transaction, not by the
arbitration clause in the trade agreement between sovereign
governments, in the EEC case, by the Community 155 . This may be the
case for transactions between market economies when the private
parties concerned are normally free to choose how to resolve
disputes, where any arbitration should take place, the designated
institutions, the rules of procedure and the applicable law. But in
the case of business activities involving Chinese partners, the
Chinese parties were generally loath to settle contractual disputes by
156	 .
arbitration	 . Chinese businessmen and bureaucrats generally
preferred to settle disputes through negotiation (friendly
consultation) between the parties or, failing resolution by such
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means, third-party conciliation, rather than through arbitration or
157
court decisions	 . In a case where an arbitration was inevitable,
158
the Chinese party would insist on domestic arbitration
In facilitating domestic arbitration for international commercial
transactions, the Chinese government established, under the aegis of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade ("CCPIT"),
a "non-governmental" organisation that is actually part of the state
apparatus and was modelled on the Soviet All-Union Chamber of
Commerce, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in 1954159. In
1958 the government established a Maritime Arbitration Commission
under the CCPIT to handle the increasing number of maritime disputes
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that confronted China
Against this background, the European Community was expected to
approach the question of arbitration in its agreement with China as
the governments of Japan and the United States did. But the Community
regarded this as a matter to be resolved by the private parties in
business transactions 161 . The Agreement therefore did not provide any
solution to this issue. Arguably, this is a shortcoming in the legal
regime provided by the Trade Agreement as far as the European
Community is concerned. However, as the companies from the EC usually
have a stronger economic position, these companies are able to get
what they want.
The recent development of the Chinese legal system gives an
encouraging resolution to this problem. Article 37 of the Law of the
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People's Republic of China on Economic Contract Involving Foreign
Interests, which came into effect on July 1, 1985, provides, in
relation to all contracts between Chinese and foreign economic
enterprises and bodies, that if consultation and mediation between the
parties are unsuccessful the parties may submit the dispute between
them to a Chinese arbitral body or another arbitral body for
arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration provision in the
contract or a subsequently written arbitration agreement162.
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IIIE 1978 TRADE AGREEMENT : NATURE AND EFFECT
The conclusion of Trade Agreement between China and the European
Community represents a great progress for promoting bilateral trade
relations. The Agreement addresses major key issues concerning
bilateral trade, although some issues are unresolved) This Chapter
will analyse the nature of the Agreement, and examine the effect of
the Agreement in the European Community and China.
A. Nature of the Agreement
For the purpose of present discussion, the international
agreements concerning the European Community, which may bind the
Community, could be divided into three categories. Firstly,
agreements concluded by all Member States with third countries or
international organisations, such as the GATF. The EEC Treaty - and
the Euratom Treaty in Article 105 - contain rules applicable to
international agreements concluded by Member States with third states
before the entry into force of the Treaties. According to the Court
of Justice the provisions of such agreements are binding on the
Community because the Member States have conferred upon the Community
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the powers necessary to meet the obligations contained in the
agreements2.
Secondly, agreements concluded by the Community. Each of the
three Communities has international legal capacity, which finds
expression in the conclusion of agreements with third countries or
international organisations according to the Treaties. It is now well
settled that agreements concluded by the Community form an integral
part of Community law3 . Under the terms of Article 228 of the EEC
Treaty these agreements are binding on the Community; its institutions
and the Member States. They are subordinate to the Treaties but take
precedence over derivative legislation4.
Another category of agreements is mixed agreements. These
agreements are concluded by both the Community and its Member States
on the one hand, and by a third state on the other. These are
agreements which are in a position astride Community and national
competence.
Since its creation the European Community, comprising the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), the European Economic
Community ("EEC") and the European Atomic Energy Community or Euratom
("EAEC"), it has become the centre of an international treaty
network5 . Agreements, varied in their legal basis, purpose, form and
subject matters, have linked the Community with a multitude of
countries and international organisations.
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The Community has concluded conventions both with Member States
and with third countries to establish diplomatic relations and to
obtain privileges and immunities for its institutions and agents 6 . It
has entered into bilateral trade agreements with European, North and
South American, African and Asian countries, covering a broad range of
subject matters, including tariffs and tariff preferences, commodity
trade, commercial co-operation, export restrictions, free trade and
custom unions 7 . Furthermore, a number of association agreements have
created more extensive and stable links between the Community and
third countries. Notably, the Lomè Convention associates 67 African,
Caribbean and Pacific developing countries ("ACP states") with the
Community8 . In addition to providing for commercial, industrial,
agricultural, financial and technical co-operation, the Convention
protects the export earnings and the mineral production of the ACP
states. Moreover, the Community signed a number of multilateral
treaties that emanated from international conferences in which it
participated. It thus became a party to several commodity agreements
and the GATT agreements 9 . Community agreements are not, however,
restricted to commercial matters. The Community is also a party to
conventions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy°, on fishing rights
11	 12
and agricultural matters , on environmental pollution and on
nuclear and health research13.
The Trade Agreement of 1978 between China and the EEC, as
indicated by the title of it, covers various key issues of commercial
policy which fall in with the exclusive competence of the Community.
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1) The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement differs from association
agreements concluded under Article 238 of the Treaty between the
14
Community and third countries
These association agreements represent close ties between the
Community and the states concerned. Association under Article 238 is
not restricted to European states but is available to any third state
or group of states or international organisation. By this means, the
provisions of Article 238 constitute an appropriate instrument whereby
the Community may establish world-wide co-operation in economic fields
and provide closer and more effective ties with other states than the
conventional trade treaties provided for in Article 113 of the Treaty.
Agreements of association entered into under Article 238 form an
integral part of the Community. They are subject to interpretation by
the Court of Justice 15 . Although Article 238 does not contain any
stipulation as to the subject matter of a treaty of association, nor
does it define how close the links resulting from association between
the Community and a third country may or must be, the absence of
specific rules in this area makes it possible to apply Article 238
with great flexibility. For example, the association agreement
between the Community and Greece covered matters like free movement of
goods, movement of persons and services, matters relating to
competition, taxation and approximation of laws and other economic
policies. This agreement, with its broad ambit, closed the gap
between Greece and the Community and facilitated Greece's accession to
the Community, which occurred nearly twenty years after the agreement
came into effect'6.
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Another example is the association agreement between the
Community and Turkey17 . The main objectives of this agreement, as set
out in Title I, are the promotion of trade and economic relations
between the Community and Turkey, the accelerated development of the
Turkish economy and the raising of the employment level and standard
of living of the Turkish people through the gradual establishment of a
customs union. The agreement includes provision for a transitional
stage, the dismantling of customs barriers, free movement and
transport, the alignment of economic policies, financial aid in the
transitional period. Eventually, when the objectives of the agreement
have been attained and Turkey is in a position to take on all a Member
State's obligations under the Treaty of Rome, Turkey may be eligible
18for full membership
The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement, with narrow scope and vague
terms, is easily distinguishable from these association agreements.
2) The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement differs from association
agreements concluded between the Community and its "overseas countries
l9
and territories
When the Treaty of Rome entered into force in 1958, certain
countries and territories, located primarily in Africa, had a special
status of dependency on France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy
(the United Kingdom was added in 1973). Since there were no trade
barriers between these countries and territories and the particular
Member States with which they had a special relationship, the
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contracting parties to the Treaty had to decide whether these
countries and territories should be included in the trade system of
the Treaty or whether the close relationship with them should be
terminated. They chose the former alternative and established a
special system of association.
According to the Treaty and to subsequent agreements, the
objectives of these agreements are to facilitate economic and social
development and to strengthen the economic structures of the overseas
countries and territories, in particular by developing trade, economic
relations and industrial co-operation between the Community and these
countries and territories, by helping to safeguard their interests
(for those economies depend to a large extent on the export of
commodities) and by affording financial and technical co-operation.
Apart from the historical connection, the economic benefits for
both sides also require them to establish closer relations. From the
widely criticised Yaound Conventions and Arusha Agreement to the third
Lomè Convention, the Community concluded agreements with these
"overseas countries and territories", covering wide areas of economic
co-operation. For these associated overseas countries and territories
flowed preferential treatment in trade and financial and technical
co-operation. For the Community came stabilisation of supplies of raw
materials and of the markets 20 . These agreements are not based on
reciprocity, but rather on preferential and differential treatment21.
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3) The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement also differs from the
agreements between the Community and the EFTA countries.
The Community's relations with the EFTA countries are governed by
strictly bilateral agreements with each individual EFTA member. These
agreements have one main feature in common - the principle of free
trade in industrial products. As stated in each preamble, each
agreement was concluded for the purpose of consolidating and binding
existing economic relations between the various partners in an
enlarged community and of ensuring the harmonious development of trade
under fair conditions of competition. The agreements cover broad
objectives such as: increased economic activity, improvement of living
and working conditions, expansion of production and promotion of
financial stability. The contracting parties thus expressed their
desire to contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of
trade through the removal of technical barriers to trade 22 . These
agreements fall within the principle of the common commercial policy
under Article 113 of the Treaty, which is the principle governing the
1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement. However, the Community's trade
agreements with the EFTA countries reflect closer and more
consolidated economic and political relations than are reflected in
the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement. Apart from conforming to the
provisions of the GATT, these agreements facilitate closer trade and
economic relations than those promoted by the trade promoting
agreement of EEC-China in 1978.
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Trade agreements between the Community and other developing
countries are similar in nature to the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement
in that they promote trade and economic relations between the
contracting parties. However, there are differences. The trade
agreements between the Community and Mediterranean countries and some
developing Asian countries, are characterised by the preferential
treatment accorded by the Community, although the precise terms and
conditions vary from agreement to agreement according to the
historical relations between the parties. For example, the 1974
EEC-India Commercial Co-operation Agreement23 provides that, in
addition to undertaking to grant to each other most-favoured-nation
treatment and the highest degree of liberalisation of imports and
exports, the two parties agree on a reciprocal basis to foster
co-operation between their economic organisations, especially in the
area of export promotion. Furthermore, the Community confirms the
suspension of tariffs in relation to the importation of certain
products originating in India24 . The agreement includes certain GSP
commitments by the Community and expresses willingness by the
Community to improve the GSP and to examine further tariff
25
adjustments
China is a developing country. The 1978 Trade Agreement with the
EEC is, however, non-preferential. It is based on a limited
most-favoured- nation treatment in matters regarding, inter alia,
customs duty and taxes 26 . It includes a number of reciprocal rules
aimed at promoting trade. Reciprocal rules of a comparable nature are
to be found in the 1976 EC-Canada Commercial and Economic Cooperation
122
Agreements27 although these deal more comprehensively with economic
co-operation. The EC-Canada trade policy is governed by the rules and
28dealings of the GATT , since both sides have developed economies.
China, however, is a developing socialist country and not yet a member
of the GATT.
Over a very considerable period, the Community has not had
official dealings with the USSR and its allies or with the People's
Republic of China. Although the Community concluded a trade agreement
with Yugoslavia in 197329, the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement is the
first trade agreement so far between the Community and a socialist
country which is not a member of the GA. It has special
significance because the agreement was concluded after the Community's
proposal to enter into new agreements with the State-trading countries
30
which was rejected by all of them except China . The Community
informed these countries that it was ready to negotiate new trade
agreements to replace the agreements between the countries in question
and individual Community Member States. These were due to lapse in
1974. The proposal was rejected by the CMEA countries at first, which
required the Community to negotiate an agreement with CMEA instead.
However, some special arrangements between CMEA countries and the
Community, mostly agreements in the agricultural, steel and textile
products sectors, do exist31.
In June 1988, a Joint Declaration on establishment of official
relations between the CHEA and the EC was signed; the relations
between them are thus normalised. At the same time, most Eastern
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European countries, including the USSR, decided to accredit diplomatic
missions to the Community, Trade and commercial and economic
cooperation agreements between the EC and the countries concerned
either are under negotiation or have been concluded32.
It may be concluded from this discussion that the 1978 EEC-China
Trade Agreement is an agreement falling within Article 113 of the
Treaty, concluded between the Community and a country which is
classified as a State-trading country on the basis of non-preference.
B. Direct Effect of the Agreement in the EC
According to international law, the effect of an international
agreement between sovereign states is determined by the national laws
concerned33 . Thus no rule of international law is violated by a
national constitution which prohibits a national judge from
recognising the legal effect of any purported rule other than rules
laid down by his own national legislator so long as the international
agreement concluded by the country concerned is duly adopted and
properly implemented. Otherwise, the state in question may have to
bear the responsibility for breaching the international agreement. It
is, therefore, understandable that the doctrine of direct
effectiveness of international treaties has received little attention
34in international legal circles
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However, as questions relating to the nature of the European
Community legal order began to emerge, the issue of the direct
effectiveness of a Community rule faced the European Court of Justice
as early as l962. In its landmark decision of Van Gend Loos, the
Court introduced the notion of direct effectiveness of Community
rules, which is further developed its well-established case law36.
The issue to be discussed now is the possible direct
effectiveness of the provisions of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement
in the European Community. This issue is related to the question of
the direct effect of an agreement concluded by the Community with a
third state or international organisation. Starting with the
International Fruit Company case37 , the Court has made various rulings
which may indicate some jurisprudential orientation in this field.
The case law in this area is nevertheless far from being well settled.
The agreements involving these rulings can be divided into four
different categories for the purpose of the present analysis, namely,
association agreements between the Community and third states, which
include the association agreements under Part IV of the Treaty and
Article 238 of the Treaty respectively; free trade agreements
concluded by the Community with third states; the multilateral trade
convention to which the Community was not a party, but it subsequently
became bound by the GATr; and normal trade agreements between the
38
Community and third states
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1. Summary of Case Law
The first case on international agreements was International
Fruit Company39 . This dealt with three main points. First, it
concerned the validity of Community regulations challenged before
national courts as infringing Article XI of the GATr. Secondly, it
was held that an individual might contest the validity of the
regulation only if the GATT provision invoked is capable of creating
rights of which interested parties may avail themselves in a court of
law; thirdly, the Court examined the spirit, general scheme and terms
of the GATT, an approach it which has largely followed since40 . The
Court examined the GATT in a rather cursory manner41 . It referred to
the "great flexibility" of its provisions and to the possibility of
derogation and stressed in particular that contracting parties may
settle their differences by consultation and by negotiation, and, if
these fail, may proceed, even without prior consultation, in urgent
cases to unilateral action. In the Court's opinion "those factors are
sufficient to show that, when examined in such a context, Article XI
of the General Agreement is not capable of conferring on citizens of
the Community rights which they can invoke before the courts." 42 Thus
the Court denied that a GATT provision had a direct effect solely
because of the nature, objectives and structure of the General
Agreement. The Court did not, therefore, consider it necessary to
examine the question of whether the provisions concerned would have
complied with the standard requirements for direct effectiveness of a
Community rule43.
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The rulings in that case were not strictly followed by the later
44
cases. In Schroeder , the Court reviewed the validity of a
Commission regulation allegedly infringing Article 41 of the
Association Agreement with Greece without having examined whether this
provision conferred rights on individuals; In Nederlandse
Spoorween45 , the Court again reviewed a Community rule in the light
of Article II of the GATT without examining whether this provision
created a right which an individual might invoke.
46
In Bresciani , the Court made rulings on the interpretation of
the Yaounde Convention of 1963 concluded between the Community and its
Member States, on the one hand, and certain African states
("associated states") on the other. The case dealt with a conflict
between Article 2 para 1 of this Convention, which prohibits the EC
Member States from imposing customs duties (or equivalent charges) on
imports from any of the associated states and a national law of one of
the EC Member States.
This ruling, which for the first time recognised the direct
effect in EC law of a provision of an agreement, is of particular
importance to the subsequent jurisprudential development of this
subject.
In considering whether the provision in question could confer a
right on individuals, the Court referred to the spirit, the general
scheme and the working of the Convention. The Court emphasised the
special nature of the Convention. It referred, in particular, to
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Article 131 of the EEC Treaty under which certain overseas countries,
which had special relations with some of the Member States, were to be
associated with the Community. Referring to "the special economic and
political connections" of those countries with the Community, the
Court recalled the special objectives of such an association. The
Court examined briefly the functions of the Association Council
regarding the conditions for applying Article 2 of the Convention and
underlined the fact that only an associated state might request a
consultation with this body.
Having examined general characteristics, such as the legal nature
and objectives of the Convention and its institutional structure, the
Court then considered the meaning and scope of the Community
obligation under Article 2 para 1 of the Convention. The Community
obligation to abolish charges having an effect equivalent to customs
duties is, according to the Court, identical to the obligation which
the Member States assumed towards each other under Article 13 of the
EEC Treaty. The Court said that "by expressly referring, in Article
2(1) of the Convention, the Community undertook precisely the same
obligations towards the associated states to abolish charges having
equivalent effect as, in the Treaty, the Member States assumed towards
I, 47
each other .
	 Applying the standard requirements for direct effect
of a Community rule, the Court stated that "this obligation is
specific and not subject to any implied or express reservation on the
part of the Community" and therefore "capable of conferring on those
subject to Community law the right to rely on it before the courts".48
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The Pabst case49
 deals with the Association Agreement with
Greece, concluded by the Community and the Member States jointly. It
concerns the direct effect of Article 53 of the Association Agreement,
a provision which is similar to Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.
According to the Court, Article 53 of the Association Agreement
performs the same functions as Article 95 of the EEC Treaty, and is
therefore directly effective. The Court arrived at this conclusion on
two grounds: the objectives and the nature of the Agreement and the
nature and purpose of the provision concerned, which met the standard
requirements for direct effect of a Community rule. The Court
examined the provision of the Agreement in the light of the
objectives. It viewed this provision, intended to ensure an equal
fiscal treatment of products imported from Greece, as being one of the
measures aimed at preparing and facilitating the incorporation of
Greece within the Community. It is clear therefore that the Court
considers the Association Agreement as already being a preliminary,
preparatory stage for the ultimate incorporation of Greece within the
Community. The Court also recognised that the provision imposed a
clear unconditional obligation, the application or effect of which
required no further action.
Another type of agreement on which the Court has ruled is the
free trade agreement. In view of the fact that association agreements
reflect special relations between the Community and the countries
concerned, the rulings on the free trade agreement may be more
important to the question to be discussed later, as the 1978 EEC-China
Trade Agreement has more in common with these free trade agreements
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than with the association agreements concluded between the Community
and other countries.
The Polydor case5 ° concerned the issue of the protection of
industrial and commercial property rights under Articles 14 and 23 of
the free Trade Agreement concluded by the Community with Portugal
which are similar to Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty. In this
case, two fundamental issues were raised before the Court. First,
could Articles 14 and 23 be interpreted in the same manner as the
Court interpreted Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty? Secondly,
even if the case law of the Court could not be prayed in aid, could
the relevant provisions of the agreement nevertheless have direct
effect?
Again, the Court based its reasoning on two considerations: the
nature and overall objectives of the agreement, and the specific
purpose which these provisions are to pursue. The Court first
characterised the nature of the agreement and underlined the
fundamental differences between that agreement and the EEC Treaty. It
then referred to the more modest objectives of the free trade
agreement, namely the mere liberalisation of trade between the
Community and Portugal. In the Court's view, the agreement sought to
eliminate customs duties and equivalent charges and quantitative
restrictions and equivalent measures. The Court also briefly
mentioned the function of the joint committee under which the
agreement was to operate.
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The second consideration concerned the nature of the provisions
of Articles 14 and 23 of the agreement on the elimination of trade
restrictions between the Community and Portugal which, the Court
recognised, were "expressed in terms... in several respects similar to
those of the EEC Treaty on the abolition of restrictions on
intra-Community trade." 5 ' The Court refused, however, to conclude
from this that the provisions of the agreement had the same meaning as
the comparable Treaty provisions. It emphasised that these provisions
must be understood within their proper context and framework and in
the light of their specific purpose. According to the Court, "such a
similarity of term is not sufficient reason for transposing to the
provisions of the agreement the above mentioned case law, which
determines in the context of the Community the relationship between
the protection of industrial and commercial property rights and the
rules on the free movement of goods." 52
 The case law evolved against
the background of an intention to promote the creation and development
of a common market. "The scope of that case law must indeed be
determined in the light of the Community's objectives and activities
as defined by Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty." 53 . According to
the Court, such considerations do not, however, apply to the free
trade agreement with Portugal simply because it does not seek to
promote and establish a common market. Consequently, the Court
considered that the provision of the agreement seeking to eliminate
quantitative restrictions and equivalent measures did not have "the
same purpose as [the equivalent provision of] the EEC Treaty."54
Similarly, the extensive interpretation of the measures restricting of
the protection of industrial and commercial property rights is also to
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be seen in the light of the function of these rights in promoting or
binding the development of a common market. The protection of these
rights within the framework of a free trade agreement performs a
different function. Accordingly, the same industrial or commercial
property right enjoyed under a national law of a Member State may be
treated differently depending on whether it is exercised in
intra-Community trade or in a trade relation with a third state which
has concluded a trade agreement with the Community. The Court further
justified this differentiation by reference to the institutional
structure of the Community.
For all these reasons the Court concluded that the prohibition
against the importation of a product from Portugal, based on the
exercise of copyright, was justified on the basis of Article 23 of the
agreement and did not therefore constitute a measure having an effect
equivalent to a quantitative restriction prohibited by Article 14 of
the Agreement. Since Article 14 of the Agreement was not applicable
in this case, the Court left the important question as to the direct
effect of this provision unanswered.
The very important case, Kupferber 55 , also related to the free
trade agreement between the Community and Portugal. It concerned the
rate of monopoly equalisation duty imposed on imports of Port wine
from Portugal, which allegedly infringed Article 21 para 1 of the
agreement, which prohibited fiscal discrimination of imported
products. Questions raised were whether this provision had direct
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effect and, if so, whether it had the same meaning as Article 95 para
1 of the EEC Treaty.
Because of the fundamental importance of the questions raised,
several Member States participated in the preliminary procedure. In
their view, the standard requirements for direct effect of a Community
rule were not applicable to free trade agreement concluded by the
Community with third states. They based their view on the following
grounds: the divided competence of the Community in the field of
external relations; the principle of reciprocity; the mechanism for
settling differences between the contracting parties; and the safety
clauses permitting derogations from the agreement56.
The Court dismissed these arguments, and made several noteworthy
statements. As to the principle of reciprocity, the Court considered
that the refusal by a national court to recognise the direct effect of
an agreement did not per se constitute an infringement of reciprocity
in the implementation of the agreement57 . Contracting parties to an
international agreement are free to determine their own legal
procedure for the pursuit of the agreed objectives. The Court
examined the mechanics for the settlement of disputes and said: ttthe
mere fact that the contracting parties have established a special
Institutional framework for consultations and negotiation inter se in
relation to the implementation of the agreement is not in itself
sufficient to exclude all judicial application of that agreement" if
58
an unconditional and clear obligation is provided.
	
The Court
considered that the safety clauses permitting a derogation from the
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agreement were not, in this instance, sufficient in themselves to
affect the direct applicability 59 . The Court confirmed that "neither
the nature nor the structure of the agreement concluded with Portugal
may prevent a trade from relying on the provisions of the said
agreement before a court in the Community." 6° Nevertheless, to have
direct effect, a provision must be unconditional and sufficiently
clear. Whether it meets those requirements or not is to be judged
within the framework of the agreement and in the light of its meaning
and purpose61 . According to the Court, in this case, the
liberalisation of trade, by the elimination of customs duties and
equivalent charges and the abolition of quantitative restrictions and
equivalent measures, could still be frustrated by discriminatory
fiscal measures and practices62 . For this reason, the prohibition of
such practices was an indispensable complement to the traditional
means of liberating trade. Thus "the first paragraph of Article 21 of
the Agreement imposes on the Contracting Parties an unconditional rule
against discrimination in matters of taxation, which is dependent only
on a finding that the products affected by a particular system of
''
taxation are of like nature.	 The Court concluded that the
provision might therefore be applied by a national court and have
direct effect throughout the Community.
This case has some points worthy of note. First, by contrast
with the above, Kupferberg seems to indicate that the legal nature of
an agreement is irrelevant to its effect. In Bresciani, the Court
based its decision as to the direct effect of the Convention, inter
alia, on the ground of the special link between the African states and
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the Community, a link already provided for by the Treaty64 . In Pabst,
one of the considerations taken into account on the question of the
direct effectiveness of a provision of the Association Agreement
prohibiting fiscal discrimination was that this provision had to
prepare for and facilitate the incorporation of Greece within the
Community65 . However, in the Kupferberg case, which dealt simply with
a free trade agreement, the Court went further. In this case the
agreement neither established a special link with the Community, as in
Bresciani, nor did it prepare for future membership of a country
within the Community, as in Pabst. Kupferberg suggests that neither
the legal nature of an agreement nor the intensity of its link with
the Community is relevant to the direct effectiveness of an agreement.
Another point is that the unconditional nature of an obligation,
one of the essential requirements for direct effect, is closely
related to the conditions under which safeguarding measures derogating
from an obligation may be taken by a contracting party. Clearly, if a
contracting party may, according to the safety clauses, take such
measures unilaterally, the unconditional nature of an obligation may
be in question. In Kupferberg, the Court placed great emphasis on the
specific conditions under which such measures might be taken under the
agreement. These involved a joint examination of the intended
measures by the contracting parties within the joint committee.
In a most recent and probably most important case, Bulk Oil, a
fundamental issue arose as to whether the 1975 EEC-Israel Trade
Agreement shall have a direct effect. The Court was asked whether
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this agreement has prohibited a Member State from implementing a
policy imposing new quantitative restrictions or measures having an
equivalent effect on export to Israel 66
 and whether the relevant
provisions of the agreement have a direct effect so as to enable an
67individual to rely on them before a Court.
The Court first noted the objective of the EEC-Israel Trade
Agreement as being the progressive abolition of the main obstacles to
trade between the parties and the promotion of commercial
reciprocity. 68
 It then examined the specific obligations concluded in
the relevant provisions. Article 3 of the agreement expressly
prohibited any new quantitative restrictions on imports or measures
having an equivalent effect. With regard to exports, on the other
hand, Article 4 simply prohibited the introduction of new customs
duties or changes having an equivalent effect. Neither that Article
nor any other provisions of the EEC-Israel Trade Agreement expressly
prohibited quantitative restrictions on exports or measures having an
equivalent effect on trade between the Community and Israel. 69
 The
Court then concluded that the EEC-Israel agreement in 1975 did not
prohibit the imposition of new quantitative restrictions or measures
having an equivalent effect on export from a Member State to Israel.
Because of such a conclusion, the Court ruled that there was no need
to reply to the question of the direct effect of the agreement.7°
The importance of this ruling shall by no means be ignored. In
this case, the Court did not mention the nature of the agreement, nor
did it mention the relations between the Community and Israel as it
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did in Bresciani. The Court simply referred to the provisions of the
EEC-Israel agreement in coming the conclusion that the agreement
itself did not prevent either party imposing quantitative restrictions
71
on export.	 This case is important because first, the EEC-Israel
agreement is an ordinary trade agreement. It is neither an
association agreement nor even a free trade agreement. Secondly, the
relationship between the EEC and Israel is that they are normal
trading partners. They are neither former colonials of having special
relations between Member State(s) and Israel; nor preparing for
Israel's future membership of the EEC. What the Court had done was to
find out whether the relevant provisions in the agreement had created
clear and unconditional right or obligation to the party in question.
2. Some conclusions
The case law on this subject is far from sufficient to enable a
definite conclusion to be drawn. However, some points are
nevertheless clear.
First, the legal nature or basis of an agreement is not the
decisive factor in the consideration of direct effect. Thus, the
Court has recognised the direct effect of an association agreement and
a free trade agreement as well as an ordinary trade agreement, as
illustrated by the Bresciani, Pabst, and Kupferberg cases. In this
regard, it is a pity that the Court did not give a clear ruling in the
Buil Oil case because this case involves an ordinary trade agreement.
As to the nature and intensity of the link between an agreement and
the Community legal order which is a pre-requisite to a finding of
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direct effectiveness, the case law of the Court is undecided. In
Bresciani the Court stressed the special and close link between the
Yaounde Convention and the Community legal order and its objectives,
as it did in Pabst with respect to the association agreement with
Greece. In both cases this special relationship constituted one of
the grounds of the Court's decision. In Kupferber on the other hand,
the Court ignored the weaker and looser relationship between the free
trade agreement and the ordinary trade agreement and the Community
legal order than was apparent in relation to any of the
above-mentioned association agreements.
Secondly, the Court has always attached great importance to the
overall objectives of an agreement and to the specific purpose of a
particular provision. In Polydor, having compared the modest
objectives of a free trade agreement with the ambitious objectives of
the EEC Treaty, the Court ruled that the provisions of such an
agreement must be understood in their proper context. A similarity of
terms is not sufficient to justify the interpretation of provisions of
an agreement by reference to case law on similar provisions in the EEC
Treaty. According to the Court, because of different objectives, a
provision of a Community agreement whose wording is similar to or even
identical with a Treaty provision may not have the same meaning as the
Treaty provision.
Thirdly, the Court's attitude towards the institutional structure
created by various agreements has been inconsistent. In International
Fruit Company, the lack of jurisdiction for settling disputes between
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the parties was one of the grounds for denying direct effect to the
GATT provisions. In Pabst, on the other hand, the Court did not refer
to the Arbitration Court of Association established under the
association agreement with Greece. In fact, in that case the Court
was not concerned with the institutional structure of the association
agreement. In Polydor the Court referred to the different
institutional structure of the Community to justify the narrow
interpretation of the provision concerned. In Kupferberg, however,
the Court did not mention this lack of jurisdiction although dealing
with the same agreement. In Bulk Oil, the Court did not mention the
institutional structure neither.
Fourthly, one of the essential prerequisites for a finding of
direct effect of a provision is the unconditional nature of an
obligation created by the provision, as the Court ruled in Pabst, Bulk
Oil and Kupferberg. In Kupferber the Court ruled that a safety
clause under the agreement, permitting a derogation from the
particular obligation, did not preclude direct effectiveness, since a
derogation is permissible only subject to specific conditions, for
example, following a consultation between the contracting parties
within a joint committee.
Finally, as regards the principle of reciprocity, the Court took
no explicit stand on the requirement for reciprocity. In Haegemann
the Court took the first step by stressing that an imbalance of
obligations assumed by the contracting parties did not necessarily
preclude the direct effect of the association agreement in question.
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In Kupferberg the Court's ruling was quite clear. In its view the
failure of one of the contracting parties to ensure that an agreement
had a direct effect in its jurisdiction did not, according to general
principles of international law, infringe the reciprocity required for
a full and faithful performance of the agreement, as in practice
national courts do not take into consideration the principle of
reciprocity when considering the effect of international agreements
within their legal systems. The Court thus rejected one of the main
objections to the direct effect of an agreement concluded by the
Community.
3. Analysis of EEC-China Agreement
The issue of the direct effect of the 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement may now be examined in the light of this jurisprudence.
First, although the rulings in Bresciani, Pabst, and Kupferberg
make it clear that the legal nature of an agreement or its legal basis
is irrelevant to the Court's decision on the direct effect of the
agreement, it is too early to conclude that the legal nature or legal
basis of the 1978 Trade Agreement between China and the Community
creates no obstacles to the direct effect of its provisions. In
Kupferberg, the Court held that the relevant provision of the
EEC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement had direct effect without mentioning
the legal nature and legal basis of the agreement. In Bulk Oil the
Court also did not mention the nature and legal basis of the
agreement. However, in Bresciani the Court stressed the special
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relationship between the Community and the African states and
Madagascar. And in Pabst the Court emphasised the purpose of the
association agreement, which was to prepare for and facilitate the
assimilation of Greece to the Community.
Even if Kupferberg is to be taken into account, it should be
borne in mind that political and economic relations between the
Community, Portugal and Israel are closer than those between the
Community and China. Because of the close political and economic
relations, Portugal subsequently became a member of the Community.
Furthermore, as China is classified as a non-market economy, the Trade
Agreement concluded with the Community is based on the Community's
trade agreement proposal with State-trading countries. The legal
nature of this is different both from that of free trade agreements
and from that of the ordinary trade agreement.
Although the case law tends to favour the direct effect of the
agreement concluded by the Community with non-member states, how far
72the Court can, and will, go in this direction is not clear
Particularly in view of the weaker and looser relations between the
Community and China, the direct effect of the 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement seems in doubt.
Secondly, linked with the first point, the legal nature of the
1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement is reflected by its limited objectives.
Compared with the wide objectives of Yaounde Convention II, and the
association agreement with Greece 74 , the objectives of the EEC-China
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Trade Agreement are limited and its scope is narrow. The first
paragraph of the Agreement describes the objectives of the agreement
as the development of economic relations and trade and the giving of a
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new impetus to these relations . Consistent with these limited
objectives are the main heads of agreement, such as mutual MFN
treatment, balanced trade, friendly consultations, favourable
consideration for imports from the Community and increasing
liberalisation of imports from China, promotion of technical exchanges
and personnel contacts. The limited scope of the 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement is further illustrated by comparison with the free trade
agreement between the Community and Portugal, which aims to
consolidate and to extend, upon the enlargement of the European
Community, the economic relations existing between the parties and the
harmonious development of their commerce in order to contribute to the
construction of Europe76 . In order to achieve this end, the agreement
provides for the progressive elimination of the obstacles to free
trade, in line with the GATT provisions concerning the establishment
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of a free trade area , whereas the EEC-China Trade Agreement aims
merely to promote trade and economic relations.
In Bulk Oil, the EEC-Israel agreement has a modest object in
comparison with association agreements and even free trade agreements.
However, its objects are very clear, definite and concrete, ie to
progressively abolish the main obstacles to trade between the parties.
Thirdly, it is apparent from the above discussion that the nature
and the purpose of the provision in question and whether it imposes a
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clear, unconditional obligation also play a crucial role in the
Court's determination of its direct effect. The 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement, which contains 11 Articles, concerns general matters
relating to bilateral trade. The MFN treatment accorded by Article 2
provides the main legal basis for bilateral trade. The terms of this
Article aim to promote the trade and the obligation imposed by this
provision is clear. rts application and effect require no further
acts. However, whether the Court will recognise the direct effect of
such a provision is doubtful, especially in view of the nature,
structure and general objectives of the Agreement.
In Article 4 of the Agreement the Chinese side promises to give
favourable consideration to imports from the European Community. The
Community exporters will have every opportunity to participate in
trade with China. In return the Community will "strive for an
increasing liberalisation of imports" from China, it will endeavour to
extend the list of products for which imports from China have been
liberalised and to increase the amount of quotas. Like other
provisions in the Agreement, this is a general guideline and statement
of intent. The application of this sort of provision needs further
actions. Such a provision in the Agreement has less possibility of
being recognised to have direct effect by the Court. Either there is
no clear, unconditional obligation, or the provision concerns the
governmental arrangement only.
As far as reciprocity is concerned, the Chinese legal system
adopts a different approach towards the direct effect of international
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agreements. Since the Court has ruled that a failure of one of the
contracting parties to recognise the direct effect of an agreement
does not infringe the principle reciprocity so long as a full and
faithful performance of the agreement is provided for 78 , an
application of how the agreement is implemented within the Chinese
legal system is not relevant to a consideration of the direct effect
of the agreement in the Community.
Finally, the institutional aspect and the safeguard clause are
also worthy of note. As mentioned above, the institutional aspect is
not conclusive for the Court has shown different attitudes in various
cases. The EEC-China Trade Agreement provides for the establishment
of a joint committee to be responsible for the administration
implementation of the agreement. However, the function of the joint
committee is completely different from that of the Community
institutions, and also of institutions established under association
agreements. Thus, the lack of the jurisdiction for settling disputes
between the Community and China arising out of the application of the
Trade Agreement, and even the lack of jurisdiction to ensure a uniform
interpretation of the Agreement by the contracting parties, may give
grounds to the Court to reject the direct effect of the Agreement, as
it did in International Fruit Company and implied in Polydor.
As far as the safeguard clause is concerned, the EEC-China Trade
Agreement calls for friendly consultation before any protective
measure is taken. However, Article 5(2) provides that in the urgent
situation unilateral action may be taken. The consultation obligation
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imposed in the Agreement is thus likely to be avoided if one of the
contracting parties alleges that the situation justifies it. Under
these circumstances it is very unlikely that the Court will grant a
direct effect to the provisions of the Agreement.
C. The Effect of the Agreement in China
Many writers have discussed the treaty law of the People's
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Republic of China . However, little research has been done on the
relationship between Chinese municipal law and international treaties
to which China is a party, and on the possible direct effect of an
international treaty within the Chinese domestic legal system. This
part of the Chapter will analyse the nature and the role of
international treaties in the People's Republic of China, examine the
circumstances in which a trade agreement may have direct effect in
China and consider whether the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement may have
direct effect.
1. The PRC Treaty Making Process
China considers that treaties are the principal source of
80international law . In practice China regards a treaty as the
principal instrument according its international rights and
obligations 81 . The treaty-making process followed by China does not




Under the 1954 PRC Constitution the plenipotentiary to
negotiation was to be appointed by the head of state, ie, the Chairman
of the PRC, in accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress ("NPC") (the Chinese parliament
equivalent82 ). In practice, the plenipotentiary could be the Premier,
the Foreign Minister, other persons and even the Chairman himself83.
However, under the 1982 PRC Constitution, although the Standing
Committee of the NPC still exercises the functions of appointing the
plenipotentiary, the negotiation of treaties and agreements is clearly
the responsibility of the State Council (the PRC executive of the
Government) 84 . Article 89(9) of the 1982 Constitution authorises the
State Council to "conduct foreign affairs and conclude treaties and
agreements with foreign states."85
It is China's practice to delegate full power to its
representatives when it is to negotiate a formal treaty 86 . This
87
authority is usually referred to in the preamble to the treaty
However, when the head of state negotiated a treaty himself in the
l950s and 1960s, full power was not required 88 . In the 1970s and




The common practice of most countries in the treaty making
process is that, when negotiations have been concluded and the treaty
is embodied in proper form, the plenipotentiaries sign the treaty89.
China follows this practice. However, China regards the signature as
having three different functions:-
(1) to give the treaty effect in the case of treaties which do
not require ratification90;
(ii) to ensure the authentication of the text or treaty; and
(iii) where appropriate, to make the treaty ready for
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ratification
Sometimes the negotiating representative merely signs a treaty ad
referendum or by initialling. This is consistent with international
practice. As to the effect of this act, Judge Fitzmaurice holds that
initialling or signing ad referendum by a representative does not bind
his government 92 . Chinese state practice and PRC writers seem to take
a similar position93 . This particular point was made very strongly by
the PRC in relation to the Sino-Indian border dispute over the
validity of the McMahon Line. The PRC claims that the draft treaty of
the 1914 Simla is not binding on China since the Chinese
representative only initialled his name94.
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Ratification
Ratification is the final confirmation given by the parties to an
international treaty concluded by their representatives. Question as
to which organ is competent to ratify a treaty depends upon the
municipal law of the states concerned. In China's case this function
is exercised jointly by the Standing Committee of the NPC and the
Chairman (President after 1982) of the state95.
There is no general rule of international law prescribing what
kinds of treaty require ratification. This question, too, is
determined by the municipal law of the parties and by the provisions
of the treaty itself. Chinese law has made it clear however. The
Standing Committee of the NPC has decided by resolution that treaties
which require the ratification of the Standing Committee are treaties
of peace, mutual non-aggression, friendship, alliance and assistance,
and all other treaties which expressly require ratification. All
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other agreements may be approved by the State Council
The conclusion of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement
When the two parties decided to negotiate an appropriate trade
agreement in May 1975 during the visit made by Sir Christopher Soames
(then Vice President of the Commission) to Peking97 , China was still
undergoing the "cultural revolution" 98 . There was, de facto, no head
of the State at that time99 , and later, by virtue of the amended
constitution in 1975, there was, de jure, no head of the State. 100
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Some of the functions exercised by the Chairman of the State under the
1954 PRC Constitution were channelled to the Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the NPC101.
During this period the negotiations for trade agreements with
other countries were conducted by the State Council. In the case of
the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Trade was
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authorised to negotiate it . The Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr LI
Qiang, signed the agreement 103
 and the Agreement was finally approved
by the State Council104.
2. International Treaty and the Municipal Law: PRC's Attitudes and
Practices
There is no specific provision in the PRC Constitution regarding
the status of an international treaty to which China is a party,
within the Chinese domestic legal system. However, one prominent
Chinese writer once wrote that, in order for an obligation under an
International treaty to have effect within a state, the state must
take legislative measures to implement the treaty°5 . How to
implement the treaty is a matter of municipal law and different
countries may have different systems. A state may adopt special
legislative measures every time that it concludes a treaty; or it may
have a general rule that, once a treaty is entered into, it has
automatic effect in the domestic legal system; or it may, by virtue of
custom, implicitly accept the binding force of the treaty in its
domestic legal system'° 6 . The view expressed by this author does not
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diverge widely from such Western writers as Lauterpacht-Oppenheim,
Verdross, McNair and 0 Connell
China's state practice with regard to the relationship between
international treaties and municipal law exhibits similarities to
practice in Western countries. In China, when a treaty is ratified or
approved, it comes into force in accordance with its provisions; or if
a treaty does not need ratification or approval according to its
provisions, it comes into force upon the signature or on a date
specified by the treaty. There is no other legislative action needed
to implement the treaty in the Chinese domestic legal system unless
the treaty so requires.
The treaty will be published in Chinese official publications. A
treaty ratified by the Standing Committee of the NPC will be published
in the Gazette of the Standing Committee. All treaties, including
agreements which do not need ratification by the Standing Committee,
but only need approval by the State Council, and agreements which come
into force upon signature, will normally be published in Zhong Hua
Renflin GongfleGuo GuoJi TiaoYie Ji (Collections of Treaties of the
People's Republic of China or Treaties Series of the People's Republic
108
of China) by the Chinese Foreign Ministry
	 . According to Chinese
practice, once a treaty comes into force it becomes part of the
domestic legal system and it is binding on the State of the People's
Republic of China.
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If a treaty provision is in conflict with the domestic law of the
People's Republic of China, which one should prevail? Although the
PRC Constitution is silent on this point, the recent development of
the PRC regulations provides sufficient grounds to conclude that under
current Chinese law, if a treaty to which the PRC is a party conflicts
with Chinese domestic law, the treaty will prevail, except for any
provision of a treaty in respect of which China has declared a
reservation. Article 6 of the China Foreign Economic Contract Law of
1985 states "When an international treaty that relates to a contract
and which the People's Republic of China has concluded or participated
in has provision(s) that differ from the law of the People's Republic
of China, the provision(s) of the said treaty shall be applied, with
the exception of clauses to which the People's Republic of China has
declared reservation."109
This position is reinforced in the newly promulgated Civil Law of
the People's Republic of China. The General Principles of Civil Law
of the People's Republic of China provide that "when an international
treaty that the People's Republic of China has concluded or
participated in contains a provision different from the Civil Law of
the People's Republic of China, the provision of the international
treaty applies except for an article to which the People's Republic of
China has declared a reservation."110
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3. Direct Effect of International Treaties in China
a. International Practice
The notion of direct effect was first developed by the US Supreme
Court.' 1 ' It was later adopted by European countries 112 , and further
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developed by the European Court of Justice	 . It is generally
accepted that an international treaty is directly effective if it can
be directly applied by national courts and national authorities, if it
establishes subjective rights and duties for the individual and if the
individual can rely on it before national courts and national
authorities. Direct effect presupposes first of all that the treaty
can take effect within domestic law. This is possible, without
involving the national legislature, as long as the monist doctrine is
followed. On the other had, if the dualist theory of the relationship
of international law to municipal law is followed, a transformation,
an adaptation or an implementation then becomes necessary, which is
either embodied in the constitution or provided in some other way.
It is also widely accepted that the question of direct effect is
essentially a problem of the enforcement of treaties and is a matter
to be determined by the municipal law of a given state1'4.
b. Chinese practice
Professor Maresceau rightly pointed out that direct effectiveness
does not live a life apart, but is intertwined with political, social
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and economic realities 115 . This is specially true in China's case,
where the legal system is undergoing a process of re-establishment and
development, and the country has re-opened to the outside world only
fairly recently. There is not only a lack of obvious answers to the
notion of the direct effect of international treaties in the
constitution texts, but also a lack of judicial decisions in rulings
on this issue. It has been discussed by academics only rarely6.
Nevertheless, positive signals, in favour of direct effect, are
emerging from both legislative and judicial branches.
As discussed above, according to PRC's practice, once a treaty
comes into force, it binds China at international level, and it also
becomes part of domestic law; no further legislative action is
required. In theory, therefore, there are no obstacles to prevent the
application of a treaty in Chinese courts. Moreover, the recent
legislative development, to let the treaty prevail over domestic laws
as basic as the Foreign Economic Contract Law, the Civil Law and the
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Civil Procedure Law , has paved the way for the direct effect of an
international treaty in domestic law.
In Chinese case law, there has been very few cases involving the
direct effect of an international treaty. However, in a case
concerning a Soviet citizen who hijacked an aeroplane to China on 19th
December 1985, the Harbing People's Court found the case admissible,
relying on the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Convention and the Montreal
Convention, to which China became a party in January 1978 and October
1980 respectively. It was a pity that the court did not go into any
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detailed discussion of the direct effect of these conventions in
China, but simply applied these conventions, and sentenced A S H Ogray
(the Soviet hijacker) to eight years' imprisonment 18 . In its review,
119the Chinese Supreme People s Court confirmed the decision
It is interesting to observe in the direct effect analysis
concerning China that, instead of case rulings, the Chinese Supreme
People's Court, on at least one occasion takes initiative to give the
legal opinions at the time when China accedes to the New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration120.
In its circular on 10th April, 1987 to local high courts, intermediate
courts and other special courts (such as the maritime courts), the
Supreme People's Court made it clear that the Convention mentioned
above Is directly applicable in China's courts. And If the provisions
of the Convention are different from provisions of the Chinese Law of
Civil Procedure, the Convention, not the Chinese Law of Civil
12].Procedure, applies except where China declared a reservation
	 , ie,
(a) the convention should be applied reciprocally; and (b) it should
not include the disputes between foreign (direct) investors and the
host country government 122 . The Supreme People's Court does not lay
down any criteria for the direct effect of an international treaty in
China. It merely specifies which cases may be admissible in Chinese
123
courts and what court has jurisdiction
Although no criteria for direct effect have yet been established
by the Chinese court, it is submitted that general international
practice should be applied here. As China has increasingly more
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interchanges with the international community, then more cases of this
sort will inevitably come before Chinese courts. The court has to
evolve its general approach towards the notion of direct effect.
4. The Possibility of Direct Effect of the 1978 EEC-China Trade
Agreement
Since there have been few cases in China about the direct effect
of an international treaty and, indeed, none on the direct effect of
an international trade agreement, it is speculative to consider the
direct effect of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement. Nevertheless, a
short discussion on this issue may still be helpful in understanding
the way China implements international trade agreements.
a. Trade Agreements in General
Arguably, the Chinese government regards the trade agreements
with other countries as matters between countries and governments, not
directly involving the rights and duties of individuals of those
countries. In these circumstances there is little chance for an
individual to obtain a positive ruling as to the direct effect of a
trade agreement. On the other hand, before the start of the
fundamental reform in 1979, enterprises in China were either owned by
the State, or owned collectively and the operation of these
enterprises were subject to the State plan. Private individual
business rarely existed. There was no necessity or possibility for
enterprises to sue the government or its organs in the court, invoking
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international trade agreements 124 . Only in the last few years, when
the private economy has played an increasingly more important role and
the State-owned enterprises have been substantially decentralised125
and probably most importantly, over fifteen thousand foreign
subsidiaries or joint ventures have been established to the end of
1261988	 , has it become even conceivable that an individual might
invoke the international trade agreement to sue the government or its
organs. An equally important factor is that, after thirty years of
subordination to the government and indeed to the Party, the judicial
system has gradually become mature while the judicial branch has
become more independent. This gives a most important factor for the
possibility of the direct effect of the international trade agreement
127in China
b. The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement Analysis
As discussed in Part B, it is very unlikely that the European
Court of Justice will give a positive ruling as to the direct effect
of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement because of its nature, its
general wording and its imprecise provisions' 28 . The position may be
the same before the Chinese courts. In an interview, judges in the
High People's Court of Zhejang Province suggested that it was not
possible to hold that the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement had direct
effect because there was no precedent and no clear and substantive
rights and duties were accorded to individuals by the Agreement. They
might view differently an international trade agreement which clearly
created rights and duties for individuals'29.
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The provisions of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement do not
establish clear rights and duties for individuals so Chinese courts
are unlikely to give direct effect to this Agreement. For instance,
Article 6 of the agreement states that both contracting parties should
promote visits by "persons, groups and delegations from economic,
trade and industrial circles." If, for example, a business group in
Shanghai could not visit a company in Rome because the the Shanghai
Municipal Government failed to give permission to the businessmen
because of lack of foreign exchange, could these businessmen go to
court, invoking the 1978 Trade Agreement, for an order that the
Shanghai Municipal Government should grant the permission? If they
did, would the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court give them a
positive ruling? The answer seems to be in the negative. First, the
provision invoked in the agreement was originally for other
contracting party authorities to "grant each other the necessary
facilities" 30
 for mutual exchanges and contacts; second, the
provision is too vague for direct applicability. In other words, it
is not a mandatory provision and could not be invoked against
government action (or non-action).
c. Conclusion
It is still too early to evaluate what sort of treaties may have
direct effect in China. In applying certain treaty provisions,
Chinese courts have tacitly accepted that an international treaty may
have direct effect. Legal opinions from the Supreme People's Court
also suggest that an international treaty may have direct effect in
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China. Although no criteria for direct effect has been developed by
the Chinese courts, it is certain that an international trade
agreement which does not afford clear rights and duties to
individuals, such as the 1978 EEC China Trade Agreement, will not be
held to have direct effect.
D. Conclusion
The nature of the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement is clear; it is
different from association agreements concluded under Article 238 of
the Treaty of Rome; it is different from the agreements between the
Community and its "overseas countries and territories" such as the
Lomô Convention; it is also different from the free trade agreement
between the Community and the EFFA countries. It is an ordinary trade
agreement under Article 113 of the Treaty, concluded between the
European Community and a country classified as a State-trading country
on the basis of non-preference. Because of such nature, China as a
developing country, does not have any preferential treatment from the
European Community. In fact, the latter is imposing extra-
quantitative restrictions on imports from China.
The 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement is generally worded vaguely
and lacks practical details. It is hardly possible to get a positive
ruling from the European Court of Justice concerning the possibility
of the direct effect of such an agreement. According to the case law
development, the nature or basis of an agreement may not be the
decisive factor in the consideration of the direct effect but the
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Court has always attached great importance to the overall objectives
of an agreement and to the specific purpose of a particular provision.
An essential pre-requisite for finding a direct effect of a provision
is the unconditional nature of an obligation created by the provision.
Clearly, in order to be able to have a direct effect in front of the
European Court, a clear, unconditional right must be created in the
relevant provisions. The 1978 Trade Agreement in this regard has
failed to meet such a condition. It only provides a basic legal
framework for bilateral trade but the terms are flexible, each party
as a last resort can take unilateral action, therefore, no
unconditional obligations have been created. The European Court would
be unlikely to rule it as a direct effect.
On the other hand, the Chinese courts do not develop rules
governing the issue of a direct effect, although paradoxically, the
application of an international treaty in China does not require a
separate domestic regulation to adopt the international treaty.
Because of the characteristics of the Chinese legal and political
system, the issue of a direct effect of international treaty in front
of the Chinese court has not arisen. However, in the recent
development of economic reform and rebuilding the legal system, the
individuals, particularly foreign investors in China, may raise this
question in front of a Chinese court and the Chinese court should
adopt the rules and criteria of how an international treaty can be a
direct effect. In fact, in a recent case involving application of an
international convention, the High Court in North East China simply
applied the international convention without giving any explanation of
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the criteria or conditions for direct effect of international treaty
in a Chinese court, and the Supreme Court in Beijing upheld this
decision. It seems that the Chinese court is adopting international
practice as to how to deal with a direct effect issue.
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COMMUNITY RULES ON TRADE WITH CHINA
Notwithstanding the MFN treatment, the Community still imposes
quantitative restrictions on imports from China'. The Community rules
for dealing with China are, therefore, in two separate sets; one deals
with products which are liberalised, I e, products which are not
subject to quantitative restrictions; the other deals with products
which are not liberalised2.
This Chapter will discuss the legal problems of the Community's
internal rules in respect of trade with China. Comparisons will be
made with regard to the differences between the Community's internal
rules and its international obligations, the difference between the
Community's common rules for imports from China, the common rules for
imports from other State-trading countries and the common rules for
imports in general. The Community rules on the GSP, which is relevant
to trade with China, will also be briefly discussed.
A. Coiminunity Rules for Chinese Products which are Liberalised
Soon after the first trade agreement with China was concluded,
the European Community promulgated a Council Regulation on Common
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Rules for Imports from China3 to replace rules established by Council
Regulation (EEC) No 109/70 of 19th December, 1969 governing trade with
China, as well as with other planned economy countries 4 . This
Regulation was subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 1766/82 of 30th June, 1982 (the "1982 Regulation") 5 . The 1982
Regulation provides that all products listed in the Annex to the
Regulation may be imported into any part of the Community without
quantitative restrictions, subject to speif Ic exceptions and
derogations provided for by the Community instruments 6 . Common rules
established here in the 1982 Regulation (and previous Regulations)
have the nature of co-ordinating actions of the Member States, and
implementing the Trade Agreement between the European Community and
China. These rules include information and consultation procedures,
investigation and surveillance procedures and possible protective
measures.
1. Liberalisation of Products
The products which are liberalised In the Community market means
that such products will be able to enter into the Community from China
without being subject to any quantitative restriction. These products
were listed in Annex A to the 1978 Regulation and replaced by Annex A
to the 1982 Regulation 7 . This Annex was updated on 30th June, 1984 to
take account of amendments to the NIMEXE code and other changes 8 . The
list of products in the Annex have been further expanded pursuant to
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 268/85 of 31st January, l985.
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The European Community has always been very restrictive and
protective towards trade with China. In comparison with other
countries, the liberalised products originating in China are far less
than those originating in countries or regions other than those being
classified as State-trading countries included in the list of
countries contained in Annex II of Council Regulation (EEC) No 926/ 79
of May 1979 on common rules for imports (about 170 such countries and
regions) 10 , but more than liberalised products originating in Eastern
European countries. According to the 1978 Regulation and Council
Regulation No 926/79, there are more than 300 CCT Heading Number
products which are liberalised at Community level or Member States
level, originating in 170 countries and regions in the list of Annex
II of Regulation No 0926/79, which will be subject to quantitative
restrictions if they originate in China11 . Although the list of
liberalised products originating in China has been expanded from time
to time, these products are still far less than those originating in
other third countries. Clearly, the European Community maintains
discriminatory quantitative restrictions against imports from China on
the ground that China is not a member of the GATT, and China's special
economic system. On the other hand, the liberalised products
originating in China are always more than those originating in other
12State-trading countries, although only by a small margin . This
practice reflects the Community's commercial policy of differential
treatment, putting the State-trading countries in a more restrictive
position than other trade partners. It also reveals the fact that the
Community is willing to open its market to China more readily than to
other State-trading countries, in return for getting a foot into the
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huge potential Chinese market, and in return for China's willingness
to conclude a trade agreement with it, although the extent of this
opening up is strictly limited.
China has complained of the Community's unfair treatment towards
it from time to time. China regards this treatment as protective and
discriminatory and, therefore, unfair. China has requested on
numerous occasions that the Community revoke all these unfair
restrictions and liberalise products from China as stipulated in the
Trade Agreement13.
According to the Trade Agreement with China it is the Community's
obligation to liberalise products from China gradually. The European
Community has liberalised a substantial number of products originating
in China and imported into the Common Market, compared with the
products liberalised before the conclusion of the Trade Agreement, or
the liberalised products originating in other State-trading countries
who refused to conclude a trade agreement with the Community
individually at that time' 4 . According to the 1983 Regulation and
recent development, products originating in China (except textiles)
currently subject to the quantitative restrictions are much less, for
example, than the restricted products originating in the Soviet
15Union
The expansion of the scope of liberalised products is, however, a
unilateral action by the Community 16 . The Community itself decides
whether the specific products originating in China should be
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liberalised according to the obligation in the Trade Agreement and the
special situation in the domestic and international markets.
Negotiations, through the Joint Committee, may however play a very
important role in this regard.
In cases where the European Community does not, under pressure
from domestic industries, extend the list of liberalised products
originating in China, or even reintroduces quantitative restrictions
to previously liberalised products originating in China, could China
challenge the Community's action in any way? First of all, the
Community undertakes the obligation in the Trade Agreement to
introduce, progressively, measures extending the list of such
products. There is an international obligation, which is binding on
the Community.
Secondly, this obligation, it is submitted, is on the condition
that China will give favourable consideration to imports from the
Community. In other words, if the Community can establish that China
does not give the promised favourable consideration to imports from
the European Community, or gives unfavourable consideration, the
Community can accordingly refuse to expand the list of products
liberalised.
Thirdly, the Trade Agreement leaves this issue open. Actually,
the Agreement does not prevent the Community from not expanding the
list of products liberalised, or even reintroducing the quantitative
restrictions to previously liberalised products.
U
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Finally, according to state practice, the Chinese government
would not like to submit disputes on this issue to the European Court
of Justice or any other International tribunal; the most important way
for resolving disputes would be through discussions and negotiation
through the Joint Committee.
2. Community Information and Consultation Procedures
In order to monitor the actual trade with China, the Community
has established information and consultation procedures among the
Commission and the Member States. According to the 1978 Regulation
and the 1982 Regulation, the Member States must notify the Commission
where the trends In Imports appear to call for protective measures and
where they find the granting of an import authorisation applied for
might prejudice the success of any subsequent application of a
protective measure' 7 . The Commission will pass on the information to
18
all other Member States . The information required above must
contain evidence based on the following criteria:-
(a) the volume of imports, in particular where there has been a
significant increase, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the Community;
(b) the price of imports, in particular where there has been a
significant price under-cutting as compared with the price of a
like product in the Community;
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(c) the consequent impact on the Community producers of similar or
directly competitive products as indicated by trends in certain
economic factors such as:-




-	 price (ie, depression of price or prevention of price
increase which would normally have occurred)
-	 profits




Where a threat of serious injury is alleged, the Commission will
also examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular
20
situation is likely to develop into actual injury 	 In this regard,
account may be taken of such factors as the rate of increase of
exports to the Community, the export capacity in the country of origin
or export already in existence or which will be operational in the
foreseeable future, the likelihood that the resulting exports will be
to the Community and China's special economic system21.
Once the information is provided by the Member State concerned,
consultation may be held either at the request of a Member State or on
the initiative of the Commission within eight working days following
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receipt by the Commission of the information from the Member State22.
Consultations are conducted within the framework of an advisory
committee which consists of representatives of each Member State and a
representative of the Commission as its chairman. The scope of the
consultation covers an examination of the terms and conditions of
imports, the import trends, the various aspects of the economic and
commercial situations as regards the product in question and the
measures to be adopted23.
The Community rules for information and consultation procedures
regarding imports from China are not substantially different from the
rules regarding imports from other non-member countries, particularly
from other State-trading countries, although the Community may take a
more restrictive attitude when it examines the possibility of a threat
of serious injury developing into actual injury involving imports from
24China and other State-trading countries
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3. Community Investizations and Surveillance Procedures
The Community investigation and surveillance procedures have also
been established in accordance with the 1978 and 1982 Regulations and
other rules set up by the Commission. Like the Community commercial
policy in general, the Community also adopts a differential treatment
policy regarding investigation and surveillance procedures. It once
again puts China at a relative disadvantage insofar as the procedure
and criterion for imposing the surveillance measures are concerned.
The Commission Decision 80/47/EEC of December 20th, 197925 laid
down the Community procedures for surveillance and protective measures
governing imports from all non-member countries. The 1978 Regulation
and the 1982 Regulation also contain common rules on Community
procedures for investigation and surveillance on imports from China.
First of all, if it is apparent from the consultations that there
is sufficient evidence to justify an investigation, the Commission
will announce the opening of the investigation in the Official Journal
of the European Community, summarise the information sent to it and
state the period during which the interested parties can make their
views known in writing. It then begins the investigation, acting in
cooperation with the Member States 26 . The Commission will be in
charge of obtaining all necessary information and verifying it with
importers, traders, producers and trade associations where it is
considered appropriate. Upon request the Member States must supply
the Commission with all the information at their disposal on the
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27development of the markets of the product being investigated . The
Commission will then submit a report to the Advisory Committee, which
consists of representatives of each of the Member States, advising the
Community on matters such as protective measures, at the end of the
investigation. If the Commission considers that no Community
surveillance or protective measures are necessary, after consultation
with the Committee, it will publish a notice about the conclusion in
the Official Journal. If it deems that one of the other measures is
necessary, then it takes appropriate action. Notwithstanding the
provision mentioned above, the 1982 Regulation stipulated that
surveillance measures and, in an emergency, protective measures may be
taken at any time if it is justified28.
According to the 1982 Regulation, the Commission may impose three
different types of surveillance measures against imports from China,
where Community interests so require, either at the request of a
Member State or on its own initiative 29 . These surveillance measures
are: -
(a) retrospective surveillance; the procedure of such surveillance
should be laid down by the Commission;
(b) prior surveillance: in order to keep a check on trends in the
imports in question, such imports should be made subject to the
production of an import document. This document will be issued
30
or endorsed by Member States
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(c) where the situation of "causing or threatening to cause
substantial injury to Community producers of like or competing
products" is likely to arise, the Commission may:-
(1) limit the period of validity of any import documents
required under external trade regulations;
(ii) make the granting of such documents subject to certain
conditions and, as an exceptional measure, make the granting
of import authorisations subject to the insertion of a
revocation clause or to the prior notification and prior
consultation procedure discussed above31.
The surveillance against imports from China is more restrictive
in comparison with the measures relating to imports from other
non-member countries. First, the requirements for taking surveillance
measures against imports from China are more easily satisfied than
those from other non-member countries. According to Article 10 of
Regulation 288/82, if the Community wants to take surveillance
measures against imports from other non-member countries covered by
that Regulation, it must find: (i) the development on the market in
respect of a product originating in such a country threatens to cause
injury to Community producers of like or directly competing products;
(ii) the interests of the Community so require 32 . Whereas if the
imports are originating in China, the only requirement is "Community
interests so require." 33
 In other words, if the Community considers
that its interests require surveillance measures being taken, the
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Community can always do so freely without any other requirements or
preconditions specified by the Regulation.
Secondly, the procedure for taking surveillance measures makes
action against imports from China much easier than against imports
from other non-member countries. In the case of imports from China,
the Commission may take action, either at the request of a Member
State or on its own initiative, whereas in the case of imports from
other non-member countries, "where the decision to impose surveillance
is taken simultaneously with the liberalisation of importation of the
product in question, that decision will be taken by the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission."34
Obviously, such a requirement is more difficult to meet and takes a
longer time.
Thirdly, the surveillance measure Cc), ie, limiting the period of
validity of any import documents, or making the granting of such
documents subject to conditions, or subject to the insertion of a
revocation clause, is only applicable to imports from China 35 . It is
not applicable to the countries under Regulation 288/8236.
It is clear from the above discussion that both the procedure of
surveillance and the requirement for surveillance have placed China in
a position of being more closely watched and under more restrictive
surveillance compared with other EEC trading partners under the
Community rules for imports.
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It is, however, not quite so in comparison with the position of
other State-trading countries in the Community market 37 . Although
imports from these countries into the Community are governed by a
different Regulation, all restrictive treatment in taking surveillance
measures towards imports originating in these countries are basically
the same as towards imports originating in China discussed above38.
Nonetheless, in at least two respects, imports from these
State-trading countries are even more restrictively treated. First,
where prior surveillance is imposed, the free circulation of the
product in question is subject to the production of an import
document, issued or endorsed by Member States 39 . As far as China is
concerned, the 1982 Regulation promises that such documents will be
issued "free of charge, for any quantity requested and as quick as
possible following submission, in accordance with the national law in
force, either of a declaration or of an application by any Community
importer, regardless of his place of business in the Community."4°
With respect to other non-member countries under Regulation 288/82,
such document is guaranteed to be issued within five working days41.
However, when it comes to other State-trading countries, such
undertaking is not given. In other words, Member States hive great
freedom at their disposal to use administrative procedures and
formalities as a weapon to protect their producers in delaying the
issue of the documents 42 . Second, it has been authorised that the
total value or quantity of the imports originating in China, together
with other non-member countries, may exceed 5-10% of the value or
43
quantity given in the import documents . Other State-trading
44
countries, however, are not entitled to enjoy this flexibility
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4. Protective Measures
The 1978 Regulation and the 1982 Regulation give more freedom to
the Community and the Member States for taking protective measures
compared with the 1978 EEC-China Trade Agreement. Although both
Regulations stipulate that when protective measures are taken, due
regard for existing international obligations must be paid47 . When
the protective measures are taken according to the 1978 and 1982
Regulations, both Regulations seem not to have taken into account the
"friendly consultation" procedure required by the Trade Agreement
before the adoption of such measures. The 1982 Regulation states that
where a product is imported from China into the Community In such
greatly increased quantities or on such terms or conditions as to
cause, or threaten to cause, substantial injury to Community producers
of like competing products, and if in its interest the Community may,
acting at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, take
48
unilateral action . A Member State may also take such action (until
the end of 1984) as an interim protective measure if it considers that
49
there exists in its territory a situation as defined above . When
the Commission takes such action, the only obligation it has is to
notify the Council and the Member States promptly. The only
obligation for the Member State in question when it takes such action
50is to inform the Commission and other Member States . Neither the
Commission's action, nor the Member State's action is to be subject to
any "friendly consultation" according to the 1982 Regulation. In this
context, the Community has neglected the international obligations it
has undertaken.
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The Community was well aware of the gap between its international
obligations and its internal common rules. In November 1983 Council
Regulation (EEC) No 3421/83 was issued, entitled "Laying down certain
detailed rules for the implementation of the Trade Agreement between
the Community and China." 51 The Regulation admits that it is
necessary to lay down certain detailed rules for the implementation of
the safeguard clause provided for in Article 5 of the Agreement, by
way of derogation from Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/82, ie, the
1982 Regulation, of June 30th, 1982, on common rules for imports from
the People's Republic of China, and from Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3420/83 of November 14th, 1983 on import arrangements for products
originating in State-trading countries, not liberalised at Community
level52 . This Regulation also stipulates that where there are grounds
for the application by the Community of safeguard measures as provided
for in Article 5 of the Trade Agreement in respect of products
liberalised by the Community, the consultation must have been
completed53 . However, if the condition laid down in Article 5(2) of
the Agreement (ie, the exceptional case) is fulfilled ) the Commission
or a Member State may take safeguard measures in accordance with the
procedures laid down in Articles 11 and 13 of the 1982 Regulation
54
respectively . A consultation will take place within the Committee
provided for in Article 5 of the 1982 Regulation55 . In this way
Regulation (EEC) No 3421/83 has thus amended rules established by the
1978 Regulation and the 1982 Regulation and filled the gap between the
Community rules and its international obligations under the Trade
Agreement.
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The criterion for applying protective measures in respect of
imports from China is the same as that for imports from other
countries classified as State-trading countries 56 . In respect of
non-member countries other than those being classified as
State-trading countries, however, the Community sets forth different
criteria. In the case of imports from these non-member countries, the
Community Regulation adds more requirements for the Commission or
Member State to take any protective action. In addition to imports
which "cause or threaten to cause substantial injury", a critical
situation must be established in order to justify Community protective
measures, which is not required at all in the case of imports from
State-trading countries as well as from China. The Community may only
take protective measures against imports from non-member countries
other than State-trading countries "where a critical situation, in
which any delay would cause injury which it would be difficult to
remedy, calls for immediate intervention in order to safeguard the
"5interests of the Community. 	 Furthermore, when the Community takes
such measures, "where the establishment of a quota constitutes a
withdrawal of liberalisation, account will be taken in particular of:
(1) the desirability of maintaining as far as possible, traditional
trade flows; (2) the volume of goods exported under contracts
concluded on normal terms and conditions before the entry into force
of a protective measure within the meaning of this Title, where such
contracts have been notified to the Commission by the Member States
concerned.. ." . The reason why the Community takes a more
restrictive attitude towards alleged State-trading countries including
China in the case of protective measures has been discussed in
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Chapter III . Clearly the Community always keeps in mind the special
economic system of the State-trading countries. In the Community's
view, imports from these countries are more likely to cause market
disruption; this is the basis for Community rules towards imports from
these countries. The rules about the Community protective measures
evidence this concern once more.
B. Rules for Chinese Products which are not Liberalised
One of the characteristics of the EEC trade law is its invocation
of a substantial number of quantitative restrictions against its trade
partners, particularly against Socialist countries. In order to
regulate its imports of products subject to quantitative restrictions
from alleged State-trading countries, including China, the European
Community has progressively standardised the import arrangements since
the early 1970's60 . The important rules were included in Council
Regulation (EEC) No 3280/80, which was replaced by in Council
Regulation (EEC) No 3420/83 (the "1983 Regulation") 61 . The 1983
Regulation provides detailed rules for the establishment of import
quotas, for the amendment of that import arrangement and for the
administration of it.
1. The Establishment of QR
As discussed in Chapter III, the Community has the discretion to
impose unilaterally quantitative restrictions on selected imports from
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China according to the Trade Agreement. The establishment of
quantitative restrictions, and quotas for the products concerned, are
all decided by the Community side. The Chinese side may contest the
quantitative restrictions and ask the Community to lift such
restrictions, but it is upon the Community to decide whether or not to
lift them, and it is upon the Community to decide the amount of quotas
for the products concerned. The rules laid down here by the Community
are rather arbitrary and applicable to all State-trading countries
including China, although the Community makes certain gestures to woo
China.
The 1983 Regulation provides that the products listed in
Annex III to the Regulation will be subject to quantitative
restrictions in the Member States, and that the putting into free
circulation of such products will be subject to the production of an
import authorisation or equivalent document issued by the competent
62
authorities in the Member States concerned . Under the 1983
Regulation, before December 1st of each year the Council must lay down
the import quotas to be opened by the Member States for the following
year in respect of the various State-trading countries for the
63
relevant products . However, if no Council decision has been made by
that date, the existing import quotas will be extended on a
provisional basis for the following year, in which case the Council
will adopt, before March 1st of the new year, any necessary amendments
to the import quotas thus extended64.
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Although these rules apply to all alleged State-trading countries
including China, the Community, pursuant to its differential treatment
policy, has granted China more favourable treatment within this
framework, in comparison with other State-trading countries:
(i) As discussed in Part A, the Community has liberalised trade
in more products originating in China, so that they are not subject to
quantitative restrictions, than those originating in other
State-trading countries. In the 1981 and 1984 Joint Committee
meeting, the Community has, pursuant to the Trade Agreement, extended
65
the list of products not subject to the quantitative restrictions
(ii) In cases where the imports originating in China are subject
to quantitative restrictions along with other State-trading countries,
the Community tends to increase the amount of the quotas for China on
several occasions; these increases may not be available for imports
from other State-trading countries.
2. Administration of QR
The administration of quantitative restrictions is both conducted
by the Commission and the Member States. The Community, and sometimes
the Member States, has the power to amend the relevant quotas.
In cases where the Member State(s) intend(s) to increase imports
exceeding the quantitative restrictions, the Member State(s) may take
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the following action without having to initiate the amendment and
consultation procedures:
(i) With respect to products subject to quantitative restrictions
in a single Member State, in the light of the economic requirements of
the market, the Member State concerned may exceed the amount of the
quotas if the products are subject to quotas, or simply open import
facilities, if quotas for the specified products have not been laid
66down
(ii) With respect to products subject to quantitative restrictions
in more than one Member State, in an emergency Member States may open
further import facilities within the strictly defined annual limits
67provided for in accordance with the Regulation.
When a Member State, which is alone in maintaining a quantitative
restriction, proposes to abolish or suspend such a restriction, it
shall inform the Commission and the other Member States. The measure
shall be adopted by the Commission within 10 working days.
Member States must inform the Commission of any measures they
adopt, the measures shall not be subject to prior consultation but the
consultation may be held retrospectively at the request of either a
Member State or the Commission68.
The import arrangements established may be amended at the request
of Member States, subject to pre-consultation, to examine the effects
of the proposed measures with regard to completion of common import
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arrangements and to ensure that the proposed measures do not affect
the proper functioning of the Common Market. In particularly urgent
cases, measures to restrict import facilities by withdrawing
liberalisation of one or more products, or abolishing or reducing a
quota, may be applied by a Member State following the submission of a
request for amendment to the Commission without awaiting the
consultation within the Consultation Committee which would otherwise
69be required
The amendment procedures do not take into consideration the
consultation requirement, imposed by the Trade Agreement, the
Community has concluded with China. As discussed in Part A, the
Community has neglected its international obligation in this regard.
This ignorance has been corrected by a special Council Regulation (ie,
Regulation (EEC) No 3421/83). According to this Regulation, the
amendment measures will be taken after consultation with China. In an
exceptional case, however, where the situation does not admit any
delay, the Member State may take unilateral action in accordance with
the procedures discussed above70.
A consultation committee has been established according to the
1983 Regulation, consisting of representatives of the Member States
and chaired by a representative of the Commission 71 . The committee
may examine questions concerning the application of the Regulation and
relating to the administering of import arrangements in respect of
State-trading countries. It may also deal generally with questions
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relating to the administration of trade agreements concluded between
the Community and such countries72.
C. GSP Issue
Soon after the Trade Agreement was concluded between the EEC and
China, China became a beneficiary of the EEC's GSP scheme on January
1st, 1980. This part of the Chapter will discuss the EEC rules on GSP
which are relevant to China.
1. Qualification as a Beneficiary Country
The European Community instituted a system of general tariff
preferences for developing countries in 1971. Under this GSP scheme
certain products, notably finished and semi-finished industrial
products originating in the beneficiary countries, could enter into
the Community market duty free. The primary purpose of the GSP is to
increase the export earnings, to promote the industrialisation and to
accelerate the rates of economic growth of developing countries73.
According to the very nature of the GSP the beneficiary countries will
be the developing countries only.
Whether China should be able to qualify as a beneficiary country
is an interesting issue. As discussed above the European Community is
always in a dilemma as to how to treat China in bilateral trade
relations. In some cases China is treated as a State-trading country,
in others it is treated as a developing country. In its Trade
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Agreement with China the Community has avoided clarifying this
question, but the Trade Agreement was concluded on a non-preferential
basis. However, in the first Joint Committee meeting under the Trade
Agreement, the Community informed China it was to be treated as one of
the EC GSP beneficiaries 74 . On the contrary, the United States has
clearly recognised China as a developing country in its Trade
Agreement with China. Article 2 of the 1979 China-USA Trade Agreement
has specifically provided that "the contracting parties note, and will
take into consideration in the handling of their bilateral trade
relations, that, at its current state of economic development, China
is a developing country." 75
 But ironically, the United States has
never granted the GSP beneficiary status to China 76 . In comparison
with the United States GSP scheme, EEC's criteria for a GSP
beneficiary country is more flexible, less politically restrictive
and, therefore, easier to meet. Although there is no clear provision
in the 1978 Trade Agreement and in the 1985 Economic Cooperation
Agreement to recognise China as a developing country 77 , the Community
does recognise China, according to the degree and level of China's
development and industrialisation, as a developing country in this
regard.
2. Limited Operation of the GSP Application to China
The Commission proposed in July 1979 to include China among the
beneficiaries of the Community's GSP scheme for all products covered,
with the exception of agricultural products subject to quotas and
sensitive industrial products 78 . Special arrangements were planned
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with regard to textiles and China's admission is conditional on the
conclusion of an agreement on trade in those products 79 . The Council
has duly approved the proposal. In the following years the Commission
has constantly proposed to expand the products coverage of the GSP for
80
China . In the 1982 proposal, for instance, the Commission called
for the extension to agricultural products of the GSP offer "in its
entirety" to China 81 . But the Council has rejected the Commission's
suggestions. Although the Council later gradually added more GSP
products available to China, China is nevertheless a beneficiary
country which has been subject to many restrictions according to the
1987 Scheme82.
3. Perspectives
As a developing country China's trade balance with the Community
suffers considerable deficits. In 1985 and 1986 China's deficits with
the EEC reached as high as $3,346.2 million and $5,464.8 million
respectively83 . In the early stages of development and
industrialisation Chinese exports to the Common Market are not highly
competitive, especially the manufactured products. It is therefore
essential that China can continue to be a GSP beneficiary country in
order to keep healthy bilateral trade development. A recently passed
Resolution of the European Parliament highlights this situation. The
Resolution states "that the generalised preferences enjoyed by the
People's Republic of China must be maintained, bearing in mind that
its GNP is still very modest and that application of the preferences
,,84helps the growth of exports.
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The GSP for China should not only be maintained, but also be
expanded. The Community's restrictions on the GSP application on
China has affected China's ability to expand its trade with the
Community further85 . It is in both parties' interest to grant China
full access to the EEC's GSP scheme.
D. Conclusion
The Community's Common Rules on Trade with China have a two-fold
function: they function as an instrument of implementing the Trade
Agreement; and streamline relations between the Nember States within
the Community regarding trade with China.
Notwithstanding the MFN clause in the Trade Agreement, the
Community still imposes quantitative restrictions on imports from
China. For products which are not subject to quantitative
restrictions in the Community market, the Common Rules have
established procedures for information and consultation, investigation
and surveillance, and protective measures. For products which are
under quantitative restrictions in the Community the Common Rules have
also standardised procedures of how to create and amend the quotas and
for the administration of the quantitative restrictions.
Clearly, the Community and the Member States not only keep
discriminatory quantitative restrictions on a substantial number of
imports from China, but also retain great freedom to amend quotas and
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reintroduce quantitative restrictions on previous liberalised
products.
It is interesting to see that both the 1982 and 1983 Regulations
fail to keep in line with Article 5 of the EEC-China Trade Agreement
by allowing the Member States total freedom of taking protective
measures without complying with pre-consultation requirements of the
Trade Agreement. The Community in this regard has neglected its
international obligation in this respect.
However, the Community also unilaterally accorded China the
status as a beneficiary country of the EEC's GSP scheme, although a
number of products in the EEC's GSP scheme are not available for
China. It is submitted that the Community should fully open its GSP
benefits for China in order to further promote bilateral trade.
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CHAPTER VI
THE 1985 AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
When the 1978 Trade Agreement was due to expire, both parties
agreed to extend it for one year 1 . But this Agreement eventually
proved to be an insufficient framework for bilateral economic
exchanges. First and foremost, EEC-China economic contacts and
exchanges increased beyond the scope of trade. The Community started
to finance development projects in China in 19842, but the 1978
Agreement did not provide a legal basis for such activities. Second,
although the trade between the EEC and China has increased from
ECU1,820 million in 1975 to ECU6,718.9 million in 1984, the amount of
trade between the EEC and China was still far behind the amount of
trade between China and Japan, and between China and the United States
for the same period of time3 . Both Sides admitted that the potential
for trade and economic cooperation between parties is far from
exhausted4 . There was, therefore, a mutual desire to see the
Agreement expanded to include wider areas and provide for broader
legal bases. The EEC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement




The first part of the Cooperation Agreement concerns matters of
bilateral trade. It follows the rules in the 1978 Agreement. The
provisions relating to trade include an MFN clause, a safeguard
clause, a price clause and a balance of trade clause; both parties
making the same commitment as in the 1978 Trade Agreement to such an
6
extent that identical wording is used . However, the Cooperation
Agreement takes into account the different stages of economic
development between the Community and China; this fills the gap in the
1978 Trade Agreement relating to different levels of economic
development between two contracting parties 7 . Article 13 of the
Cooperation Agreement states that in view of the difference in the two
contracting parties' level of development, the European Economic
Community is prepared, within the context of its development aid
activities, and the means at its disposal and in accordance with its
rules, to continue its development activities in China. But this does
not mean the Community is going to classify China as a developing
country in bilateral trade relations, nor does it change the
Cooperation Agreement from a non-preferential one into a preferential
one. This provision is only recognising the different stages of
economic development between the Community and China and is addressing
the problem of financial cooperation and the Community aid activities
rather than the problem of trade relations. The Community continues
to treat China as a non-market economy without paying attention to the
changing economic structure in China and still imposes discriminatory
quantitative restrictions to a large number of products originating in
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China. Like the 1978 Trade Agreement, both parties retain great
discretion in trade policies regulating bilateral trade relations.
The actual operation of bilateral trade are regulated through
discussions and negotiations in the Joint Committee under the
Cooperation Agreement. Under such circumstances, the party who has
stronger economic power is in fact in a better position. The European
Community, therefore, still has advantages over China in bilateral
trade relations.
B. Areas of Economic Cooperation
The main feature of the Cooperation Agreement is not that it
incorporates provisions to facilitate economic cooperation between
China and the European Community, but that it facilitates such
cooperation with China at the Community level. The Member States have
individually conducted economic cooperation with China in various
areas before the Cooperation Agreement was concluded. Up to the end
of 1980 all Member States except Ireland had concluded economic (and
technical) cooperation agreements with China8 . The provisions for
economic cooperation are, therefore, no more than a recognition of the
existing practice as far as the Member States are concerned. However,
the Community's cooperation activities are conducted at the Community
level, which are supported by the Community budget. Also, these
activities shall be supplementary to the Member States' cooperation
activities but not conflicting with each other.
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The areas of economic cooperation is to extend to every possible
sector according to the Cooperation Agreement. It includes, in
particular, industry and mining; agriculture and agro-industry;
science and technology; energy; transport and communications;
environmental protection and cooperation in third countries 9 . These
areas correspond to the Community's competence in external relations
explicitly and implicitly granted by the Treaties establishing the
Community. According to the wording in Article 10 of the new
Agreement, no spheres of future cooperation are excluded as long as
they fall within the Community's competence.
The Cooperation Agreement has not only broadly mentioned the
areas for cooperation, but has also encouraged the application of the
various forms of industrial and technical cooperation for the benefit
of undertakings or organisations on both sides. Among other
activities, the Cooperation Agreement specifies the following methods
and forms of cooperation: joint production and joint ventures; common
exploitation; the transfer of technology; cooperation between
financial institutions; visits, contacts and activities designed to
promote cooperation between individuals, delegations and economic
organisations; the organisation of seminars and symposia; consulting
services; technical assistance, including the training of staff; and a
continuous exchange of information relevant to commercial and economic
cooperation 1 °. These forms and methods of cooperation had already
been utilised when the Cooperation Agreement between the Community and
China was concluded both at Member State and Community level.
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The defect of the Cooperation Agreement with respect to the
economic cooperation provisions is that it lacks any practical
details. It only provides that the two contracting parties agree to
develop economic cooperation in all these areas; and recommends the
forms and methods for such cooperation. Without being supported by
any cooperation scheme and programme, the Cooperation Agreement fails
to address the question of how to apply these methods. In this regard
these provisions are only a statement of general policy or political
goodwill. It lays down a primary legal basis; the development of the
economic cooperation is very much dependent upon the contracting
parties implementation of the Agreement. Nevertheless, the Community
promises that within the means at its disposal, and in accordance with
its rules, it will continue its development activities in China and
examine the possibility of stepping up and diversifying these
11
activities
In comparison with the Lomè Convention, the difference between
the Lomè Convention and the EEC-China Cooperation Agreement is
obvious. The former is special; because of the historical relations
between the Member States of the Community and the ACP countries, the
Community made a special commitment towards these countries. It has
committed itself to help "to promote the economic and social
development of the countries and territories" concerned in the Treaty
12
of Rome . In order to attain this purpose, the Community established
association relations with them. The Lomè Convention reflects the
development of the relations between the Community and the ACP
countries from the first Yaounde Convention 13. It represents a much
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closer economic relationship than that between the EEC and China. The
Lomè Convention has, therefore, more advanced schemes compared with
other ordinary economic cooperation agreements. The economic
cooperation between parties under the Lomè Convention are supported by
detailed arrangements and programmes. The Sysmia (or Minex) scheme,
for instance, has been arranged to encourage the Community to
investment in mining and energy industries in the ACP countries in
Lomè 1i 14 . With respect to the cooperation in agricultural areas, the
Lomè III provides for many concrete programmes. In recognition of the
dependence of many ACP states upon earnings from their export of
agricultural commodities, in addition to the improvements in the
15Stabex scheme , a Joint Committee on Agricultural Commodities has
been established16 , so that cooperation in this area can be more
closely coordinated and monitored; in addition, the states' parties
have agreed to improve and intensify their consultation procedures
17
prior to the conclusion or renewal of global commodity agreements
The framework and scope of long-term campaigns for the preservation of
natural ecological balances in the ACP states, and especially for
18
drought and desertification control, is established . Greater
support is also being provided for the ACP states' own food policies
and strategies. For financial and technical cooperation, the European
Community has undertaken to provide during Lomè III a total sum of
ECU8,500 million in EDF funds and ECU1,000 million in own resources
20from the EIB . In accordance with these development activities
undertaken by the Community, the Lomè Convention characterises as an
advanced preferential cooperation agreement. In this respect, the
EEC-China Cooperation Agreement is similar to the cooperation
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agreements between the EEC and India, between the EEC and Brazil and
21between the EEC and Canada
Notwithstanding the primary, broad and somehow insufficient legal
basis for economic cooperation, various economic cooperation projects
have been undertaken. These cooperation activities are mainly
concentrated in the areas of promotion of economic and trade
relations, agricultural, science and technology, energy and education
and training etc. The Community has started to finance different
development projects even before the Cooperation Agreement has been
concluded. From 1984 onwards the Community has provided ECU6 million
annually to support the transfer of technology using in Chinese
agriculture and the food processing industry in eleven projects and
the 1988 budget has been increased to 8.6 million ECU in two
projects 22 . The Community employed another ECU3 million in supporting
23Chinese exports . In addition to that, the Community also spent
million of ECU on technical cooperation with China in the areas of
mining, electric power, chemical and non-ferrous metal industries, in
which over 60 projects have been involved24 . During 1987 to 1988
another two major cooperation projects have also been established. In
March 1987 an exchange of letters was signed between two parties with
a view to the establishment of a Centre in Beijing for the
coordination of biotechnological research for applications in
agriculture and medicine. The principal task of the Centre will be to
coordinate research projects carried out jointly by Chinese and
European laboratories with Community aid totalling 80 million ECU over
25	 .five years . On March 1st, 1988 the EEC signed an aid agreement with
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China for the development of the country's milk industry. Under the
agreement, during 1988 to 1992, the Community will provide 45,000 tons
of de-fatted milk powder and 15,000 tons of dehydrated butter (worth
about ECU71.65 million) as well as ECU4.5 million in financial aid to
twenty major cities including Beijing and Shanghai. These cities will
sell liquid milk made with milk powder and butter and use the revenue
from this selling, the EC monetary aid and local funding to develop
the Chinese domestic dairy industry26 . The aid will be mainly
directed to the following areas:-
(a) providing experts and offering technical consultancy to help
China work out a national strategy for the development of
milk production;
(b) providing managerial technology and formulating a
comprehensive production plan;
(c) providing new technology and establishing dairy product
enterprises;
(d) assisting Chinese enterprises in improvements of processing,
packaging and storage facilities;
(e) training Chinese technicians to increase milk production27.
The economic cooperation between the EEC and China is just at
start point, it has a bright prospect insofar as China's development
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potential and the Community's economic power are concerned. There are
signs that the Community was seeking to increase official commitment
in China. Such a move may help the Community to improve its position
in China vis-a-vis its competitors, ie Japan and the United States.
However, it is submitted that as both parties contain different
political systems, the development of economic cooperation requires a
long-term mutual trust and understanding between the parties. Without
close and good political relations it is impossible for both parties
to undertake substantial economic cooperation 28 . On the other hand,
economic cooperation shall not only serve as evidence of good
relations, but shall also be mutually beneficial economically, because
it is not merely an emergency aid programme. In other words, the
economic cooperation activities shall be helpful for China's economic
development and also helpful for strengthening economic ties between
China and the Community. And from the legal point of view the
Cooperation Agreement is only a basic framework, more detailed
cooperation schemes should be worked out alongside the development of
economic cooperation.
C. Investment Clause
There is an investment clause in the Cooperation Agreement which
states that "the two Contracting Parties shall agree, within the
framework of their respective laws, rules and policies, to promote and
encourage greater and mutually beneficial investment"29.
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This clause is incorporated into the agreement against the
background of China's policy of opening up the door to attract foreign
investment; and the relatively low share of investment in China from
the Community. From the late 1970s China has started to open its door
to the outside world. In 1979 the Chinese government promulgated a
joint venture law to encourage foreign investment in China for the
first time in the history of the People's Republic 30 . Since then a
great many laws and regulations have been promulgated to accommodate
foreign investment31 . By the end of 1988 there were over 15,300
foreign investment projects which were established in China in the
form of equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises 32 . The total commitment of investment is
33
over US$ 25 billion . However, the Community s share of investment
in China was comparatively small up to the end of 1984 when the
negotiations for the Cooperation Agreement began. The statistics show
that the Community's share of foreign investment in China was far
behind that of the US, Japan and Hong Kong34 . On the other hand,
Western Europeans are popular investors in China because they usually
engage in manufacturing projects. The investment from Europe often
involves the transfer of relatively advanced technologies which are
much appreciated by the Chinese 35 . Investment in China by Europeans
has increased since then. To the end of 1987 there were 167
investment projects with US$ 1.4 billion invested 36 . Major Community
investors include Philips (Netherlands), Volkswagen (Germany), Peugeot
(France), Pilkington (UK) and Bell (Belgium). China wanted an
investment clause to be included in the Cooperation Agreement. It is
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China's consistent intent to further strengthen economic relations
37
with the European Community to diversify its economic relations
The investment issue arose in the Community before the
Cooperation Agreement had been concluded. The European Parliament
passed a resolution on April 13th, 1984, in which the suggestion was
made to investigate the possibility of concluding an investment
38
protection agreement with China at the Community level . If an
agreement as such had been concluded, it would have been a great
innovation for the Community - no similar agreement has been concluded
so far. Clearly, it is a shared competence between the Community and
the Member States over the matters concerning investment promotion.
The Member States are still exercising their powers to conclude
39investment agreements with non-member states . As far as the
investment protection is concerned, the individual Member States alone
exercise the competence to conclude agreements with the third
countries. The Member States are unlikely to give up this power to
the Community. Of course, a mixed agreement would be possible
theoretically, but in practice it takes a long time and would be a
more complex negotiation. In fact, the Federal Republic of Germany
concluded an investment agreement with China in 1983 and France, Italy
and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union also concluded investment
agreements with China before the Cooperation Agreement had been
concluded. Now all major capital export Member States, including
Holland and the United Kingdom have concluded investment protection
40
agreements with China individually . In these circumstances the
Community did not accept the Parliament's suggestion, but simply
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confirmed the practice between the Member States and China in the
Cooperation Agreement by adding an investment clause in the
Cooperation Agreement.
The investment clause further provides that: "the Parties
undertake to improve the existing favourable investment climate in
particular through encouraging the extension, by and to the Member
States of the Community and by and to the People's Republic of China,
of investment promotion and protection arrangements based on the
principles of equity and reciprocity"41.
The bilateral investment protection agreements between individual
Member States and China have been concluded in the form of investment
promotion and protection treaties which normally include the following
major provisions: -
(a) Each side shall give investors from the other side treatment
no less favourable than that enjoyed by third country investors 42 , and
shall not discriminate against investment from the other side in
comparison with measures taken in respect of investors and investments
43
of third states, as long as domestic law is not compromised
(b) Each side shall compensate the other if it must expropriate
or nationalise the latter's investment for public interest reasons44.
If the investor and the expropriating side fall into dispute over the
amount of compensation, the case may be submitted either to the
national courts of the contracting party in whose territory the
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investment is being made or to international arbitration in the form
of an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. The applicable law for the
arbitration tribunal under the following treaties would be:-
(i) the German-Chinese treaty: the provisions of the bilateral
agreement, the specific investment arrangement and general
principles of international law45;
(ii) the French-Chinese treaty: the domestic law of the
contracting party in whose territory the investment is
46
situated, and the provisions of the bilateral agreement
(iii) the Belgium-Chinese treaty: the domestic law of the country
in which the investment is situated, the provisions of the
bilateral agreement, the specific investment arrangement and
"principles of international law generally recognised and
"47
adopted by the contracting parties
The treaties between China and Germany, France and the UK also
carry a side letter providing for an Additional Protocol if and when
China adheres to the Washington Convention of 1965 for the Settlement
of International Investment Disputes ("ICSID")48.
(c) Each side shall ensure the other side's right to transfer
freely to the country where they reside their investments or
49
returns . The transfer of profit, interest, dividends, royalties or
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fees of a minimum of 20 per cent a year is guaranteed in the China-UK
50
treaty
(d) The two sides shall make use of friendly consultation
through diplomatic channels if a dispute arises from the
interpretation of the agreement and related law. The dispute may be
submitted to international arbitration if it has not been settled
51
within a certain period of time
(e) In the China-UK treaty, there is a subrogation clause
according to which, if one contracting party or its designated agency
makes a payment to its national or company under an indemnity given in
respect of an investment made in the territory of the other
contracting party, the former contracting party shall have all the
rights and claims of the national or company indemnified52.
In sum, the investment clause in the Cooperation Agreement is
only a call for improving the existing investment climate, to promote
and encourage more investment53 . The European-China investment
relations are regulated by the treaties concluded between the Member
States and China individually. These relations are basically
harmonious; China has been trying very hard to improve its investment
climate, and investments from the Member States of the Community have
been increased gradually54 . Especially because the Member States take
a relatively liberal attitude to the transfer of technology, the
55
Community has become the major supplier of high-tech to China
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However, the Community's investment in China is still far behind that
of the USA and Japan56.
D. The Conmmnity's Conpetence in Concluding Cooperation Agreements
The division of powers between the Community and the Member
States in respect of concluding economic cooperation agreements with
non-member states is not very clear. The Community has exercised its
powers in concluding economic cooperation agreements with non-member
57
states for a long time . It has concluded agreements involving
58
economic cooperation with third countries from very early days
However, these agreements were not mainly concerned with matters of
normal economic cooperation, but concentrated on association matters
under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome 59 . Further, these association
60
agreements were signed both by the Community and the Member States
ie, so-called mixed agreements 61 . Although the commercial cooperation
agreement concluded between the European Community and Israel in 1975
had a special provision to regulate economic cooperation62 , the first
agreement of economic cooperation was concluded with Canada in 197663.
Since then a number of economic cooperation agreements have been
64	 65	 .	 66
concluded, including ones with Brazil , India , Pakistan , Member
States of the South-East Asia Union 67
 and China, etc.
The Community's power to conclude economic cooperation
agreements, however, is not exclusive. Member States still have the
power to conclude economic cooperation agreements with third
countries, and economic cooperation agreements concluded by the
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Community must correspond to the Community's competence, explicitly or
implicitly provided for by the Treaties, and developed by the case law
of the Court of Justice. In most economic cooperation agreements
concluded by the Community, the designated cooperation areas normally
involve industry and mining, agriculture, science and technology,
energy, transportation and communication, environmental protection,
68
etc . Due to the vagueness of the division of the power between the
Community and its Member States, there are certain overlaps in
cooperation between the Member States and the third country, and
between the Community and the third country concerned. Cooperation in
science and technology with a third country, for instance, is both
conducted by the Community and the Member States. Therefore, the
Cooperation Agreement between China and the Community providing for
cooperation in science and technology does not exclude the cooperation
between China and the Member States of the Community in science and
69
technology . Indeed, the Community cooperation activities should be
supplemented by the cooperation activities undertaken by the Member
States, and not conflicting with each other. For the time being, the
Community competence in economic cooperation shall be extended,
particularly when the single market comes to be the reality in 1992.
The Community would then bear more responsibility both in internal
market and external relations and it will have more power in
exercising economic cooperation with third countries correspondingly.
On the other hand, when the Member States conclude economic
cooperation agreements with third countries, these agreements cannot
prejudice the relevant provisions of the Treaties establishing the
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European Community. Before such agreement is concluded, a
consultation procedure laid down by Council Decision No 74/393/EEC of
July 22nd, 1974 must be followed 70 . The Decision requires that
cooperation agreements between Member States and non-member states and
any commitments and measures planned in the framework of such
agreements must be in accordance with the common policies of the
Community and with the common commercial policy of the Community in
particular. The negotiation and implementation of such agreements
should, therefore, be subject to a prior consultation procedure 71 . In
so doing, Member States shall inform the Commission and other Member
States of any agreement which they propose to negotiate; and of
commitments and measures which are proposed by the authority of Member
States. The Member States shall forward to the Commission and other
Member States the text of cooperation agreements initialled with third
countries 72 . If so required by a Member State and proposed by the
Commission, this information shall be subject to prior consultation
with other Member States and the Commission. Such consultation is
intended:
(a) to ensure that the agreements, commitments and measures proposed
are consistent with common policy, in particular with the common
commercial policy;
(b) to encourage coordination with regard to the relations with the
third countries concerned; and
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Cc) to examine the advisability of unilateral measures which could be
taken by the Community in the fields covered by Article 113 of
the Treaty in order to promote cooperation projects73.
There were controversies within the European Community at the
very beginning with regard to what sort of agreement should be
concluded between the Community and China. According to the European
Parliament, an economic cooperation agreement should have been
concluded much earlier. As early as 1977 the European Parliament
called for broad economic cooperation. The report of its External
Economic Relations Committee of May 5th, 1977 recommended that the
agreement with China "should be used not only to settle the technical
trade and customs problems contained in the outline agreement, but
should also provide a framework for a progressive and pragmatic
development of economic relations between the parties" 74 . The
rapporteur supplement of the External Relations Committee was in fact
even more precise, and it wondered whether the EEC-Canada model of
economic agreement "would not be the best way of increasing
,,75
cooperation between the EEC and China	 This suggestion, although
supported by the Commission, was not accepted by the Council 76 . The
Council opted for a limited trade agreement rather than a broad
economic cooperation agreement with China at that time. The first
agreement between them therefore was a limited trade agreement.
The Council option reflected not only the Community's caution in
dealing with external relations in the early days, but also reflected
China's situation in the later l970s. First of all, the Member States
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would not easily give up the power to conclude economic cooperation
with a third country. The Council, as the representative organ of the
Member States, was reluctant to accept the fact that the Community has
the right to conclude an extensive economic cooperation agreement.
Also, it is the Community's general practice first to conclude trade
agreements with non-associated third countries, then to develop an
economic cooperation agreement at the Community level. Particularly
as China was classified as a State-trading country, the Council did
not want to conclude an economic cooperation agreement with China at
the first instance. On the other hand, China had not recovered from
the "Cultural Revolution" during that period of time. The internal
political struggle was going on between the Maoist leftists and the
pragmatists. More importantly, China did not start to reform its
economy systematically until l979. The political and economic
situation in China, it seemed to the Council, made it not desirable
for the Community to conclude a comprehensive economic cooperation
agreement with China78 . A broad economic cooperation agreement
between the EEC and China therefore did not come into reality until
1985.
A number of Member States, however, concluded economic
77
cooperation agreements with China between 1978 and 1980 . These
agreements provided for economic cooperation between the Member States
concerned and China in similar or the same areas as provided for by
the Cooperation Agreement. Even after the Cooperation Agreement was
concluded, various economic cooperation agreements with China at the
Member State level have also been concluded 80 . This is not
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inconsistent with the EEC-China Cooperation Agreement. In fact, the
Cooperation Agreement states that this agreement and any action taken
thereunder shall in no way affect the powers of any of the Member
States of the Community to undertake bilateral activities with China
in the field of economic cooperation and conclude, where appropriate,
new economic cooperation agreements with China81.
Some conclusions
The Cooperation Agreement corresponds with the development of
economic exchanges between the Community and China. It explores new
areas to cooperate, provides a broader legal framework for future
cooperation, and many development and economic cooperation projects
have been developed under the capacity of the Cooperation Agreement.
But this agreement adheres to certain limitations.
First of all, the Cooperation Agreement does not resolve any
problem in trade relations. It does not make any progress in
abolishing and diminishing trade restrictions on both sides. The
Community still employs quantitative restrictions to control imports
from China. The Chinese, on the other hand, do not open any wider
their market to the Community than the 1978 Trade Agreement did.
Also, the Cooperation Agreement does not tackle any problems on
intellectual property or commercial arbitration issues. On the face
of it, the Cooperation Agreement is still a non-preferential agreement
but because of the relative unequal economic positions, the Community
enjoys great advantages over China. Furthermore, over the years, the
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Community has developed a trade policy of differential treatment. It
has granted more preferential treatment towards the ACP countries,
EFTA countries, Mediterranean countries etc. Consequently, China is
in a position of being treated most disadvantageously in comparison
with other EEC trading partners. In this regard, the Cooperation
Agreement not only does not grant China treatment compatible with its
position as a developing country, but also confirms the Community's
practice of putting China in a most disadvantaged position.
Secondly, the Cooperation Agreement does not, as argued above,
provide any practical detail for economic cooperation, nor has any
clear financial commitment been made to support the cooperation
scheme. In this regard, therefore, the Cooperation Agreement is more
an expression of political goodwill than a practical comprehensive
economic cooperation framework. The development of actual cooperation
would very much depend upon the relations between the parties.
Because of the alleged good relations, the Community has undertaken a
considerable number of cooperation activities in China and there are
signs that the Community was prepared to make more commitment. The
"Beijing Event" in June 1989 seriously damaged bilateral relations,
the Community, in the author's view, should nevertheless continue the
cooperation activities for both parties' interests.
Furthermore, it is submitted that it is hardly possible that the
European Court of Justice will give a positive ruling on the issue of
direct effect of the Cooperation Agreement because of the very nature
of it and the non-specific provisions which, in the author's view, do
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not create rights and obligations to the individuals of both parties.
Nor will the Chinese courts give a positive ruling in this regard.
However, the Cooperation Agreement establishes a broad legal
basis for economic cooperation. The contracting parties have started
to cooperate in various areas provided for by the Agreement but such
cooperation is far from enough considering the sizes of both parties
and the said good political relations. The great potential for
economic cooperation should be developed and supported by more
commitment in a mutually desirable and beneficial way. The Community
now is picking up more power in external economic relations. It shall
develop a more detailed cooperation scheme with China and encourage
more European investment in China, whereas the Chinese should not only
open up more market to the Community, but also further improve the
investment climate to attract more investment from the EEC.
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EEC ANTI-DUMPING LAW RELATING TO IMPORTS FROM CHINA
There are twenty four anti-dumping proceedings against China
which have been published in the Official Journal till the end of
1988. China has become one of the major targets of the EEC
1
anti-dumping law since 1979 . The first case occurred in 1979
concerning products of saccharin and its salts 2 . From 1981 about 5 to
10 per cent EEC anti-dumping proceedings every year are against
Chinese exporters although imports from China are only about
1 per cent. of its total imports. The Community's anti-dumping rules
play an important role in trading with China3 . It is predictable that
more and more anti-dumping proceedings will involve China's exports
since trade between China and the Community has increased
substantially, and will continue to increase; more importantly,
because of China's special economic situation and the Community's
current regulations. This Chapter will examine the EC antidumping
rules relating to imports from China. It is necessary to note that
because China is classified as an NIlE, the rules relating to it are
very much the same as the rules relating to all other NIlE countries in
general. The arguments in this Chapter are, therefore, focused on
rules relating to NIlE in general.
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A. Coainunity Rules on Anti-Dumping
Since the first EEC anti-dumping regulation was enacted in 1968k,
the Community's anti-dumping rules have undergone various amendments
to correspond with the changing situations 5 . The current rules are
set out in a new Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11th July,
19886, to reflect the latest developments and changes. The
Community's anti-dumping rules are said to be among the most liberal
in the world, and it is fully in line with the GATT rules 7 . However,
doubts may arise as the Community may have given a too arbitrary
interpretation of the GATT rules, and the GAIl' anti-dumping rules
themselves may also be challenged.
Under the GAIl' rules, a product is considered to be dumped if its
export price is lower than its normal value 8 . The Community
regulation follows the GATT rules and provides that the basis for
assessing the normal value and the export price depends on the
particular situation obtaining in the country of origin or export and
the importing country9 . Normal value may be based on the domestic
price in the country of origin or export 10 , or the supplier's export
11price to a third country , or the costs of production in the country
of origin' 2 , or where the goods are from a State-trading country, the
normal value may be established by reference to the price or cost of
similar goods in a comparable free market economy country3.
Similarly, the export price may be the exporter's price to the
importer or it may be that derived from the price of the importer's
first independent sale in the importing country' 4 . Thus, as Dr
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Beseler rightly pointed out: "dumping in the legal sense is
essentially a collective term for a variety of practices."15
In addition to the fact of dumping, relief is predicated upon
proof that the alleged dumping is causing or threatening to cause
material injury to a "Community industry" and that the proposed relief
is in the "Community interest" 16 . The injury at issue must be
suffered by an industry as a whole [or a major part of it] and must be
17
material . Among the criteria relevant to establish the necessary
injury are loss of share of the Community market due to imports,
unemployment, short working time, depression of price in the Community
market, loss of profits and low rate of capacity utilisation18.
"Industry" is not broadly defined and is normally taken to be the
19
narrowest sector of production which can be identified . The
"Community industry" is normally taken to be either all the
manufacturers of the product in question or those who account for a
major proportion of the Community production 20 . This is
notwithstanding that they may be concentrated into a small
geographical area. "Community interest" covers a wide range of
factors including the interests of consumers and processors and the
21
competitive situation within the Common Market
Any application will normally require the support of a major part
of the industry22 . The Commission carries out a preliminary
examination in order to determine whether a prima fade case has been
established, whereupon a full investigation of the complaint may take
place23 . 1n order to prevent material injury being caused to an
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industry while the full investigation is in progress, the Commission
may implement provisional action against allegedly dumped imports.
This takes the form of a provisional anti-dumping duty which is
imposed by a Community regulation 24 . In the event that the
investigation establishes dumping, the amount of duty ultimately
collected shall not exceed the margin of dumping finally
established25 . An investigation may be terminated where the foreign
supplier undertakes to implement measures to eliminate the margin of
dumping or the injurious effects caused thereby26.
The "ratio legis" of the Community's anti-dumping legislation and
the GATE anti-dumping rules has been discussed for a long time. Dr
Beseler considers that it is one of the instruments of commercial
defence which permit the general liberalisation of trade on a most
favoured nation basis, as established by the GATr 27 . However, others
have argued that anti-dumping provisions have, in their
implementation, become an impediment to international trade and a
28
threat to the liberal trade order . It reasons as follows:-
(a) The primary-injury standard applied in anti-dumping
investigations is based on a protectionist diversion of business
test rather than on anti-trust principles. Under this standard,
injurious dumping may be found if domestic producers' sales are
displaced by dumped imports, whatever the implication for the
competitive health of the domestic industry.
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(b) The reasoned findings are often inconsistent, unpredictable and
even capricious, thereby increasing the commercial uncertainties
of those engaged in international trade.
(c) The remedial measures applied are anomalous.
(d) Anti-dumping proceedings represent a charge on public
expenditure, while also imposing direct costs on those engaged in
international trade29.
The Community anti-dumping legislation also sets special rules to
deal with imports from countries which have been categorised as
State-trading countries. According to the Community regulations,
because of the different economic systems and pricing systems, the
concept of normal value is hardly relevant in these countries. In
assessing the possible dumping, therefore, the Community employs a
method of referring to a third market economy country in order to
determine the normal value in these countries. Such an approach is
even more problematic: it denies any possible comparative advantage,
or any possible efficiency, in these countries. This issue will be
discussed in more detail below.
B. An Initial Analysis of Proceedings relating to
Imports from China
Since 1979 China has constantly been the subject of several
anti-dumping actions. In 1979 a total of twenty four investigations
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were initiated, two of which concerned China. In 1980 one case out of
fourteen concerned China. In 1981 two out of forty eight concerned
China. In 1982 the number of investigations concerning China reached
its highest level, four out of fifty eight cases against China. There
were two in 1983, two in 1984, one in 1985 and two in 1986. In 1987
two proceedings were started against China, but in 1988 alone the
number reached as high as six 30 . There is a clear tendency towards an
increase in dumping actions against China (see Table 1).
Table 1
Community proceedings of anti-dumping against imports from China
1979 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88
Numbersof	 2	 1 2 4 2 2 1 2 2 6
proceedings
Sources: Bull EC 1979-1988
The above numbers correspond to the increasing trade volume
between the Community and China after the first bilateral trade
31
agreement on the one hand . On the other hand, it also reflects the
Community's practice since the late 1970s of invoking of anti-dumping
law as an instrument in protecting the Community industries more often
than in previous years 32 . This is particularly true since very
recently the Community has invoked more anti-dumping actions against
developed and developing economies, particularly those of the Pacific
Basin33 . It is reasonable to assume that this trend is likely to
continue for the years to come against the background of forming a
single market in 1992. For non-European firms, the low price of their
products will be necessary in order to maintain their competitive
position in the European market because of the reduction of the cost
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of products within the Community, whereas the Community industry would
like to be better protected under such circumstances. The result will
inevitably be more anti-dumping complaints. The signs of the
Community anti-dumping action point in the direction of a more
protective and fortified Europe, not the opposite.
The commodities involved in these twenty nine proceedings consist
principally of chemical products, (eighteen out of twenty four are
chemical or allied products), four machinery products, one food and
one hand tool (see Table 2).
Table 2
Commodity involved in anti-dumping proceedings
chemical products	 machinery products
	 food	 others
18	 4	 1	 1
Sources: Bull EC 1979-1988, and various issues of Official Journal
It is worth noting that textile exports from China to the
Community is the single largest volume of trade transaction between
the two parties. China's rank has jumped from No 15 in 1978 to No 2
3in 1985 among the Community s textile products suppliers . But there
are no anti-dumping proceedings against Chinese exports involved in
textile products so far. This is partly because the 1979 and 1984
textile arrangements have been followed well. Within the quota of the
arrangement the Community has no necessity to start anti-dumping
proceedings; and partly because, even if the quota is slightly
exceeded somehow, a substantial part of the textile products from
China consist of raw materials and semi-products according to the
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arrangements , and these relatively low-priced raw materials are
beneficial to the Community textile industry in competing with outside
suppliers. In this regard the Community is reluctant to start
anti-dumping proceedings. Yet there is another reason. The Textile
Committee established under the Textile Agreement and its consultation
arrangement within this Committee have effectively enabled the
Community to resolve the problem without having to initiate
anti-dumping proceedings 36 . For other products, however, where there
is no special arrangement like the Textile Agreement, the Community
wants to protect its industries from severe competition through the
commercial instruments of anti-dumping proceedings. Among others,
chemical and machinery products are most often being the subject of
EEC anti-dumping proceedings. Statistics show that chemical and
allied products accounted for approximately 40 per cent. of the total
EC anti-dumping proceedings during 1981, 1982 and l984.
The relief of these proceedings is another interesting subject to
discuss. Community law provides in accordance with Article 7 of the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code that there is no need for the imposition of
anti-dumping or countervailing duties when foreign exporters whose
products are subject to an investigation render a reasonable price
38
undertaking . This implies that the exporter will raise the export
price in such a way as to either eliminate the dumping margin or to
avoid injury or the threat of injury to the domestic industry. The
European agencies have made frequent use of this alternative method of
terminating investigations, quite in contrast to their US counterparts
who have been more reluctant to settle cases amicably39 . In the
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Commission's First Annual Report on the Community's Anti-Dumping and
Anti-Subsidy Activities, the Commission stated that "the Community is
impartial in its stance on the acceptance of price undertakings as an
alternative to the imposition of duties. Indeed it is often found
that undertakings prove to be more flexible than duties as a means of
eliminating the injury caused by dumping or subsidisation."4°
According to Mr Dietmann, the number of investigations concluded
by acceptance of a price undertaking is well over 50 per cent. of all
cases41 . It is a similar situation in the case of proceedings
involving imports from China. Among twenty four investigations,
eleven were terminated by acceptance of a price undertaking, two were
subject to provisional duties, another seven were subject to




undertakings	 definitive	 provisional no injury	 pending
duties	 duties
11	 7	 2	 2	 5
Source: Bull EC 1979-88, Beseler & Williams p263
Some commentators argued about the advantages and disadvantages
of terminating investigations through acceptance of a price
undertaking by the exporter 43 . The question seems to be more an
economic issue rather than a legal one. However, what seems to be of
more interest to a lawyer is the question whether the forms of
undertaking include quotas for selling to the Common Market by the
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specific exporters. In Article 10(2) of the Council Regulation (EEC)
No 2423/88, undertakings are defined as "prices are revised or exports
cease to the extent that the Commission is satisfied that either the
dumping margin or the amount of the subsidy, or the injurious effects
thereof, are eliminated."44
 Dr Beseler interprets the words "cease to
the extent. . ." as allowing of the Community to accept undertakings by
which quantities are limited 25 . Actually, there was a case terminated
26by limiting exports to the Community . In my view, it is unlikely
the intention of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, to contemplate the
possibility of limiting quantities. Rather, the imposition of a quota
arrangement at the Community level is normally governed by other
regulations - Regulation No 288/82 in the case of imports from
non-socialist countries, Regulation No 1765/82 in the case of imports
from most socialist countries, and Regulation No 1766/82 in the case
of imports from China. So when the Commission considers the
acceptance of undertakings of limitation exports, it should not mix
the anti-dumping proceeding with the quota arrangement in any way,
only in exceptional circumstances where the exporter clearly prefers
to limit his exports rather than increase his prices, the limitation
of exports arrangement may be accepted.
C. Law and Practice of the EC Anti-Dumping Proceeding
against Imports from China
The very crucial element in determining whether sellings in the
Community market have been dumped is the determination of normal
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value, that is specially true if the proceeding involves imports from
non-market economy countries. Under normal circumstances, it is the
Commission's practice to base the normal value on the domestic price
of the exporting country, or price of export to a third country, or
the constructed value adding cost of the product and a reasonable
margin of profit47 . Whereas in dealing with imports from alleged
non-market economy countries including China, the Community, in common
with the United States, determines the normal value, not based on the
domestic price of the country concerned, but on the price of a like
product in an analogue third market economy48 . This is the main
difference in the rules applied to market and non-market economies and
affects the whole basis of the comparison of prices which is at the
heart of an anti-dumping investigation. This difference is,
therefore, extremely significant in the Community anti-dumping rules
against China.
Community legislation provides that, in the case of imports from
State-trading countries, the normal value shall be based in an
appropriate and not unreasonable manner on one of the following
criteria: -
(a) the domestic or export price of the like product in a third
market economy country;
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a third market
economy country; and
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Cc) if neither of the above criteria provides an adequate basis, the
price paid for the product in the Community, adjusted where
necessary, to include a reasonable margin of prof it9.
The following part of the Chapter will discuss the main legal
problems in EC anti-dumping rules relating to imports from China.
1. Non-market economy country
The European Community applies special rules to determine if
exports from non-market economies (China is classified as one of them)
have been dumped in the Community market. There is no published
official explanation about it 50 . But the principal rationale of the
Community in establishing two separate sets of rules for determining
normal value is that actual prices or even constructed values in a
non-market economy country cannot be fairly compared with export
51prices to the EEC . The main justifications for using special rules
are:
(a) that the monopoly of the State over foreign trade distorts export
prices;
(b) that a domestic market price cannot be identified in a non-market
economy whose domestic economy is managed by the State rather by
the principle of the free market;
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(c) that costs of production are distorted in a non-market economy;
and
Cd) that the non-convertibility of domestic currency makes a
comparison of domestic price and export price unreliable52.
The justification may bear merits to the extent that the
traditional centrally planned economy in China and most Eastern
European countries do make the determination of normal value difficult
and unreliable. However, the EC Anti-dumping Regulation and its
underlying justifications have so far failed to give a definition of a
non-market economy, nor has it set any clear detailed criterion of a
non-market economy. Consequently, the EC has wide discretion in
applying the Regulation in a rigid, or even arbitrary, manner.
By virtue of Article 2(5) of the Anti-dumping Regulation, the
Commission will treat China as a non-market economy for dumping
purposes. As discussed in Chapter II, the concept of a non-market
economy is not an accurate one in describing the economic system in
China any more. Since economic reform, the State monopoly over
foreign trade in China has been, to a certain extent, dismantled. The
economy is regulated both by the State plan and market forces, with a
tendency for the latter to pay an increasingly important role.
Alongside the State-set price, a free market price is also available.
The Community Anti-dumping Regulation has also failed to provide any
facility for applying market economy rules on a sectional or regional
basis, yet the development of special economic zones in China raises
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important questions as to their economic status. It is alleged that
market forces play a dominant role in the economy of these special
economic zones53 . The issue of the post-1997 status of Hong Kong,
which at the moment is treated as a free market economy and will
become a special administrative region of China when the time comes,
perhaps underlines the nature of the problem 54 . Furthermore, the
Community's method of deciding non-market economy ("NIlE") has further
deepened the problem. In deciding which country is an NilE, the
Community simply produced a list of countries without any
justification or explanation. This approach of enumeration has the
advantage of relieving the Commission of the burden of having to
determine in each case whether it regards the country involved to be
an NME. However, such an approach gives no criteria as to why a
country qualifies as an NIlE (or State-trading country), and lacks a
careful analysis of a particular economy. The party in question does
not even have a chance to contest or discuss in such circumstances.
Moreover, such an approach is less flexible and less adaptable in
reflecting changes in the economic structure and system of the country
concerned. "This is a disincentive to more liberalised non-market
economies to bring their trade policies into line with Western
capitalist ideas since they have no idea what behaviour placed them on
the list in the first place." 55 This is particularly true in the case
of China. As argued in Chapter II, the failure of recognising China's
changes in its economic structure on the EEC's part not only
discourages trade and economic relations between China and the EEC,
but may also discourage China's further development towards a more
market-orientated economy.
240
Unlike the EEC, the US has an open-ended definition as to what
qualifies as an NME, ie:
(a) the degree of government ownership of the means of production;
(b) the degree of centralised government control over allocation of
resources;
(c) the degree of centralised government control over outputs; and
(d) relative convertibility of the country's currency and the degree
of government control over imports56.
Neither the United States law, nor the Commerce regulation
enumerates the countries or the economies of which are considered to
be State-controlled for the purposes of law. Instead, the character
of the economy of the country from which the imports under
investigation are exported, is determined on a case-by-case basis57.
To be fair and less discriminatory, the EC should discard the
unrealistic concept of NNE (or State-trading country) in trading with
China, and repeal the special rules against it. This is also in line
with the GATT Anti-dumping Code which requires the developed countries
to give special regard to the special situation of developing




If this proves to give rise to endless debates and a long process
of legislation, the first step the EC could take is to change its
enumerate approach, and give an objective criteria of NME, as its US
counterpart has done, and to make it possible of applying market
economy rules on a sectional or regional basis.
2. The Choice of Analogue Country
The selection of an analogue country is an extremely important
factor of the dumping process in cases concerning non-market
economies. This is so both for the complainant industry and for the
non-market economy. A dumping action aims to show that the domestic
price of a product in the country of export is greater than its export
price. Therefore, the complainant industry will seek to identify an
analogue country with a domestic price as high as possible. It will
be vital for the non-market economy to obtain the selection of an
analogue country with a domestic price as low as possible.
Accordingly, the selection of an analogue country is likely to be the
subject of strong argument on both sides.
2. 1 Guidelines in the Anti-dumping Regulation
In the selection of an analogue country there are hardly any
guideline in the Community Regulation of No 2423/88, except a general
obligation on the Commission in Article 2(5) of the Regulation to
determine normal value "in an appropriate and not unreasonable
,, 59
manner .	 This leaves a great deal of discretion to the Commission.
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The administrative discretion of the Commission, therefore, plays a
critical role in choosing an analogue country.
According to the Community legislation the complainant industry
must submit evidence to prove that the selling by the NME country
producer or exporter in the Common Market is dumped and injuries are
caused. In practice, the complainant has the initiative right,
therefore, to choose the analogue country. They will not, of course,
choose a country which is not favourable to them in the finding of
dumping. It is the burden of exporters, whose exports are allegedly
dumped, or the importer concerned, to prove the "inappropriateness and
unreasonableness" of the selection. Thus, in a proceeding on imports
of barium chloride from China, the complainant had suggested the
United States of America as the analogue market economy country to
determine the normal value60 . The main importer of the product
concerned objected to this suggestion on the grounds that the American
producer is the only manufacturer of the product concerned in that
country. This manufacturer, therefore, benefits from a monopoly
position enabling him to impose upon his customers prices which are
higher than prices resulting from normal market conditions. The
Commission then concluded that the evidence to support the above
argument was not sufficient and it would be appropriate and not
unreasonable to determine normal value on the basis of the domestic
price in the United States of America61.
The Anti-dumping Regulations, however, do not limit the choice of
the analogue country being suggested by the complainant only. In a
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number of cases, the Commission accepted the other interested party's
suggestion to choose another analogue country 62 . In some cases
neither the complainant's suggestion nor the exporter's choice are
accepted by the Commission in deciding an analogue country. The
Commission may itself choose an "appropriate and not unreasonable"
63
one
2.2 Guideline in the Practice
Although there is hardly any guideline in the Anti-dumping
Regulations for the selection of an analogue country, in practice,
however, the Commission almost always provides a rationale for its
selection. After examining these rationales put forward by the
Commission, we may find that the Commission's choice of analogue
country is dictated by a number of factors including:
(i) the structure of the manufacturing process; the Commission
will usually look to see whether the proposed analogue
country and the non-market economy country concerned have
similar production processes in the relevant industry or
whether the scales of production in the two countries are
comparable;
(ii) the competitiveness of the market, as evidenced by a level
of internal competition sufficient to ensure that price
levels are in a reasonable proportion to production costs
and the absence of price controls in the analogue country.
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However, the lack of competition is not always fatal and
sometimes the Commission will pay particular attention to
the relationship between price and cost. This was the case
with Natural Magnesite (both caustic and dead burned) where
Spain was selected as an analogue country notwithstanding
the fact that there was only one Spanish producer64.
In the case of both non-market and market economy countries who
are accused of dumping, it is the Commission's practice to use one of
the market economy countries accused of dumping as an analogue for the
NME country since this would reduce the need for investigation and
inspection of another potential analogue. In the Hardboard case, for
example, the Commission was faced with a complaint of dumping
involving ten countries, including market economy countries. In
choosing the analogue the Commission rejected the suggestion of
choosing Austria as an analogue country because it had not been
accused of dumping65.
The Commission is also concerned that the situation might arise
whereby it may not be able to receive any information from the
analogue country. In the Russian Watches case, the Commission had to
reject Switzerland as a potential analogue country since, under Swiss
law, Commission officials could not inspect Swiss manufacturers'
premises66 . This criterion has also been used in the Chinese
Artificial Corundum case67 . The willingness of countries to
participate in Commission investigations is well accepted. But in at
least one case in the United States, information supplied by a Finnish
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producer, as an analogue to help the International Trade
Administration to substantiate a claim of dumping from an NNE was used
against that analogue country in a later dumping action against it68.
This has caused a marked reluctance on the part of free-market
producers to supply information to the ITA. It is also precarious to
see whether the same would happen in the EEC context, since the
co-operation of potential analogues is an important element in the
Community's anti-dumping policy towards NMEs.
2.3 Inattention of Development Level
The choice of an analogue country is a highly flexible matter.
The degree of similarity varies from case to case. The Commission has
used a number of countries at various stages of economic development,
such as India, Sri Lanka, Spain, Norway, Japan and the United States,
as analogue countries in dumping actions against China69 . A notable
tendency in most cases has been that the analogue country chosen has
been one with a much higher level of economic development, and
therefore of GNP, in excess of that of China. As a result, a positive
finding of dumping is more likely.
It is important to note that comparative levels of economic
development between the non-market economy and the analogue country
have not, in contradistinction to the position in the US, been
considered as significant in the Commission's choice of an analogue
country. In the United States, "the third country is chosen in a
manner designed to give as fair a comparison as possible" 70 . It is
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explained that the fairness is to be that "the initial choice is made
on the basis of considering non-state controlled economy countries,
both in the same geographical area as the non-market country and at a
closely approximating economic development level." 7 ' The reasons are
that if the raw materials are from the same approximate geological or
geographical area or semi-finished materials from the same approximate
industrial area, accordingly the costs are likely to be similar,
excluding the differences in the economies; and if two countries are
at approximately the same industrial level, their overall costs are
more likely to be similar72 . This test was incorporated into the US
73
Regulation
It is criticised by the Commission officials for the lack of
factual evidence and rationale 74 . Dr Beseler also poses the question
on "no reliable indication of the level of economic development, and a
comparison with prices or costs from countries with a similar level of
development is frequently neither practicable nor appropriate since
like products may not be produced in the comparable market economy
country; or price or cost data may not be available there; or they may
reflect sales at a loss, dumping or subsidy."75
However, one Advocate General of the European Court of Justice
has pointed out in Timex case that this factor is one of the
characteristics to be considered in determining the analogue country,
on a par with the competitiveness of the market and the structure of
76the manufacturing process . In his opinion, A-G Darmon stated that
"when applying Art. 2(5) the institutions have a wide discretion as
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regards the characteristics to be considered in determining the
analogue country. In this regard they apply criteria based not only
on the similarity of the product, an indispensable requirement, but
also on the level of development, the competitiveness of the market
and the structure of the manufacturing process in the country in
question. That practice, which enables the analogy to be narrowed
down, is in keeping with the aim of determining normal value in an
'a	 fat and not unreasonable' manner"77.
Following this statement of the Advocate General of the Court,
the Commission, in Roller Chairs for Cycles, supported its choice of
analogue country over that chosen by the defendant on the basis that
its level of development was closer to that of the non-market economy
in question78.
2.4 Problems related to the Choice of Analogue
The approach of using the price of an analogue country poses a
number of difficult problems for the Chinese producer.
First, the outcome of the process of selection of an analogue
country is unpredictable. The inability to predict accurately the
choice of an analogue can be damaging in the commercial field where
certainty is of paramount importance. Two American lawyers criticised
such a system: it is not fair nor is ft commercial reasonable to
expect an NME producer to be familiar with the home market price of a
similar product in Finland or Paraguay or some other country which
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Commerce may decide ex post facto is the appropriate surrogate. It is
even less reasonable to expect him to know the cost of production of a
similar product in some unidentified third country. Such a system "is
expecting the NME producer not only to know his produce's price around
the world but also to keep track of all of the prices of the inputs in
the production around the world. This uncertainty of methodology is a
9179trade barrier in and of itself
Secondly, and closely related to the above problem, if the NME
has no indication of which country will be used as the analogue in a
potential anti-dumping dispute, it will not know how to adopt its
pricing structure to avoid such a charge 80 . A free-market producer
knows that if his export price is lower than the domestic price of the
same product, he will be open to a charge of dumping where the other
conditions obtain. It is open to him either to raise his export price
or lower his domestic price to eliminate a dumping margin. However,
this option is not open to the NNE producer since under no
circumstances can the domestic price be utilised; the market strategy
of an analogue country will be beyond the influence of the NIlE
81
member
Thirdly, for reasons of confidentiality, the data obtained from
the analogue country will not be disclosed to the Chinese producer.
As a result he will not be able to check its reliability. Experience
has shown that problems may be encountered in obtaining the permission
of the analogue State to investigate the analogue producer, and, even
where granted, difficulties may be encountered in obtaining the
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co-operation of such producers. It must be noted, in this respect,
that the analogue producers will by definition be in competition with
the Chinese producer either in the EEC or in other export markets.
There will be an adverse interest in the outcome of the case between
them. Consequently, the information on the pricing structure supplied
by the analogue producer may not be complete or even trustworthy82.
The analogue producer may also have other private reasons (apart from
inconvenience) for not wishing to disclose fully what is often
sensitive business information to a State authority.
Finally, the NNE also suffers from the fact that if it wishes to
counter the dumping accusation, it will need to attach the
determination of the normal value of the analogue producer's product,
arguing that it is inappropriate. To do this it will need accurate
information from the analogue producer on its pricing structure. As
discussed above, whether the analogue producer will be willing to
provide reliable information is very doubtful indeed. Even if the NME
producer does get accurate information from the analogue country, this
will relate to past pricing behaviour only and will not be able to
influence the pricing decisions of the NME producer so as to avoid an
anti-dumping action in the first place. The retroactive nature of
this information only gives the NIlE producers at most an opportunity
to counter actions already brought.
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2.5 Normal Value in the Analogue Country
There are a number of methods for deciding normal value in an
analogue country. According to the Anti-dumping Regulation, the
Commission may either:
(a) select the domestic price of the analogue country, or an export
price to another country, including to the Community; or
(b) construct a value; or
Cc) If neither (a) nor (b) provide an adequate basis, select the
Community price.
In common with its usual approach to cases involving imports from
non-market economy countries, the Commission has, in cases involving
the PRC, tended to base normal value on the domestic price of the
analogue country. Export price, used where the domestic price was
considered unreliable either because of the special nature of the
domestic market or because a significant amount of domestic production
was exported, has been used only three times in cases involving the
PRC83.
Constructed value has been used where the domestic price in the
analogue country is considered unreliable either because of protection
of the domestic product or because the domestic price is considered
not to cover all the costs of production. This has been used in three
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cases against the PRC The constructed value will include: (a)
production costs and selling and general administrative expenses; and
(b) reasonable profit.
The use of a Community price, to be taken only as a last resort
has, in fact, never been used.
3. Export Price and the Dumping Findings
Not merely the determination of normal value is the crucial
element towards a dumping finding, but the way the Commission
calculates the export price and the comparison between the normal
value and the export price is also an important element in
anti-dumping proceedings.
Article 2(13) of Regulation No 2423/88 provides that where prices
vary, "export prices shall normally be compared with the normal value
on a transaction-by-transaction basis except where the use of weighted
averages would not materially affect the results of the
investigation." And Article 2(14)(b) provides that "where dumping
margins vary, weighted averages may be established." In Ball Bearing
II (Japan and Singapore), the Commission used the transaction-by-
transaction method to calculate the export price and weighted average
method to determine the normal value. The different methods employed
by the Commission were challenged by the exporters in front of the
European Court85 . According to the exporters, the possibility of
choosing between various methods of calculating the dumping margin
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specified by the EEC Regulation had to be reconciled with Article 2(9)
of the Regulation, which required that the normal value and the export
price should be calculated according to the same method so that a fair
comparison might be made. The Japanese exporters further claimed that
the result of the transaction-by-transaction method of assessing the
export price applied by the contested regulation was that only sales
at dumping prices were taken into account, while those at prices above
the normal value were disregarded. The method adopted therefore
inevitably led to a finding of dumping and to the establishment of a
dumping margin which had no connection with reality86.
The Court recently rejected the claim. It held that Article
2(l3)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 3017/79 merely stated the various
possibilities for calculating the dumping margin without imposing any
obligation that the methods chosen for calculating the normal value
and the export price should be similar or identical. It further held
that Article 2(9) of the Regulation did not require the normal value
and the export price to be calculated according to the same method.
As far as the transaction-by-transaction method is concerned, it did
not, in the Court's view, exclude from the calculation of the dumping
margin transactions at prices above the normal value, but included
them in the calculation of the weighted average of all the prices
charged on the export market. Furthermore, the Court concluded that
"the transaction-by-transaction method was the only method capable of
dealing with certain manoeuvres in which dumping was disguised by
practising different prices, some above the normal value and some
,,87	 ,,below it . The application of the weighted average method in such
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a situation would not meet the purpose of the anti-dumping proceeding
since that method would in essence mask sales at dumping price, by
those at what were known as "negative" price, and would thus in no way
eliminate the injury suffered by the Community industry concerned."88
The case, as it can be seen, only dealt with techical problems to
explain the provisions of the Regulation 3017/79 which determines the
way of calculation of anti-dumping duties. The legal consequences,
however, should be by no means underestimated. In the first place,
the severe attitude taken by other European Institutes in dealing with
anti-dumping proceedings is now confirmed by the Court. The European
Institutions, therefore, are further solidified in front of alleged
dumping of imports. Secondly, it is clear from the judgment that the
European Community anti-dumping laws are aimed to protect the industry
of the European Community, rather than to liberate international
trade; and it becomes an important instrument of eliminating "the
injury suffered by the European industry concerned." 89 Thirdly, it is
also clear from the Court decision that not merely the way of
determining the normal value, but also the way of determining the
export price and the way of making comparisons are very important in a
dumping finding.
4. Adjustment
The newly amended Regulation contains an exhaustive list of the
factors which may be taken into account when adjusting the normal
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value of the analogue country and the export price of the NNE country
so as to make a fair comparison. They are:
(a) physical characteristics;
(b) import charges and indirect taxes;
(c) selling expenses resulting from sales made at different levels of
trade, or in different quantities, or under different conditions
and terms of sale.
The issue of adjusting has always been a contentious one in
practice. Strong argument is often required as to whether each of
these factors should be taken into account in the Commission's
decision.
4.1 Physical Characteristics
The question of similarity of physical characteristics is closely
related to the "like" nature of the analogue product (Article 2(12).
A particular difficulty arises where the quality of the products is
different. The inferior quality of some products from NNE,
particularly China (as a developing economy) is often recognised, for
example, in barter-trade arrangements. Such a difference has
occasionally been recognised by the Commission, for example, in the
case of Upright Pianos from Russia. In this case the Commission made
a downward adjustment to the piano prices of the analogue country
(Finland) to account for the inferior quality of the pianos from the
90	 .
USSR . The Commission takes a restrictive attitude towards the
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claims involving the different qualities of the products. It has so
far generally refused any downward adjustment to the normal value of
the analogue country for reasons of cost advantage enjoyed in a
particular case by a NME country. In the Natural Nagnesite from China
and North Korea proceedings, the Commission found that products with
lower quality sold on a third market economy country could make no
difference in the sales price, and there is no difference in the cost
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of production of these two qualities . When the interested parties
claim such an allowance, they must present the evidence. Without the
evidence the Community will not consider giving any adjustment92.
Products from China are often of different levels of quality to
those from an analogue market economy country. If the Commission does
not take account of these differences and make appropriate adjustments
accordingly, the Chinese products are more likely to be subject to
anti-dumping duties as the finding of dumping of their products is
more likely.
4.2 Comparative Advantage and NME
Another interesting issue is whether adjustment should be made to
the analogue country's prices or costs to reflect any comparative
advantage held by the producer in the non-market economy country. The
issue is interesting because it involves the whole idea of to what
extent trade relations and economic co-operation between the Western
world and a socialist country can be conducted and what sort of
arrangements should be made in respect of such relations.
256
It is the Community's practice that such an adjustment shall not
be made. In the case of Natural Ilagnesite Caustic-Burned originating
in China, it has been argued that the ore used for Chinese production
has an exceptionally high raw magnesite content, and much less
processing is needed for using this material, thereby giving these
producers an exceptional natural competitive advantage as compared to
producers in an analogue country93 . The Commission initially replied
that it was difficult for the Community to establish whether any
natural comparative advantage existed in China, and if so, how normal
value should reflect such advantage, if the same conditions existed in
the market economy country used for establishing normal value. It
was, therefore, unable to decide whether this factor should be taken
into account, and it would continue to examine the question of whether
94
such an adjustment should be made . The Commission decided later
that adjustments of the normal value could not be made since it was
uncertain how these advantages, if they really existed and were not
counterbalanced by competitive disadvantages, would be reflected in
the normal value if the same conditions existed in the market economy
country, as prices were not only a function of costs, but also of
demand. More importantly, the Commission argued that if normal value
were to be based on constructed value in a market economy country, any
adjustment of costs established in a market economy non-member country
to take account of alleged natural advantages would involve relying on
costs and resource allocations in a non-market economy country, which
Article 2(5) of Regulation (EEC) No 3017/79 was specifically designed
to exclude95.
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The same reasons were used in deciding to give no adjustment of
alleged cost advantages to the raw materials in the proceedings of
96
Barium Chloride importing from China
It is clear that the Commission follows the view expressed in
1973 by the British judge, Mr Justice Ackner, in Leopold Lazarus
Limited v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, concerning an
anti-dumping investigation involving imports of pig iron from the GDR.
In that case the judge stated that:-
"The fair market price cannot be determined by taking the price
at which identical or comparable goods are being sold in the ordinary
course of trade in the domestic market of the State-trading country.
The Minister must look for the price of identical or comparable goods
from another country. In doing so, he is not concerned with the
conditions in the State-trading country or with their economics or
mode of production, assuming contrary to the inherent probabilities,
that he could ever have a true or balanced picture"
This view is further theorised by Dr Beseler. He argued:-
(a) The comparative advantages are not known with certainty and they
may be more than offset by other comparative advantages enjoyed
by the market economy producer. An advantage resulting from
cheaper raw materials, for example, might be outweighed by
advantages resulting from economies of scale or better production
techniques in the market economy country.
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(b) Prices are determined by demand as well as supply. Where the
normal value is based on prices in the market economy country,
rather than costs, there is no way of knowing how any comparative
advantage would be reflected in these prices; and
(c) it would involve the need to rely on the methods and the costs of
production in the State-trading country if any allowance for
differences in comparative advantage is made, an exercise which
the use of a third market economy country analogue is designed to
98
avoid
The Commission's view seems reasonable at first glimpse. It
needs a great deal of work to be sure whether the alleged comparative
advantage exists in the State-trading country concerned. Even if it
does exist, it is even more difficult to find out whether those
advantages are offset by other comparative disadvantages. To avoid
all these troubles the Community simply does not take into account any
alleged comparative advantage at all. The inevitable result of that
is that products from alleged State-trading countries can never be
sold at the lowest price in the Community market, now matter how low
their actual costs, or how efficiently they might be produced, because
the Community regulation requires the exporter of a State-trading
country to charge a price in the Common Market at least as high as
that of a producer in a market economy country, and no adjustment of
comparative advantage, if any, will be taken into consideration. In
such a way, the Community anti-dumping legislation has placed the
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exporters from State-trading countries in a disadvantageous position
in the competition.
Anti-dumping legislation of the EEC, and for that matter the USA,
has a fundamental flaw based upon an inaccurate premise. The premise,
stemming from a lack of understanding and a certain degree of
prejudice, is that the NNE producer cannot produce goods cheaper than
the cheapest Western producer because it is inherently less
efficient99 . This premise is highly hypothetical and in fact absurd.
Countries such as China could have good reasons as to why they can
produce goods more cheaply than a Western free-market producer, taking
into consideration its low labour costs and rich natural resources.
Although these comparative advantages are obvious, they are
irrelevant from the EEC's point of view, because the non-market
economy system is irrational. Given the NME's pricing structure is
unreliable or irrelevant to the Western concept of cost of production,
value or price, there must be a substitution of the pricing structure
of a comparable Western producer for that of the NME producer. Once
the analogue producer has been identified, any comparative advantages
enjoyed by the NIlE producer are irrelevant. It is only their bad
luck, that NIlE producers adopt a basis of trade which is irrational
and may prove to be unfair. The underlying implication is that if the
Community's attitude to the NIlE is harsh, that is the fault of the
system of the NIlE, not the Community or its rules. The anti-dumping
rules of the EEC, therefore, pose a most straightforward
discrimination against imports from the NIlE in general, and against
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China in particular, as the latter is a developing economy. In this
regard it may be concluded that the anti-dumping rules of the EEC have
not only ignored the fundamental motive for international trade, ie,
utilising comparative advantage, but also placed political
consideration in a weighted position in its international trade law.
D. Coninunity Remedies and Subsequent Action
The remedies applied by the European Community, generally,
include an anti-dumping duty (provisional and definitive), and
acceptance of undertaking. The Community, however, has preserved its
freedom to impose quantitative restrictions or take other measures,
rather than to impose dumping duties, on imports from countries which
are not parties to the GATT by virtue of the "special measure"
provision of Article 17(3) of the Anti-dumping Regulation. In the
only case of this kind the special measure (QR) was taken against
imports of certain nuts of iron or steel from Taiwan°°. Until
China's membership of the GATr is settled, which is now under
negotiation, it is always available to the Community to take special
measures against the alleged dumping of products from China as long as
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the bilateral trade agreement is not compromised
1. Anti-dumping Duties
There are two sorts of anti-dumping duties; provisional
anti-dumping duty and definitive anti-dumping duty. The provisional
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102duty is imposed for a limited period ; once it is imposed, the
release of the products concerned for free circulation in the
Community will be conditional subject to the provision of security by
the importer. The duty is not actually collected initially, but the
importer must provide a guarantee that it will be paid if it is later
decided that it should be collected. When the Commission has reached
its final conclusions it makes a proposal to the Council which decides
whether to impose a definitive duty and also whether to collect the
provisional anti-dumping duty.
The level of duty shall not exceed the dumping margin
established; and it shall be less if such duty would be adequate to
remove the injury. The Commission requires the exporter's
co-operation in the proceedings. If an exporting company has not
co-operated with the Commission by completing the questionnaire and
supplying such other information as required it may have to pay the
highest duty (equal to the dumping margin). That was what happened in
a number of cases involving Chinese exporters who never replied to any
questions sent by the Commission. The Commission based its findings
on the information available to it, and imposed the highest margin on
the Chinese exporters103.
Anti-dumping duty may be imposed in one of a number of ways, for
example, by way of:
(a) ad valorem duty, ie, a fixed percentage of the CIF prices before
payment of customs duty;
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(b) specific duty, ie, a fixed amount per unit imported;
(c) duty of an amount equal to the difference between the price at
the Community frontier and a fixed price established by the
Commission.
Ad valorem duty is the most common form of the duty.
2. Undertakings
As an alternative to duties, undertakings may be accepted from a
company found to be dumping. These generally consist of a promise to
the Community to increase prices to a specific level sufficient to
eliminate either the dumping margin, or, (if less) the injurious
effects of dumping. Because the undertakings given are confidential,
the exact contents are never known to the public. However, in a
recent proceeding, the Commission revealed that 1 price undertaking
is not only binding on the export company, but also its subsidiaries,
branches and agents; 2 the undertaking also includes a promise that
necessary steps would be taken to see that it is not circumvented by
means of resale of the company's products from other countries; and
3 the company shall report to the Commission periodically, giving
details of quantities exported to the Community, unit price and total
104
value
As mentioned above, the Commission for some time has tended to
accept more undertakings than to impose anti-dumping duties to
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eliminate dumping. Recently, however, the Commission and the Council
have been reluctant to accept undertakings, particularly where the
product involved has been in politically sensitive, often relatively
technologically advanced, areas. Their reasons for refusing
undertakings have been that the undertakings may be difficult to
monitor and may be easily evaded.
This may be particularly true in the case of undertakings offered
by Chinese exporters, as in a number of recent cases Chinese exporters
have been accused of breaching the undertakings. In the Roller Chains
for Cycles and Potassium Permanganate cases, the Community withdrew
the acceptance of undertakings offered by two Chinese exporters and
imposed definitive duties on these imports from China'05.
3. Actions That May Be Taken By Chinese Exporters
Chinese exporters may take actions against measures taken by the
Commission or the Council before the European Court of Justice.
According to the Treaty of Rome, Chinese exporters are entitled to
challenge under Article 173(2) the imposition of provisional or
definitive anti-dumping duties against them. Also the case law of the
Court of Justice shows that foreign exporters are entitled to
challenge the imposition of provisional or definitive anti-dumping
duties regardless of whether or not they are specially named in the
challenged regulations, provided that they were concerned by the
preparatory investigations'06 . In Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82 the
Court ruled that "it is not excluded that the provisions [of
264
regulations imposing provisional or final anti-dumping duties I concern
directly and individually those producers and exporters to whom are
imputed the dumping practice." "It follows that the acts imposing
anti-dumping duties are of such a nature that they concern directly
and individually those producers and exporters who are able to show
that they have been identified in the decisions of the Commission or
the Council or concerned by the preparatory investigation."107
China is classified as a State-trading country as far as the EC
anti-dumping law is concerned, as if a proceeding involves Chinese
exporters, any on-the-spot investigation will take place in other
countries, either in Common Market countries, or in an analogue
country. This does not exclude, however, the Chinese exporter from
involving in the preparatory investigation. They must, if the
proceeding involves their exports, reply to a standard questionnaire
which the Commission sends out to them. If they do not reply, the
Commission may make its preliminary or final findings "on the basis of
the facts available"	 . In this respect the rulings in the Joined
Cases 239/82 and 275/82 shall apply to them.
The independent importers may not directly challenge the
imposition of anti-dumping duties in an action under Article 173(3) as
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the Court ruled in the Alusuisse case 	 . They may challenge the
contested anti-dumping measure in an action before national courts
which may refer the matter to the European Court of Justice under
Article	 In practice, as pointed out by a writer, national law
and legal practice represents a considerable barrier to a private
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individual who wishes to bring an action before the European Court of
Justice under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty'11.
E. Alternatives?
It is widely discussed and well acknowledged that the concept of
	
112	 ,,dumping is meaningless in the context of East-West trade 	 .	 In the
first place, neither price discrimination nor below-cost pricing are
measurable concepts within the East-West trade context. More
importantly, even if they were, no reliable conclusions could be
reached as to the likely permanence or temporariness of low-priced
imports on the basis of such calculations." 113 Furthermore, the use
of the analogue country test in dealing with determination of normal
value in non-market economy countries pre-empted comparative advantage
in those countries. Imports from non-market economy countries are,
therefore, put in a most disadvantageous position in competition in
the Common Market. The use of the analogue country test also brings
great uncertainty to the non-market economy exporters as they can
never predict whether the price they charge for their exports have
breached the trigger of the Community anti-dumping legislation,
because they never know what country will be selected as the analogue
country.
Dissatisfaction with the European Community anti-dumping rules,
and indeed the GATT anti-dumping rules, has attracted numerous
proposals for reform.
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Instead of anti-dumping measures, Dr Dale suggested alternatives
to handle the problems market economy countries may face with
114low-priced imports from a non-market economy country . These
alternatives include: (i) a reformed GATT Article XIX safeguard clause
to the extent that protectionist action against low-priced imports
from centrally-planned or market orientated economies is believed to
be necessary, (ii) invoking the appropriate clauses in bilateral trade
agreements, and (iii) if there must be anti-dumping laws,
consideration might be given to replacing action against low-priced
imports with measures aimed at penalising the ultimately excessive
prices which, it is claimed, are the true target of anti-dumping
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action
Some trade lawyers have suggested that imports from planned
economies should be limited to a fixed percentage annual increase.
A novel solution has recently been proposed by an American lawyer
to use a "true exchange rate" test, ie, the administering authority in
the USA chooses one source of exchange rates and makes that choice
publicly available, producers in NME could apply that rate to their
costs of production and be able to ascertain their minimum fair price
for US sales. Similarly, US producers could estimate the NNE
producers' cost of production (as they do at present with market
economy producers) and by applying this constructed exchange rate,




These suggestions, as the results of examining current practice
and intellectual thinking, bear merits in one way or another.
However, they also have some problems. As far as Dr Dale's proposal
is concerned, there are some problems in his proposal waiting to be
overcome: -
(a) The anti-dumping practice has long been accepted by the
international community and it has a legal basis in the GATI' law
system. If, according to Dr Dale, a reformed Article XIX
machinery is used to the extent that the safeguard clause is
selectively applicable to replace anti-dumping law, one might
think that this is merely using one protective measure to replace
another. There is hardly any difference between the two, and
they are equally barriers to international trade.
(b) A price clause in a bilateral trade agreement is a good solution
in theory to prevent low-priced imports from State-trading
countries. In practice, however, it does not always work. The
trade agreement between the EEC and China concluded in 1978 and
renewed in 1985, merely provided in Article 7 that "trade in
goods and the provision of services between the two contracting
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parties shall be effected at market related prices and rates.
A provision like that is too vague to provide effective
protection. Any clause which goes further will be resisted by
the countries concerned. If it does go further it could severely
limit the possibility of mutual benefits from trade between
market and planned economies based on comparative advantage.
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(c) The emphasis of measure aimed at penalising the ultimately
excessive price is, at least it turns out according to the
Community's anti-dumping practices, not the true target of
anti-dumping action. The consideration of protecting the
domestic industry, the Community industry in the European
Community case, overrides other considerations. There is no
point, therefore, of persuading authorities to change the target
of anti-dumping action at present unless the industries concerned
are better protected.
The proposal of using a true exchange rate test in East-West
trade is a good idea, but lack of possibility of practical
implementation:
(a) To adopt the "true exchange rate" test, exporters need to be
persuaded to believe that this is a fair test and the exchange
rate used is one more fair than that of their government's
official one. Not to mention the government's reluctance to
admit its exchange is not true, the exporters might also doubt
the fairness of the constructed exchange rate.
(b) In determining the "fair price", to calculate the costs of the
components of goods or raw materials may be relatively easier if
the "true exchange rate" test is accepted, but in applying it to
calculate the labour costs, it may not be so simple. In using
this test, the lower labour cost will make all Chinese exports
never be subject to anti-dumping actions, whereas relatively
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higher labour costs in the USSR and high valuation of the rouble
will make exports from the USSR targets of anti-dumping
proceedings constantly.
Cc) More importantly, this methodology ignores the internal economic
structure (eg, price structure, quota allocation, etc) of the NNE
countries, which is the primary reason for the current GATT law
of using the analogue country test in dealing with alleged dumped
imports from non-market economy countries.
There has long been much controversy as to whether it is too easy
to invoke anti-dumping actions. In fact, anti-dumping actions have
been used as trade barriers by industrialised countries, including the
EEC, to protect their markets. A demand for further amendment of the
GATT Anti-dumping Code has been made. And a request for restrictive
interpretation of the Anti-dumping Code, particularly towards imports
from developing countries, has also been voiced. The present thesis
is not to discuss the GATT rules in general, but to focus discussions
on the EEC rules, especially the EEC rules relating to imports from
China. The following suggestions are therefore concerning the EEC
rules.
In the first place, the concept of the NME should be clarified.
As discussed above, this concept is not an accurate one in describing
the Chinese economy any more. The anti-dumping rules based on such
concept is not appropriate. If the concept of the NME has to be used
in the Community anti-dumping regulations, the Community ought to give
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a clear, objective definition as to what is an NNE, as is done by its
American counterpart. Further, the method of deciding of what is an
NME shall also be modified so as to reflect the realities in the
countries concerned. The way of enumerating countries as NIIEs,
without giving any explanation, or giving the countries concerned a
chance to contest, is not only rigid, but also unfair. It is a
disincentive for countries like China or Hungary to move further into
a market-orientated direction.
Secondly, if the NIlE concept is still used by the Community in
trading with countries such as China, and the Community is classifying
a particular country as an NIlE country, then the anti-dumping rules
should not be applied between the Community and the country in
question, because under the current trade law between the Community
and the country in question a selective safeguard clause is always
applicable between them. As is well recognised, the concept of
dumping is meaningless in the context of trade between the NIlE
countries and the free-market economy countries. Such meaningless,
unpredictable and, indeed, protective measures should be replaced by
more predictable, acceptable and meaningful ones. In this regard
Dr Dale's suggestion may carry merits. A well drafted safeguard
clause should replace the anti-dumping rules in connection with
East-West trade.
Thirdly, if the anti-dumping rules are going to be applied to
countries which have been classified as NMEs, then the fabricated,
totally unpredictable analogue country test should be replaced by a
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more predictable, less discriminatory one. For example, as far as
imports from China are concerned, the normal value can be found in one
of China's Special Economic Zones ("SEZs"), or can be constructed in
accordance with the market prices in these SEZs, where market forces
play a dominant role. The analogue country test not only gives all
discretion to the administration in deciding which country is chosen
to be the analogue country, but also puts the exporter in a position
that it will never know which country would be chosen in future
actions.
Finally, before the Community may eventually move to change the
rules, the Commission should follow the statement of an Advocate
General of the European Court of Justice in choosing analogue
countries which set a comparable level of economic development as one
of the essential characters in choosing an analogue country, in order
to reach a more equitable result. In the past the Commission has
decided, in most cases, to choose analogue countries with a much
higher economic development level than that of China in anti-dumping
cases involving imports from China.
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EEC Anti-Dumping Proceedings Against Imports From China
Initiation	 Product	 Analogue Countries	 Further Development
1979	 Saccharin and its salts 	 Korea (weighted average price	 Undertaking accepted 1980
of exports to Australia and 	 Undertaking lifted 1983
the USA)
1979	 Mechanical alarm clocks	 Hong Kong (export price)	 Undertakings accepted 1980
1980	 Furfural	 No injury
1981	 Oxalic acid	 Spain	 Definitive duty (34.2%) 1982
1981	 Paracetamol	 Complaint: USA	 Undertakings accepted 1982











Chinese exporter: Argentina	 Undertakings accepted 1983
Commission: South Africa
Spain (following Council	 Provisional duty 1982
rejection of Commission	 Undertaking accepted 1984
proposal for imposition of
duty, later substituted by
Austria export price)
Spain	 Provisional duty 1982
Provisional duty extended 1983
Reviewed 1985 Terminated 1986
USA	 Provisional duty 1983
Definitive duty 1983
USA	 Undertakings accepted 1983
Yugoslavia	 Provisional duty 1984
Undertakings accepted 1984



















1988	 Tungsten metal power
1988	 Ammoniuii paratungstate









































Paint, distemper, varnish	 Sri Lanka
and similar brushes
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CHAPTER VIII
EEC - CHINA TRADE IN TEXTILES
The law of international trade in textiles is separated from the
international trade law system under the GATT for decades. This
reflects the political and economic relations in international textile
trade, especially the relations between the developed and the
developing countries. The European Community, one of the major
textile products importers, has played a crucial role in international
textile trade and the legal regime governing the trade. China, a new
member of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), has been involved in the
textile trade for a long time and has been becoming a major supplier
over the last few years. Textiles products are one of the major
trading products between the EEC and China. The two parties concluded
a textile agreement in 1979 and amended and extended it in 1984 and
1988 respectively. The current agreement will operate from 1st
January, 1989 to 31st December, 1992. This Chapter is going to review
very briefly the history of the legal system of international trade in
textiles, the EEC's role in this system and, in more detail, the
relations and legal issues between the Community and China in the
textile trade. The analysis is concentrated on pre-1989 issues.
However, the comparison with the post-1989 legal regime and analysis
of legal problems in future development will also be made.
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A. Trade in Textiles : Introduction
Textiles play an important role in today's international trade.
According to Das, international trade in textiles accounts for nearly
5 percent of the total world trade and nearly 9 percent of the world
trade in manufactured goods 1 . For developing countries, textiles form
an even more important part of their exports. The exports of textiles
accounted for about 27 per cent, of the total exports of manufactured
goods from the non-oil developing countries and nearly one third of
their manufactured exports to the developed countries 2 . As far as
China is concerned, textiles are crucial to China's economy. It is an
industry which attracts massive employees to a country like China with
a population of over one billion. Its political and economic
importance should by no means be underestimated. The total value of
output of textile products in 1986 was RMBY 93.3 billion (one sterling
pound equals 5.95 Chinese RMBY on July 25, 1987). This accounted for
nearly 5 per cent. of the total Chinese gross national products (GNP)
in that year4 ! China has 24 million spindles working, which is
claimed to be the largest amount in one country in the world5 . As the
largest developing country, China needs to export more to earn hard
currencies in order to meet its increasing domestic demands. Textiles
logically become the most important export manufactured products in
its international trade. China's exports of textiles in 1986 was US$
6.5 billion, 24.1 per cent. of its total exports of that year 6 . In
1987, the exports of textiles reached as high as US$ 8.8 billion7.
And in 1988, textiles to the value of over US$10 billion were
exported, a quarter of China's total exports in
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that year7 . During the last ten years, China's exports of textiles
have increased immensely. Earnings from textile exports formed a
substantial part of China's foreign exchange earnings (see Chart 1).
Chart I: China's exports of textiles between 1977 and 1988 (LJS$ billion)













Sources: 1977-1984: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade 1985,
	
1985:	 Beijing Review January 26, 1987,
	
1986:	 People's Daily July 4, 1987,
	
1987:	 People's Daily May 18, 1988,
	
1988:	 People's Daily February 4, 1989.
China is increasingly becoming one of the world's leading
suppliers in international textile trade. In the United States
market, for example, imports of textiles from China were virtually
neglected until the late 1970s, but in 1986 China became the second
largest supplier, with imports growth since 1980 of 370 per cent., or
more than 1.2 billion square yards 8 . In the European Community, the
story was very similar, Chinese textiles of MFA products alone into
the Common Market grew from 31 thousand tons in 1978 to 191 thousand
tons in 1987, a growth of 516 per cent. 9 . (See Chart II).
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Chart II: Chinese exports of textiles into the Community Market
Between 1978 and 1987
Amount of exports (of MFA products)
Year	 Tonage (1000)	 Values (million ECU)
1978	 31.0 (Member States of 9)	 127.3
1979	 40.9	 187.1
1980	 59.2	 292.5




1985	 107.5 (Member States of 12)	 817.4
1986	 136.2	 893.6
1987	 191.1	 1,244.5
Sources: Compiled by author through interviews with Officials in
the Commission and Mofert.
The textile trade between the Community and China has proved to
be a problematic area between the parties, not only because of the
dramatic increasing inflow of Chinese textile products into the
Community, but also because of the uncompetitively low price of such
products, which has created a situation of bitter competition in the
Community. The textile industry in the Community was alleged to be in
danger of collapsing.
Trade in textiles between the European Community and China is
governed by a separate legal framework, although certain principles in
the 1978 Trade Agreement may apply. The Community concluded a textile
agreement with China in 197910, which granted significantly increased
access for textile products from China to the Community market'1.
When this agreement expired in 1983, the Community and China expanded
the arrangement through the Additional Protocol in 1984, which became
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more restrictive than the previous one. The 1984 Protocol expired at
the end of 1988. The two parties negotiated a new agreement which was
to run from the beginning of 1989 to the end of 1992. This Chapter is
going to analyse mainly the 1979 and 1984 agreements in the context of
the EEC textile trade regime in general, and the global aspects of the
international textile trade.
B. The 1979 Textile Agreement
1. Background
The European Community concluded the textile agreement with China
soon after the 1978 Trade Agreement was concluded. For a long time
textiles were the principal export items from China to Western Europe,
though the total amount of it was not a large portion of EEC's
importation until late 1970s. Before the textile agreement was
concluded, the textile trade between them was governed by the
Community's autonomous policy. Common rules for imports from
State-trading countries were established under Regulation (EEC) No
L109/70, which applied to those products which were liberalised under
such regulation 12 . Textile products, along with the other products
which were not liberalised at the Member States and the Community
level, were subject to the Council Decision No 74/652/EEC of
2 December, 1974, laying down the import arrangements applicable in
the Member States to imports of products subject to quantitative
restriction from State-trading countries, which was adopted as a
provisional measure to ensure continuity in trade with State-trading
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countries, including China13 . In the following year, the Council
issued a decision on unilateral import arrangements in respect of
14State-trading countries for products including textiles . According
to this decision, the Council should adopt any amendment, before
30 November each year, which it appeared necessary to make for the
following year to the quotas15.
Once the Community established official relations with China the
Chinese party could no longer accept the unilateral arrangements by
the Community, especially when the Chinese modernisation plans were
expanding rapidly and the country desperately needed to increase
exports in textiles in order to augment foreign exchange earnings to
cover, as far as possible, the importation costs of industrial items
that were needed. Indeed, the textile trade had become a major source
of disagreement between the Community and China, and had developed
into a serious dispute between them at that time' 6 . Although the
parties successfully negotiated a Trade Agreement in 1978, it only
provided some general principles 17 . In the textile trade sector, a
more concrete arrangement was highly desirable. For the Chinese
exporters, it might give them an opportunity of a secured access to
the EEC market; for the Community, it would enable the Community more
easily to control the inflow of textiles from China, which, with rich




Negotiation of the textile agreement started in due course, but
it proved to be very tough. The Chinese negotiators wanted to obtain
an increase in its textile exports from the existing level of 20,000
tons a year to 60,000 tons a year 18 , an amount the Community was not
prepared to accept at a time when the developed world was hit by the
recession and the textile industry in the Community fell to its lowest
level in 198019. The different interest groups put pressure on the
European Community not to make any major concession. The pressures
came from the textile and clothing industry in the Community, members
of the European Parliament, and also the third world textile
suppliers 20 . But there were also contradictory pressures within the
Community on the impression of the vast potential of the Chinese
market.
The compromise came from the fact that the Chinese negotiator
gave in. The Community successfully persuaded the Chinese negotiator
to withdraw from the request of huge quotas into the Community. It
should be noticed that in negotiation practice, the Community employed
tactics which had from time to time actually given the Community more
bargaining powers at the negotiation table. A tactic of two
dimensions was employed by the Community: the Council issued a
mandate, and the Commission would negotiate the relevant agreements
with the counterparts concerned according to the mandate. In the case
of negotiation with China, the Commission successfully persuaded the
Chinese party to accept the arrangement of making 23 categories of
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textile products in Annexe IV to be subject to quantitative
restrictions 21 ; it also successfully argued that an amount of 60,000
tons quota a year to China was exceeding the global ceilings set in
the Council's mandate, and had little hope of being accepted by the
Council22 . For products not subject to quantitative restrictions in
Annexe IV, a basket extractor mechanism was incorporated into the
agreement, according to which, various specific levels of importation
for different groups of products had also been fixed23.
The EEC-China textile agreement did not, however, limit Chinese
textile exports to a nil or low Increase rate. In fact, the agreement
provided for Chinese textile products a significant increase for the
quotas of products under Annexe iii24, and a relatively larger
proportion of textile products other than those under quantitative
25
restrictions into the Community . If this agreement is reviewed in
the context of the Community textile policy in general during the
26	 .	 .
period of the NFA II , taking into consideration the restrictive
attitudes of the European Community towards the developing suppliers
at that period of time27 , it is safe to conclude that in the 1979
textile agreement the Community has made, to certain extent,
concessions regarding textile imports from China in the following
ways: large increase of quotas; big proportion of cake of EC global
ceilings; better terms with respect to flexibility than normal
bilateral agreements under the MFA II and large annual growth rate
28
etc . Although China was not a member of the I'IFA until January
198428, the terms accorded in the 1979 textile agreement were even
more favourable towards China than normal MFA II bilateral agreements
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concluded between the Community and some developing countries. Many
reasons may explain why China had been granted such relatively
favourable terms in the textile agreement at the time when the
Community was taking very restrictive attitude towards textile
imports. Among others, two main reasons should be mentioned here.
First, China had engaged in textile trade for a long time, but the
volume of the trade was relatively small. In this respect, China
might be regarded a newcomer at that time, and it was therefore easier
for the Chinese to get better terms than those who had already become
leading suppliers. Second and more importantly, China had stronger
bargaining position in comparison with other developing suppliers
because of its enormous potential market. Major trade partners
(including the EEC) wanted to get a larger share of the opening
Chinese market via the concessional treatment to China in textile
30trade
3. The Legal Mechanism
The large increase of quotas from China, and some other
favourable terms towards China in the textile agreement does not mean
that the agreement is favourable only for China, nor that the
interests of the Community and its textile industry are ignored. On
the contrary, the terms of the textile agreement on the whole are
clearly more favourable to the Community, and the legal mechanism
accorded in the agreement is, by and large, intended to protect the
Community textile industry.
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a. Arrangement of Quotas
When the 1979 textile agreement was concluded, China was not a
member of the MFA. The agreement, however, was analogous to the
bilateral agreements between the European Community and the developing
suppliers concluded under the MFA II. The products covered by the
EEC-China textile agreement were, therefore, the same as products
covered by the MFA ii31.
The arrangements of quotas were detailed in Articles 2 and 3 of
the agreement, and Appendices I and III to the agreement. Under such
arrangements, the Community undertook to suspend the import quotas in
force prior to the conclusion of the agreement, and not to introduce
32further quotas in respect of the products listed in Appendix I
Measures equivalent to Community import quotas were also forbidden33.
On the other hand China agreed to stipulate and maintain export quotas
for its products to the Community in accordance with Appendix iii.
The quota arrangements have served the Community's desire to
firmly control textile imports from China in order to prevent the
"market disruption". This purpose has been achieved not only because
the same article has provided that "in the management of the quota
mentioned in paragraph 1, China will ensure that the Community's
textile industries benefit from the use of the quotas" 35 , but the
statement of general purpose in the preamble of the agreement has also
emphasised the Community's interests "to eliminate the real risks of
market upsets" 36 . Moreover, although the provisions in Article 2
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restrict the Community from imposing any further quantitative
restrictions over textile imports from China, it has so far failed to
prevent the Community to do so. Over the duration of the agreement,
the Community, through the consultation procedures established in
Article 16 of the agreement, has successfully persuaded the Chinese
government to accept more quantitative restrictions for the products
which were not covered by the original quota arrangement37.
b. Base Level, Growth Rate and Flexibility
As with other bilateral agreements under the MFAs, the EEC-China
textile agreement also incorporates the structure of base level,
growth rate and flexibility.
(i) Base level: the base level is the annual level at which the
quantity of export of a particular product is restrained.
The principle is that the base level of export in the first
year of the restraint cannot be lower than the annual level
that it has already achieved unless a "roll back" has been
qualified38 . The base level in the 1979 EEC-China textile
agreement, as discussed above, increased from the existing
20,000 tons a year, to 40,000 tons in 1979, a result of
compromise: China wanted 60,000 tons a year at first40.
(ii) Growth rate: if the restriction is to continue beyond one
year the levels for the subsequent years have to be higher,
allowing for a growth over the level for the previous year.
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The minimum growth rate provided in MFA I was of 6 per cent.
In the restraint levels for the products under restraint,
certain exceptions have provided for the growth rate being
lower than 6 per cent. 41 . In the 1979 EEC-China textile
agreement, the growth rate of import for the products
subject to quantitative restrictions was far below the 6 per
42
cent., especially the products in Group I . The growth
rate for products in category 1 was as low as 0.6 per cent.,
43
the growth rate for products in category 2 was even lower
Among the products of all 23 categories restrained by the
quotas, only the products of category 20 and 39 were above
the minimum growth rate of 6 per cent. 44 . In short, the
Community had successfully restrained the growth rate of
textile imports from China to a very low level.
(iii) Flexibility: there are three types of flexibility in
utilising the opportunities within the restraint levels by
an exporting country. These are swing, carry forward, and
carry over. Swing is the adjustment among the restraint
levels for various products during a particular year. The
MFA I contained a provision for 7 per cent. swing meaning
thereby that the export of a particular product may exceed
the restraint level in a given year by 7 per cent. 45 . In
the 1979 EEC-China textile agreement, however, swing between
products was restrained to 5 per cent. in general 46 . Also,
Group I products were separated from the others, the
products of categories 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were authorised to
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transfer only between themselves 47 , and the products of
categories 1, 2 and 3 were authorised to transfer between
themselves, with the reservation that the category 1
products could not have increased transferring48.
When the level of export of a product is likely to exceed the
restraint level in a particular year there is a provision for
borrowing from the quota of the same product in the next year, ie,
carry forward. The MFA I provided for a 5 per cent. carry forward.
The 1979 EEC-China textile agreement also permitted a 5 per cent.
carry forward49 . Similarly, when the restraint level of a product in
a particular year is not fully utilised by the actual export, there is
a provision for utilisation of the unused level in the next year, ie,
carry over. The 1979 EEC-China textile agreement provided for a 5 per
cent, carry over, which was much lower than the 10 per cent, carry
50
over provided for by the MFA I
The flexibility accorded in Article 5 of the agreement was
further restrained by two provisions. First, a product in a category
could not, as a result of the cumulative application of the
flexibility measures, exceed 15 per cent. during any one year in any
case51 . Second, recourse to the measures of flexibility must be
52
notified in advance by the Chinese authorities
On the whole, the terms accorded in the EEC-China textile
agreement, in respect of the base level, growth rate and flexibility,
were the products of compromise of bargaining: they were to some
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extent better than what other developing suppliers had got at the time
when the bilateral agreement concluded between the EEC and other
developing suppliers under the MFA II were shadowed by "reasonable
departure" clause, the Community was very restrictive towards the
textile imports from these countries and regions. But, on the other
hand these terms were also very restrictive with flexibility reduced
to a low level, and the growth rate far below the minimum growth rate
established in MFA I.
c. The Basket Extractor Mechanism
In order to control imports from developing suppliers, the
Community operates a basket extractor mechanism which provides that in
the situation wherein a supplier country exceeds a certain level of a
given MFA product in the basket (the so-called threshold level), which
is not subject to the Community quantitative limits, the Community may
nevertheless ask for consultation with the country concerned, with the
aim of fixing a quota for the given product. Should no agreement be
reached during the negotiation, the Community can then impose a
restriction by itself, but not lower than the threshold or 106 per
cent, of the imports of the previous year 53 . This mechanism was
incorporated into the 1979 EEC-China textile agreement. The agreement
stated that when imports from China reached 0.2 per cent. in the case
of Group 1 products, 1.5 per cent. in the case of Group II products,
and 5 per cent. in the case of Group III products, of the total volume
of the previous year's extra - EEC imports products of the same
category, the Community might ask for consultations. During the
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consultation, China should, from the date of notification of the
request for consultation, suspend or restrict exports of the product
in question to the Community, or to the region or regions specified by
the Community, to the level of triggering off the consultation. At
the same time, the Community, for its part, might subject the
importation of the products concerned to a quota at the level notified
in the request for consultation 54 . If no agreement can be reached
during the consultations within a month of initiating the
consultation, the Community was then entitled to introduce a
definitive quota unilaterally. If such quotas were introduced, the
annual growth rate of the quotas should be stipulated by mutual
agreement between the parties. If there was no mutual agreement on
the growth rate, the Community would be likely to have the right to
decide. This mechanism was a double lock in protecting the Community
market for it eventually granted the Community the right to put
previously unrestricted products under restrictions whenever the
Community considered necessary. The Community had utilised this
mechanism from time to time to protect its market. It managed to
increase the number of textile products originating in China and under
restriction from 23 to 37 product categories over five years operation
of the 1979 textile agreement55.
The basket extractor mechanism might also be initiated between
China and a single Community region, or regions, because the
quantities of MFA products allocated to China in the basket are, in
fact, distributed among the Community regions on a pro rata basis of
,,56
their theoretical quotas as defined by the term burden sharing
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The share of the quotas was subsequently modified in 1981 when Greece
joined the Community57 , and modified again when Spain and Portugal
also became Member States 58 . When the imports concerned exceeded the
"share" of a Community region, the basket extractors mechanism might
be applied. This practice had further restricted the flexibility of
Chinese textile exports to the Community because certain regions in
the Community, notably the UK and West Germany, are far more
marketable than others. It is submitted that such a practice is
inconsistent with the idea of the single market and should be
I,	 I,
abandoned after 1992 . The share of burden system, however, has
been incorporated into the new textile agreement between the EEC and
China which will be valid to the end of 199260.
d. Price Clause
In the textile agreement, there was a price clause under which
importation would be suspended, should the price of textile fall below
a fixed level. According to the agreement, the price of textiles sold
to the Community, originating in China, should take particular account
of the prices usually governing similar products sold under normal
trade conditions by other exporting countries in the importing
country's market. If textile products from China were imported at
prices lower than that, the interested party might request
consultation, and under critical circumstances, the competent
Community authorities might suspend delivery of import documents or
61licences
296
The purpose of this provision is to prevent low priced Chinese
products distorting the Community market. It is also a common clause
regarding textile imports from other State-trading countries 62 . The
rationale behind it is that the State-trading countries can manoeuvre
the price to the extent that it may distort the market.
Problems arise from such a provision. In the first place, what
prices are "the prices usually governing similar products" is not very
clear, the only thing clear here is that these prices cannot be the
prices of textile products from other State-trading countries, since
there is a similar price clause in the textile agreements between the
Community and countries concerned to prevent textiles from these
countries being sold at low prices. In the second place, "normal
trade conditions" "in the importing country's market" is a matter of
fact, such fact should be established by criteria clearly applicable.
Such criteria are not provided. Thirdly, and more importantly, there
is also no criteria of "critical circumstance" in the provision to
enable the Community to take appropriate action. Eventually, the
Community will have complete freedom to suspend the imports if it is
regarded as necessary "in the expectation of reaching a mutually
acceptable solution" 63 . Under such circumstance, a shotgun solution
is to be expected.
The direct consequence of this provision is that textile products
from China can never be sold at the lowest price in the Community no
matter how competitive they might be, since the Community can always
ask for consultation if the price is lower than similar products from
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other sources into the Community, or even suspend the importation if
the Community considers this necessary. In this sense, such a price
clause, it is submitted, is discriminatory in nature, since it has
made pre-emption of any possible economic efficiency and other
comparative advantages existing in China. Arguably, such advantages
do exist. The massive labours are very low-paid and certain raw
materials, for example silk, are only or principally available in
64China
Another legal effect of such clause is that it also excludes the
possible application of Community anti-dumping rules in Chinese
textile imports. Because the problems and fears of low priced imports
of Chinese textiles can easily be removed through consultations and/or
unilateral actions, there is no need to initiate a proceeding of
anti-dumping although some producers have from time to time threatened
to start the complaints procedure to the Commission. This probably
explains why there have been no anti-dumping proceedings involving
textile products from China whilst many other Chinese imports have
become principal targets of EC anti-dumping proceedings65.
e. Anti-Surge Clause
The anti-surge clause was not commonly employed in bilateral
textile agreements until it was embodied into the MFA ui66.
Arguably, it might be regarded as an innovation of the MFA III, a new
tool to tackle the problem of the possibility of a sudden increase of
textiles imports even though these might well be within the negotiated
298
67
restraint level . However, it was in 1979, much earlier than the MFA
III, that the Community was able to persuade the Chinese negotiator to
agree to incorporate a provision similar to the anti-surge clause into
the textile agreement between them. In the agreement, China undertook
to "make every endeavour to ensure that exports of textile products
subject to quotas shall be distributed as regularly as possible over
the year, taking particular account of seasonal factors" 68 . While
this provision did not directly provide the instrument for the
"mutually satisfactory solutions or arrangements" as an ordinary
anti-surge clause did, it nevertheless granted the Community a right
to request from Chinese textile exporters a more gradual growth in the
utilisation of the quotas agreed, otherwise the consultation
procedure, on the grounds of problems arising from the application of
the textile agreement, could be triggered. It is safe to say that
such provision is at least a half-way through to a typical anti-surge
clause later. The effect of such provision is that China lost the
certainty of when it is allowed to use its allotted quotas freely and
to the full69.
f. Double Administrative Control
This was a common provision, not only incorporated in the
EEC-China textile agreement, but also in other EEC textile agreements.
The double administrative control system provided that exports from
China should be subject to export licence issued by the Chinese
authorities, and imports into the Community, on the other hand, should
be subject to the import licences or equivalent documents issued by
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the Member State in question and applied by the importers according to
the contracts. The double administrative control system was not
merely applicable to products under the quantitative restriction but
also to all products including those not under the restriction. This
technique could control effectively the inflow of textiles from
particular sources such as China.
g. Guaranteed Raw Materials Supply
The most special feature in the EEC-China textiles agreement was
the provision under which China undertook to supply minimum guaranteed
quantities of textile raw materials, (pure silk, angora, cashmere
etc.) to the European textile and clothing industry in the light of
71
market practice and normal trade price . In order to have a strong
position in the bitter competition of the international textile and
clothing market, it is very important for the European manufacturers
72
to have constant access to raw materials from China . This is
probably another explanation of why the Community granted Chinese
exporters the opportunity of unusual increasing in the common market.
In practice, the agreement provided that, before the end of year, the
Community might submit to the competent Chinese authorities a list of
the interested producer/processing companies and, if appropriate, the
quantities of raw materials required by them. The Chinese
authorities, bearing in mind of China's export capabilities, should
give favourable consideration to these orders in order to satisfy
Community industry's requirements73.
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The agreement requested the parties to review the possibility of
increasing the ceiling of Chinese raw material supplied to the
74Community every year . It did not, however, provide a minimum annual
growth rate for the Community industries. Problems may arise out of
this provision when the Chinese textile industry also needs such raw
materials. It has actually happened that because of the increasing
domestic demand, China cut down the supply of raw materials to the
75	 .Community . In my view in order to improve further the Community
industry's opportunity of access to Chinese raw materials the system,
therefore, needs to be amended to the extent that a annual growth rate
of the raw material supply should be fixed to the general annual
growth rate of Chinese textile imports into the Community.
h. Imports into China from the Coiinunity
Another special feature in the EEC-China textile agreement was
the stipulation in the agreement regading textile products imports
into China from the Community. The agreement provided that, in return
for increased export prospects for Chinese textile products into the
Community, China should encourage and facilitate the importation into
its own market of textile products originating in the Community 76 . To
this purpose, China undertook not to aggravate and, if possible, to
reduce the imbalance in the textile trade balance with the Community
from 1 to 5.3 in terms of value77 . Both parties would examine the
situation of the textile trade each year. If, after the second year
of the textile agreement, any change in the imbalance of the textile
trade balance became apparent, the consultation procedure should be
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employed in order to remedy the situation. In cases where no
agreement had been reached, each party was entitled to take unilateral
action to maintain 1 to 5.3 formula78
China also undertook that, if more imports of textiles products
into China were needed, preference would be given to importing the
79
products of EEC origin , and if the Community felt it had been placed
in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis a third country, the Community
might request consultations with China in order to adopt appropriate
measures to balance the rights and obligations under the 1978 trade
agreement 80 . This provision is intended to provide a guaranteed
access to the Chinese market by the Community textile and clothing
industry whilst the Community will inevitable increase its imports
from China. It requires China to open its own market in line with the
increasing of its exports of textiles to the Community.
i. Textile Couinittee and Consultation
A textile committee was set up according to the textile agreement
which consisted of representatives of the contracting parties
appointed by the Joint Committee established under Article 9 of the
81	 .	 .
1978 Trade Agreement . The textile committee has been granted a wide
range of powers: consultations provided in this agreement should be
conducted within the committee, and any other problem arising from the
application of the agreement should also be dealt with within the
committee
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Procedures for consultation have also been set up, that is: a
request for consultation must be in writing. A report stating the
reasons and circumstances which, in the opinion of the requesting
party, justified the making of such request, should be promptly
followed (in any case not more that 15 day's notice) 83 . Consultations
should be initiated within one month of the notice of the request in
order to reach an agreement or mutually acceptable conclusion also
84
within one month
The textile committee established hereunder plays an important
role in running the highly regulated textile trade between China and
the EEC smoothly. Because there is no particular subject the textile
committee is limited to deal with, the committee is empowered to
discuss virtually any problem relating to the textile trade between
them. This has been another reason why Chinese textile products have
not been subject to EEC anti-dumping proceedings so far85 . However,
Article 16 does not provide the solution for the situation where the
contracting parties cannot reach a mutually acceptable conclusion in
consultations. In such circumstances the contracting party is
actually entitled to take measures it deems appropriate. Since the
Community is basically a textile importer from China, it is clear,
therefore, that such a clause is mainly to protect the Community's
interests.
This viewpoint is supported by various other parts of the
agreement. Article 6 provides, for example, that the Community may
request consultations in order to reach agreement on an appropriate
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quota level, if it notes that imports of the Chinese textiles have
reached a certain level of the total volume of the previous year's
extra-EEC imports of products of the same category86 . In such case
China shall suspend or restrict exports of the product category in
question to the Community. The Community for its part may subject the
importation of the products concerned to a quota at the level notified
in the request for consultation 87 . Moreover, if the consultations do
not enable the parties to produce a satisfactory solution within the
time limit mentioned above, the Community shall be entitled to
introduce a definitive quota unilaterally at an annual level not less
88
than the level indicated in the request for consultation . Example
could also be found in Article 13 of the agreement. It provided that
if after the second year of the agreement, any change in the imbalance
of the textile trade balance (1:5.3) became apparent, at the request
of either party, the consultation procedure should come into effect in
order to remedy the situation. In the event of the parties not
reaching an agreement or a mutually acceptable conclusion, each party
should be entitled to take the appropriate measures89.
4. Some Comments
The 1978 textiles negotiations and the textile agreement
concluded in 1979 between the Community and China increased Chinese
textile imports into the Community significantly. In fact, the 1979
textile agreement made concessions to Chinese exporters in some way in
terms of growth rate of Chinese textile products into the Community
market. It was particularly true under the circumstance when the
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Community was taking a very restrictive attitude towards other
developing suppliers under the MFA II. This was because China was a
relative newcomer in the textile trade at that time, and also because
of the potential Chinese market to the Community.
However, the quotas arranged thereunder were considerably lower
than China asked for, and more importantly, the terms concluded in the
agreement were clearly well devised to make textile imports from China
under control and to protect the Community's industry. First of all,
the special basket Extractors Mechanism had enabled the Community to
subject all Chinese MFA textile products, including those which were
not subject to quantitative restrictions, to some sort of limits. The
Community, therefore, kept the initiative to restrict textile and
clothing exports from China to the level it can and is willing to
bear. Secondly, the Community successfully concluded a price clause
into the textile agreement, under which importation would be suspended
should the price of the Chinese textile products fall below a fixed
90	 .	 .
level . Thus, any possible economic efficiency and other comparative
advantages of Chinese textile products had been prejudicially denied.
Thirdly, the agreement had made China undertaken to supply minimum
guaranteed quantities of textile raw materials for the EC processing
industry. This had not only provided a guaranteed access for the
Community industry to rare materials such as silk, but also put a
major challenge on the Chinese textile industry because these raw
materials were also needed by the Chinese industry for the growing
production capability. Finally, other clauses had also been
incorporated into the agreement to control Chinese textiles. A
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so-called "double administrative control system", for example, has
been concluded into the agreement which was applicable to all products
and not merely to those subject to limitations. Also, a clause
similar to the "anti-surge clause" had been concluded which limits the
possibility of using the allotted quotas freely.
The development of the EEC-China textile trade was dramatic,
despite the restrictive terms concluded in the textile agreement.
Chinese textile exports to the EEC increased from 30,911 tonnes in
1978 to 87,957 tonnes in 1983, increasing nearly two times 91 . The
proportion of the Chinese textile products in the Community market
also increased from 2.32 per cent. of total extra-EEC textiles in 1978
92	 .for about 5.5 per cent. in 1983 . Over that period of time, China
gradually became one of the major textile suppliers in the European
Community.
The increasing volume of cheap Chinese textiles coming into the
Community market caused increasing concern both to the European
textile and clothing industry and the European authorities. When the
four-year agreement came to expiry in 1983, a tougher round of
negotiations started, a more restrictive textile agreements was on its
way.
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C. The 1984 Supplementary Protocol
1. The Negotiations
Preliminary discussion on the renewal of the first EEC-China
textile agreement started as early as May 1983. At that time, China
was not a member of the MFA, and accordingly, the EEC textile
producers, concerned by the quick expending of Chinese textiles into
the Community market, emphasised that China should not be given, in
the new agreement, more favourable treatment than those MFA countries
with whom the EEC had already concluded bilateral textile agreements
at the end of 1982 under the MFA III. Various problems existed for
the coming agreement. On the EEC side, the Commission did not require
a specific mandate from the Council for the negotiations of the
renewal of the EEC-China textile agreement. Therefore, the scope for
flexibility in the negotiations was restricted to the extent to which
the quotas were required to remain within the global ceilings and
growth rates set down in the Council of the EEC Minister's Mandate of
February 1982; the EEC could only envisage increases of approximately
6-7 per cent. in order to remain within the limits 94 . On the Chinese
side, however, China exported more than 600 million square yards
equivalent of fabric and garments in 1982 to the Community, compared
with 12 million square yards in 1972. Since textiles made up nearly
a quarter of China's manufactured exports, the country relied heavily
on the industry to earn the foreign exchanges it needed for its
imports. China tried to push the European Community for an average 20
per cent. increase in its textile quota for the new
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arrangements 96 . Furthermore, from a regional point of view, China
wanted to increase its sales where the possibilities for favourable
market access were the greatest, such as Germany, whereas the
Community's approach was generally one of burden sharing of the quotas
97between the Member States
The first round of negotiation between the Community and China,
against this background, broke down at the end of 198398. At the same
99
time, China joined the MFA from January, 1984 . New legal problems
were brought about by this development of whether negotiations should
be based on the MFA III or whether China was considered a dominant
supplier within the MFA as opposed to a developing country. On the
one hand, China would have more of a say by joining the MFA; on the
other hand, while China's exports of textiles to the Community were
comparable in tonnage to those of Macao or South Korea (which were
regarded as dominant suppliers), there was a mounting opinion that
100China should be considered as a dominant supplier
In reality, the parties simply followed the 1979 textile
agreement, which according to its terms, was automatically renewed for
five years. On March 29, 1984, the agreement was finally reached in
the form of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1979 agreement (the
Supplementary Protocol)101.
In the Supplementary Protocol, the Community tightened up its
imports from China, put five more categories of textile products from
China under the limits, and some 34 new restrictions have been imposed
308
on imports into various parts of the Community'° 2 . The importation of
textiles from China are therefore under more severe restriction under
the Supplementary Protocol. In return, the Community has agreed to
increase some quotas, including those on highly sensitive products.
2. Amendments to the 1979 Agreement Legal Mechanism
When China and the EEC concluded the Supplementary Protocol in
1984, the MFA II was expired two years ago, and the MFA III was in
operation. There were some changes and development from the MFA II to
It	 ItMFA III
	
. Notably, the reasonable departures clause was discarded
in the MFA III; instead it contained some new provisions to protect
textile importing countries 104 . Corresponding with these changes,
some legal techniques used in the 1979 textile agreement have been
amended, and some new techniques have been brought in.
a. Anti-surge Clause
The MFA III, was different from the MFA II in that the MFA III
had incorporated a new legal tool to tackle the problem of the
possibility of sudden increase in levels, even though these might be
within the negotiated restraint level, ie the anti-surge provision.
The MFA III expressed the developed importing countries concerns about
"sharp and substantial increase in imports as a result of significant
differences between large restraint levels negotiated in accordance
,,105
with Annex B on the one hand and actual imports on the other
Under such circumstances, the parties concerned "may agree to mutually
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satisfactory solution or arrangements", if "such significant
difficulties stem from consistently under-utilised larger restraint
levels and cause or threaten serious and palpable damage to domestic
,,l06industry
In my view, this provision was rather vague, the wording of
"significant differences' t , "significant difficulties", "large
restraint levels", "consistently under utilised" were not well
defined, and needed to be further elaborated. Consequently, the
question of which quotas and how much under-utilisation would attract
the invocation of the anti-surge clause would depend a great deal upon
the bilateral agreements and the way these would be implemented.
As mentioned above, the 1979 textile agreement had already
concluded a provision similar to or halfway to an anti-surge
107
clause	 . But that provision was not well developed at that time.
The 1984 Supplementary Protocol on the other hand took the MFA III
into consideration, a full range of anti-surge clause therefore had
been incorporated into the Supplementary Protocol. The Supplementary
Protocol provided that where the Community ascertained that the level
of imports in a given category of Group I subject to quantitative
limits exceeded in any agreement year the level of imports in the
proceeding year by 10 per cent. of the quantitative limit, the
Community might request the opening of consultation 108 . In the
consultation, the agreement should be reached on:
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(a) the suspension, wholly or in part, of the flexibility provided by
Article 5 of the textile agreement;
(b) a modification of the quantitative limit set out in Annex IV by
the establishment of an ad hoc limit below the existing
quantitative limit; and
(c) the corresponding equitable and quantifiable compensation109.
Under such a situation, and pending a mutually satisfactory
solution, China undertook for a period of one month from the date of
notification of the request for consultation, to restrain exports of
the products in the category concerned to the Community market
specified by the Community to one-twelfth of the level of exports
reached during the proceeding calendar year 110 . Should the parties be
unable to reach a satisfactory solution the Community was entitled to
suspend wholly or in part, the flexibility for Chinese products
provided in the textile agreement in respect of the Community or any
of its regions for the category concerned, or to modify the
quantitative limit set out in Annex IV for the category concerned so
as to restrain exports to the Community to 125 per cent. of imports
attained during the preceding calendar year, or to the level of
exports up to the date of the request for consultations plus the level
of exports carried to the Community during the consultations shipped




There were some limitations on the application of the anti-surge
clause. Any of the following situations would prevent the Community
from applying the anti-surge clause:
(a) If quantitative limits established in Annex IV for the Community
for the category concerned represented less than 1 per cent. of
total Community imports during 1982.
(b) If the level of imports originating in China during the current
agreement year represented less than 50 per cent. of the
quantitative limit set out in Annex III for the category
concerned in the Community as a whole or in any Community region
or regions concerned.
(c) If the level of imports originating in China for the category
concerned was lower than the level of imports of products in that
category originating in China in 1982112.
(d) In the event that the anti-surge clause was applied, the
Community undertook to maintain an offer of equitable and
quantifiable compensation113.
The mechanism of anti-surge clause is a product of intention to
protect the interests of the importing countries. It prevents any
sharp and substantial increase of textile imports from China and
therefore diminishes the difficulties for European industry. The
application of this clause meant that in a number of instances the
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Chinese suppliers lose the certainty that they would be allowed to use
113
their allotted quotas freely and to the full
Anti-fraud Clause
In line with the changes in the MFA III, the Supplementary
Protocol has also accorded an anti-circumvention clause114 , The
protocol provided that the parties agreed to co-operate fully in
preventing the circumvention of the agreement by transhipment,
re-routing or whatever other measures 115 . Where information became
available to the Community that products of Chinese origin subject to
quantitative limits established under this agreement had been
transhipped, re-routed or otherwise imported into the Community in
circumventions of this agreement, the consultation should take place
with a view to reaching agreement on an equivalent adjustment of the
corresponding quantitative limits established under this agreement116
Pending the result of the consultation, China should, as a
precautionary measure, make the necessary arrangement to ensure that
adjustments of quantitative limits might be carried out for the quota
year in which the request to open consultations or for the following
year if the quota for the current year was exhausted, if so required
by the Community, and clear evidence of circumvention was provided117.
Should the parties be unable to reach a satisfactory solution, the
Community should have the right to deduct from the quantitative limits
amounts equivalent to the products of Chinese origin, if clear
evidence of circumvention had been provided 118 . This provision goes
further than relevant provisions in the MFA III. In Article 8 of the
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MFA, if the parties concerned cannot reach a mutually satisfactory
solution, the matters shall be referred to the TSB. Paragraph 14 of
the 1981 Extension Protocol confirmed that. In the EEC-China
Supplementary Protocol, however, the Community had the right to say
last words, if it could provide clear evidence. There were no clear
definitions as to what was clear evidence, and in fact, statistics and
information about bilateral textile trade were provided by the
Community 119 , the Community clearly had the great disposal in this
respect. However, it is submitted that if disputes do happen with
respect to measures taken by one party, the other party shall have the
right to refer the disputes to the TSB.
An inevitable issue in dealing with the problem of circumvention
is the origin of textile products. Because China is undertaking a
certain special practice with Hong Kong textile manufacturers, and
this practice has caused legal problems and disputes in international
trade, it is therefore necessary to discuss this here. On August 3,
1984, the US Custom Service, under the Executive Order 12,475 by the
120
President, promulgated interim country-of-origin regulation	 . In
this regulation, the traditional standard of "substantial
transformation tt , as recognised by long-standing judicial and
administrative precedent in the United States to determine the origin
of products manufactured through multicountry processing operation,
was abandoned. Instead it adopted a two-pronged ttsubstantial
manufacturing" test. Under this new standard, the country of origin
of a textile or clothing product manufactured through a multi-country
processing operation is the country in which that product last
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underwent (1) "a substantial manufacturing or processing operation",
,,121(2) resulting in a new and different article of commerce
Furthermore, the regulations also abandoned the case by case approach
of determining origin under the traditional "substantial
transformation" standard. Rather, it created per se rules which
determined arbitrarily that certain manufacturing operations would
never confer country-of-origin states' 22 . The most significant effect
of these changes was that final assembly through sewing, looping, or
linking of component parts knit or cut in another country no longer
123
would confer country-of-origin status on the country of assembly
The regulations particularly affected a large volume of sweater trade
that was manufactured through knitting operations undertaken in China
and looping operation performed in Hong Kong, a legitimate and
124
long-established business practice	 . Under previous US court
decisions and Customs' rulings, Hong Kong traditionally had been the
country of origin of these products 125 . Because the smaller quota for
sweaters under the US-China bilateral agreement than under the US-Hong
Kong agreement, serious trade disruptions and disputes between parties
126
concerned occurred
Will a similar legal problem be raised between China and the
Community? Would the competent authority take action if it deems it
necessary to challenge the origin of the products concerned? If it
does, what other legal problems may arise? The following discussions
try to tackle some of these problems.
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In the EEC textile trade, the rules governing the country-of-
origin are unilaterally the rules in force in the Community 127 , except
in cases where international agreements have specific clauses on
country-of-origin, which are very similar to the rules enforced in the
128Community . The Community generally takes the view that the
products originate in the country where the last substantial
transformation takes place 129 . According to the current rules of
origin in the Community, which were established in 1968, "a product in
the production of which two or more countries were concerned shall be
regarded as originating in the country in which the last substantial
process or operation that is economically justified was performed,
having been carried out in an undertaking equipped for the purpose,
and resulting in the manufacture of a new product or representing an
important stage of manufacture"130.
In implementing Article 5 of Regulation No 802/68, the method of
change of tariff heading has been adopted. According to this
standard, the qualification of product of origin is conferred, if the
processing or working transformation implies that the final product
falls under a different tariff heading of the Common Customs Tariff
than the raw material. This strict criterion of change of tariff
heading is adjusted by an A- and a B-list. The A-list requires
compliance with additional conditions for some products before they
are conferred with origin, even if the processing or working operation
has resulted in a change of tariff heading (negative list). For some
products, the B-list provides the opportunity that processing or
working operations can result in the obtaining of origin, even though
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these operations do not lead to a change in tariff heading (positive
list)131.
The case-law of the European Court of Justice has given some
rulings on this issue, although the question is not entirely clear
yet. It is clear, however, that the method of merely changing the
tariff heading in determining the origin of goods was rejected by the
132
Court in the uberseehandel case 	 . According to the Court, the
tariff clarification of the Common Custom Tariff had been conceived to
fulfil a special purpose and not in relation to the determination of
the origin of goods. Whereas a more flexible application of the
method of the changing of the tariff heading by way of adding A- and
B-lists to it is, according to the Cousin decision, not in itself
incompatible with Article 5 of Regulation No 802/68. By using this
more precise method, the determination of origin of goods can be based
on a real and objective distinction between raw material and the
processed product within the meaning of the case-law of the Court133.
In the Yoshiola case also the Court held that a too restrictive
interpretation by the Commission will not conform with the objective
of Regulation No 802/68134. However, in the Cousin's case, the Court
recognised the power of the Commission to implement Article 5 of
Regulation 208/68. According to this the Commission has a margin of
discretion which allows it to define the abstract concepts of Article
5 with reference to a specific working or processing operation. The
Court respected this margin of discretion and examined whether or not
135
the Commission had exceeded the limits of its competence 	 . One of
these limits is the principle of equality and the prohibition on the
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abuse of power. Regulation No 749/78 was declared invalid, not
because of its rigourness itself, but because of the fact that the
Commission could not provide an explanation for treating operations
carried out on yarn more restrictively than the same operations
carried out on cloth and fabrics' 36 . The Court might seem prepared to
accept a restrictive implementation by the Commission to a certain
extent provided that the principle of equality inter alia is complied
137
with
As far as textiles operations and working processing between
China and Hong Kong is concerned, it is very unlikely that the
Commission will deem China to be the country of origin of these
sweaters (mentioned above). First, because looping operations
undertaken in Hong Kong add more value to the final product, and
require more skill, technology, time and complexity of operation;
secondly, they also result in a greater physical change to the subject
merchandise than knitting operations performed in China. Looping
operations transform knit-to-sharp panels into sweaters that have a
name, character, and use that is different from those of the panels,
138
not only the changing of tariff heading . Thirdly, the practice of
subcontracting panel knitting operations to Chinese factories
originated because panel knitting is lower-skilled, low-paid work, the
joint productive technique of knitting panel takes advantage of the
comparative advantage of each: lower cost factories in China and
138
skilled workers in Hong Kong. It is economically justifiable 	 and
is not intended to circumvent the provision applicable in the
140	 .	 .	 .Community . Other similar operations and working processing should
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also be justifiable under the Community rules of origin. However, if
the Commission does want to exercise its power by establishing rather
severe requirements with regard to the conferring of origin, like the
US government does, it must provide an objective justification to meet
the general criteria of Article 5 of the Regulation No 802/68 and by
the principle of equality, as established criteria by the Cousin case.
Outward Processing Clause
The new form of textile exchanges is also established in the form
of outward processing trade 141 . Outward processing is the procedure
by which raw materials or semi-manufactured products are exported to
have certain stages of production taking place outside the
Community'42 . It can then be re-imported into the Community without
being charged on the quantitative limits concerned. The quantitative
objectives as regards outward processing operations are agreed between
the Community and China on 6 categories in Annex VII of Regulation No
2072/84. This sort of industrial co-operation gives the Chinese
producer a new channel to expand in the Community market, although the
quantities agreed upon are still very small 143 . The Community, at the
same time, can benefit from lower labour costs, and easily control




The price clause which was concluded in the 1979 textile
agreement has been dropped from the 1984 Supplementary Protocol. This
clause provided a solid basis for the Community to take necessary
measures to alleviate the impact of low-priced textiles from China,
and thus enable the Community to restrain from using other commercial
measures such as anti-dumping action. The deletion of the price
clause may give Chinese exporters opportunities to sell their goods
more easily in the Community Market, as they now can price their
products lower than their Community counterparts.
To deal with the low-priced textile products from China, the US
government has taken commercial measures, both anti-dumping
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proceedings and countervailing duty , whereas in the Community, none
of these measures have been taken against textiles from China,
although both measures are available to the Community. However,
imports of Chinese textiles into the Community are more tightly
controlled than into the United States.
D. Prospects and Conclusion for EEC-China Textiles Trade
Textiles represent one-quarter of China's exports to the EEC
Any change in the textile trade system will significantly change
China's ability to export to the Community, and will thus affect
EEC-China trade relations. The following legal issues concerning the
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EEC-China textile trade system may directly relate to the prospects of
the EEC-China textile trade.
The first issue concerns whether international textile trade
should be continuously regulated separately from the GATT rules. A
thorough discussion of this issue requires a full research and may
develop into a separate Phd thesis. But as it shall greatly affect
the EEC-China textile trade in future, a brief mention may be
necessary.
The economic irrationality of the MFA is obvious and is well
146	 .
recognised . However, an immediate revocation of the MFA system may
not be possible and be good neither for developing textiles exporting
147
countries, nor for developed textile importing countries 	 . But a
gradual phase out is necessary to terminate the temporary MFA regime
and is also possible 148 . The return of textile trade to the GATT
rules should be carefully arranged through multi-negotiations.
The second issue concerns the position of China vis-a-vis the EEC
under the MFA regime. It is the question of whether China shall be
treated as a "dominant supplier" in the Community Market. The
Community has already made three suppliers be so treated (South Korea,
Hong Kong and Macao). The Community has successfully cut back their
quotas during the MFA III. In the current bilateral agreements with
these three, the Community offers the lowest flexibility and the
toughest rules against them. If China is classified as a dominant
supplier, the legal mechanisms governing bilateral trade in textiles
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between China and the EEC and quotas for individual products could be
substantially different.
When China joined the MFA in 1984, other members noticed the
increasing importance of China in the textile trade and some wanted
149
China to be treated as a dominant supplier 	 . At that time China was
not ready to accept the allegation that it was a major textile trading
country, neither could it agree that it was among the rank of the
150
world leading suppliers	 . However, countries such as the United
States reiterated that they would certainly accord China treatment
which was equivalent and equitable to that accorded other similarly
151
positioned textile trading nations 	 . In practice, China negotiated
an agreement with the United States at a growth rate of 3.5 per cent.,
a rate much higher than the "big three" dominant suppliers (South
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) had in the United States, which only got
0.5-2 per cent. growth rate at the same time'52.
The situation now is somewhat different from then. Over the last
ten years (1978-1987), China has had an extraordinary surge in textile
trade. Between 1981 and 1985, for example, China had nearly 20 per
cent. annual growth in its clothing exports to the developed
153	 .
countries	 . In 1986, its exports of textile products reached
US$ 6.5 billion 154 , and US$ 9.1 billion in 1987155. By the end of
1987, China had become the biggest supplier in the world in terms of
volumes, and one of the top suppliers in terms of values. A country
with such a trade position is bound to be treated as a major textile
trading country, and therefore with great possibility of being treated
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as a dominant supplier and subject to more restrictive trade terms as
other dominant suppliers are facing.
Notwithstanding the possibility of being classified as a dominant
supplier, China may still gain a relatively high growth rate, because
of the bargaining power in the bilateral negotiations. This was
confirmed by the negotiation of China-USA textile agreement under the
MFA IV. China was the USA top supplier of 1987, ahead of competitors
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. However, the textile
agreement concluded at the end of 1987 allowed China an increase of 3
per cent. annually, which is still higher than the annual growth rate
156
of Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea
China's expansion of textile exports to the Community was not as
dramatic as it was in the United States market. Nevertheless, over
the ten years (from 1978 to 1987), the amount of exports to the
Community increased 5 times in terms of the tonage, and 9 times in
terms of the value 157 . It is a very convincing argument that China is
well qualified as a "dominant supplier" in the EEC market, as China
has been represented about 6 per cent. of total extra EEC textile
158	 .	 .imports	 . The point is, even so, it may still be difficult for the
Community to reduce the import growth rate from China as low as the
Korean's, simply because now textiles are the principal Chinese export
to the Community, and China runs a large amount of trade deficits
generally vis-a-vis the Community. Further restriction on China's
textiles export to the Community will inevitably push China into more
deficits in bilateral trade, and thus restrict China from buying more
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from the Community. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that a modest
and steady growth of textiles from China can still be exported,
159despite a reported bleak outlook on textiles in the Community
On the other hand, as far as China is concerned, as one of the
world's top textile suppliers, China should not put emphasis on
increasing the quantity which is becoming more tangent and limited,
but should concentrate on enhancing the quality of the products and
increasing the value of the products160.
The third issue concerns whether the quota should be maintained
at a national level. China was concerned by the Community's "burden
sharing" system, ie, the quotas are not only imposed at the Community
level, but also broken into a national level. When the imports
concerned exceed the "share" in a particular region (or regions), such
region (or regions) may reject importation of the product in
question161 . Furthermore, if a Member State feels that its market has
been "disturbed", it can then introduce safeguard measures at national
level in conjunction with the Commission' 62 . In the textile agreement
negotiations, China wanted to revoke the "burden sharing" system (or
national quota system), or, if not possible, to increase quotas in
13	 .	 .	 .
some more marketable Member States . The Community rejected China s
requirement during the negotiations 164 . But this issue now will
increasingly concern Chinese textile exporters as well as other EC
textile trading partners as the date of the single market approaches.
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It is understandable that textile manufacturers in the Community
are concerned about the possible removal of the national barrier165.
One may foresee that it will bring difficulties for some Member States
industries if national controls are removed and if national safeguard
measures are abandoned, because this will allow third country
exporters to the Community more flexibility in the use of their
quotas; consequently it will increase their competitiveness, and
possible market concentration and more market shares generally. The
EC textile producers therefore want the national safeguard measures to
remain, or alternatively, a reduction in the overall quotas allowed to
166
third country exporter, as a compensation for the single market
Clearly, safeguard measures between the Member States is contrary
to the idea of the single market, a true single market would eliminate
such measures. The quotas, if they still exist, ought to be at the
Community level, once the single market becomes reality and no "burden
sharing" system shall continue to exist. The safeguard measures, if
any, should also be maintained at the Community level.
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I	 EEC-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS: DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS
Relations between the European Community and the People's
Republic of China have blossomed since the establishment of official
relations in 1975. Politically, the two parties hold regular high
level meetings and consultations, which stimulates the development of
bilateral relations. Economically, bilateral trade reached US$12.87
billion in 1988. The European Community is not only one of China's
leading trade partners and investors, but also a principal supplier of
relatively high technology and equipment to China.
It has been suggested that China's interests in the European
Community have been primarily political, whereas the Community's
interests in China are basically economic. Such a proposition is
groundless. The rapid development of bilateral relations is motivated
both by political and economic factors as far as both parties are
concerned. Moreover, there is no clear-cut distinction between
political and economic interests in the reality of the contemporary
international community. Economic interests themselves are often
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political, and this is particularly true in the case of trade and
economic relations between China and the EEC.
The trade and economic relations, however, are admittedly far
below the true potential. Trade with China only accounts for just
over one percent of total EEC external trade. The trade volumes
between them are far behind trade volumes between China and Japan.
The EC investments in China are far behind those of the USA and Japan.
Various reasons may explain the EEC's relatively weak position in
China; they include historical, cultural and geographical factors.
But from the legal point of view, the following factors, may have
hindered the further development of trade and economic relations
between China and the EC:
(a) the growing protectionist tendency in the European Community has
largely to be blamed in impeding the development of the EEC-China
trade and economic relations. Despite the formal commitment to
free trade, there is an increasing tendency on the part of the
Community to turn to more rigid protectionism. The evidence can
be found in the EC's increasing restrictive trade policies in
trade in textiles vis-à-vis China. The frequent application of
the anti-dumping rules over the last ten years also pointed to
the same direction;
(b) the organisational framework of the European Community itself, as
it is presently constituted, has also created problems and
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obstacles regarding the development of trade and economic
relations with China. The Community decision-making process on
economic issues gets bogged down, because the wishes of the
twelve highly individualistic Member States have to be taken into
account and incorporated into the final decision before any steps
can be taken. On a number of occasions, the Community could not
reach the necessary unanimity in the decision process which would
otherwise help to increase bilateral trade. In the GSP schemes,
for example, the Commission has recommended repeatedly to extend
the products in the agriculture sector under the GSP scheme, and
to increase the GSP quantities for Chinese industrial products.
This recommendation was from time to time scaled down by the
Council;
(c) the EEC-China trade and economic relations are also restricted by
the embargo of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Control (COCOM), a Western watchdog body that supervises
strategic sales to Communist countries and a product of the Cold
War. Although the restrictions are generally less tight on China
than on the USSR and East European countries, there are
nevertheless numerous items that cannot be sold to China, or for
which special permission is required. Some items may be generally
accepted as having strategic importance, but most of the items
are under embargo only for economic reasons. The fears of
ruthless competition among European and American multinationals
or the fear that the Chinese producers may eventually become
competitors in the field carry main weight. It was not
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surprising, therefore, when the Belgian Bell concluded an
agreement for the sale of a 100,000 digital telephone line to
China, and a $250 million joint venture factory in China, that
the French came to compete, and the Americans wanted to curb at
least part of the deal.
Above mentioned problems can and will be overcome, particularly
in line with the 1992 single European market programme. For example,
to overcome the organisational problem, the Commission will have more
autonomy in external trade policy-making. And the Community will
technically use more majority votes instead of unanimous votes in
policy formulation.
It should be added that because of the difficulty to assess the
full impact of the "Beijing Events" of June 4th, 1989 on China's
direction and development in general, and its relations with the EC in
particular, I have not included an assessment of impact on EEC-China
trade and economic relations in my concluding analyses. It is clear,
however, that because of the "Beijing Event", from the economic point
of view, if China still reforms its economy towards a more market
oriented direction, as it did over the last ten years, the Community
should continue to liberalise the restrictions on imports from China.
But, if the reform stops or even reverses, the Community may treat
China as an NME and impose more restrictions. From the political
point of view, on the other hand, it is predictable that the Community
is less willing to treat China more liberally after the Event. In
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this respect, the bilateral trade and economic relations would be
affected.
II NilE TBEORY AND TRANSITIONAL CHINESE ECONOMY
There is always a fundamental contradiction in the EEC's attitude
towards China in trade and economic relations, that is whether China
should be treated as a non-market economy (or State-trading) country,
or as a developing economy country. It is recognised sometimes by the
Community that China is a developing country with an economy at a
different development level from that of the European Community. The
Community, based on such an acknowledgement, has granted development
aid to China from its non-associated country fund. Nevertheless, as a
principle, the Community treats China as a non-market economy
regardless of the fact that China is a developing country. In fact,
by way of placing China into the category of non-market economies, the
Community deprived China of many rights which a developing country
would have otherwise enjoyed.
The reason why the Community takes such an attitude is obvious.
On the one hand, the Community fears that any easy market access by
the Chinese products may distort the Community market, bearing in mind
that China has enormous natural resources and massive cheap labour; on
the other hand, the policy-makers in the Community institutions and
the Member States believe that because China is a socialist country,
the Government, by utilising the plan and other measures, can
manoeuvre prices and other matters concerning business transactions,
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which are supposed to be decided by the market forces in a normal
market economy. Consequently, the low-priced Chinese products would
disrupt the Community market. Moreover, because the Chinese
government controls the foreign trade and the whole domestic economy,
there is little chance for the Community industries to penetrate the
Chinese market. The Community, therefore, should make appropriate
steps to protect its own market. Yet, one would wonder whether the
covert motivation of the European Community for taking a very
restrictive attitude towards Chinese products (apart from political
considerations, if any) is that the European Community cannot imagine
the situation of facing another Japan in 30 or 50 years time. To
prevent China from becoming an ultimate competitor, the best way is to
cope with it at an early stage.
However, the conclusion that China is still a traditional
non-market economy is no longer a correct reflection of the Chinese
economic reality. The Chinese economic system after ten years of
reform has been greatly changed towards a more mixed economy. The
reform of the planning system has reduced the number of products
subject to mandatory plan to just over 20; the reform of the price
system has allowed most prices to be influenced or regulated by the
market forces rather than decided by the State; the reform of the
enterprise system of ownership and management has to some extent
separated enterprises from the State so that they ultimately function
independently; the reform of the foreign trade system has broken down
the State monopoly in foreign trade.
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It is submitted that, since World War II, international trade law
has developed rules, no matter how weak, to regulate East-West trade,
and a set of rules to govern trade relations between developed and
developing countries. But thus far no specific rules have been
developed to regulate trade with a developing socialist country like
China. The problem was not apparent until China opened its door and
started its economic reform ten years ago. As far as the European
Community is concerned, how to treat China in bilateral trade
relations always seems problematic. The Community fears low-priced
products from China and China always fears that she is being unfairly
treated. It is very true that ten years ago China was a typical
State-trading country (or a non-market, centrally controlled economy).
On the other hand, China is also a developing country (the largest
developing country in fact). The Western trading partners, namely the
United States and the European Community, treat China basically the
same as they do the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. It
is understandable for the European Community, along with other Western




(i) As the largest developing country, China cannot enjoy the
treatment granted to developing countries in international
trade. Imports from China are subject to quantitative
restrictions under the EEC trade regime, although IIFN
treatment has been granted.
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(ii) After ten years of reform the Chinese economy is now in a
transitional stage. This stage is different from a
traditional non-market economy. It is still going towards a
more mixed economy. The market forces will play an
increasingly important role in China. This fact is,
however, little recognised by the Western trading partners.
China is, and will still be, classified as a State-trading
country in the foreseeable future.
China always claims that it has been unfairly treated under
situation (1) above. In line with its reform progress, it will cry
out even more strongly that it is being unfairly treated as a
State-trading country. China has formally applied to resume its GATT
membership as a developing country as opposed to a State-trading
country. During the last ten years China's foreign trade has
effectively increased from US$20.64 billion in 1978 to over US$100
billion in 1988. It is expected that China's international trade
position should be stronger in the 1990s and in the next century. The
problem of how to treat China will be more frequently encountered by
the European Community, as well as by other developed countries.
There is no ready-made answer available to this question at
present. However, it is submitted that a two stage approach could be
adopted to tackle the problem:
Ci) At the present stage a compromise trade law system must be
created. China should basically be treated as a developing
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country, albeit with certain restrictions. The European
Community should revoke most existing quantitative
restrictions against imports from China. It should also
revoke the restrictions imposed on China of full access to
the EEC's GSP scheme. On the other hand, the safeguard
clause should be precisely defined to deal with possible
disturbance because of imports from China.
(ii) When reform in China goes as far as to establish a system
which is more compatible with GATT rules, China should be
accordingly treated as a normal developing country. The
quantitative restrictions established according to the
judgement of China's economic system should then be
completely abolished. Other restrictions should also be
abolished.
III INCOMPATIBILITIES OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
There exist two general incompatibilities in EEC-China trade
relations, which mark the EEC-China trade as a difficult regime to
manage. The first incompatibility is at the theoretical level. As
far as the EEC is concerned, it is committed to free trade at least in
theory (never mind whatever it has done in reality). Whereas on the
Chinese side, there is no commitment to free trade even in theory.
Although the Chinese foreign trade system has been substantially
decentralised, the government may still have great persuasive power
and control over foreign trade in one way or another. It believes
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that foreign trade should be controlled and regulated by the state to
a certain degree. The second incompatibility is at the practical
level. In practice, the European Community also exercises controls
over external trade, with more visible measures, such as quantitative
restrictions and antidumping proceedings. It also adopts a
differential trade policy, giving different preferences to a number of
countries ranging from the EFTA countries, to the 66 ACP developing
countries and to the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. Whereas in
China, apart from visible measures, the Government is more ready to
use some invisible measures to control foreign trade, such as foreign
exchange allocation, licensing, or administrative discretions.
The Trade Agreement concluded in 1978, and renewed and expanded
in 1985, was based on the Community's proposal for a trade agreement
with State-trading countries. The Agreement did not bridge these
incompatibilities. On the contrary, it legalised the EC's
discriminatory quantitative restrictions against imports from China,
putting China in a most disadvantageous position in trading with the
EC vis-a-vis other EC trading partners. 	 It also allows China to
adopt a restrictive trade policy towards the EEC. In the Agreement,
both parties have made a commitment to facilitate the increase in
bilateral trade. However, each party retains a considerable degree of
discretion as how to do it. In practice, the negotiations in the
annual joint committee meeting play a decisive role in managing and
expanding bilateral trade.
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Such an arrangement is far from satisfactory. First, this
arrangement is very much one-sided. It is a product of dominance of
the EC economic superpower. The Agreement does not grant any
preferences to China, as it is a developing country, but imposes
additional quantitative restrictions on China as it was also a
State-trading country. Secondly, such an arrangement, both in respect
of the restrictive MFN treatment and safeguard provisions, is
inconsistent with the GATT principles. The promise from the Chinese
side to give the EC favourable consideration, in particular, is
directly against the GATT principles. It drew international trade
back into bilateralism and barter. Thirdly, such an arrangement may
easily serve the purpose of protecting the domestic market of both
sides. While the EC may be able to use its economic strength to get
more benefits from such trade regime, it is ultimately less beneficial
for both parties because it slows down the development of trade and
economic relations.
The issue is now becoming particularly relevant and important as,
first, the single European market will be a reality after 1992, and,
secondly, China is applying to resume its seat in the GATT.
Naturally, the trading partners of the EEC are concerned whether
the EC will become a fortress Europe after 1992. Neither the single
European Act nor the White paper have themselves made any change to
the Community's commercial policy towards third countries in a more
liberal or protective direction. But one difficulty has been and will
continue to be the lack of agreement amongst Member states upon the
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precise policies to be adopted. While the Treaty provides for the
Community to maintain a common commercial policy thus giving the
Commission an important role in its formulation, the Council, which
represents the Member States, retains considerable powers. The lack
of policy coupled with the often contradictory signals which have
emanated from the Commission and the Member States undoubtedly
contributed to a growing concern that the Community may increase
protection through the use of 1992 to create a fortress Europe. This
is heightened by increasing calls from European industry for
protection during the early stages of the programme. In the field of
anti-dumping, for example, the Community has revised Regulation, among
others, establishing a new procedure to prevent circumvention of
antidumping duties by means of the establishment of "screwdrivert'
assembly plants in the Community. The Community has also dramatically
increased invocation of antidumping proceedings, recently to protect
its industry.
These moves are regarded as indicatives that the Community
external policy has yet to be determined. The Community has been
criticised as "dtd discrimination as a norm, a guiding principles"
for the past two decades. It is essential therefore that the
Community should not only carry on the flag of free trade, but also be
committed to free trade in practice. In addition to paying
lip-service to free trade and a multilateral trading system, the EC
should in practice be less restrictive, less bilateral and open up
more.
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As far as China's negotiations with the GATT are concerned, the
outcome of the negotiations is closely related to the development of
China's economic reform. After a few years of economic reform, the
economic system and the foreign trade system in China has been
drastically changed. However, the GATT signatories are concerned on
the issues of the speed and effectiveness of the economic reform;
Chinese pricing and costing methods, the lack of information for
foreign traders and the availability of foreign exchange.
China expects to be accorded the preferential treatment allowed
for developing countries in GATT. It also expects to resume its GATT
membership through reducing its tariff barriers. This requires China
to speed up, not slow down, its economic reform, and to further
diminish visible and invisible restrictions on international trade.
The above two aspects (ie the single European market in 1992
and China's attempt to rejoin the GATT) are bound to reshape the
future EEC-China trade and economic relations. Both the development
of the EC policy regarding external trade and economic relations, and
the outcome of the GATT membership negotiations will greatly affect
any arrangement between China and the EEC. It may be difficult to
predict the direction of the EC's external policy, and the result of
GATT negotiations, but changes on EEC-China trade relations may be
expected to follow. First, as trade relations after China rejoins the
GATT will be governed by the multilateral rules (GATT rules) rather
than bilateral agreement, the promise of special favourable treatment
given by the Chinese side to the EEC industry provided in the 1978 and
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1985 Agreement carmot and should not be valid, because it is against
the principle of non-discrimination. Also, the Community's special
commercial measure, which is designed to protect industry against
non-GATT third countries, cannot be applied against China any more.
The Community in this respect may want to consolidate the position
through a revised and possible selective safeguard clause. Further,
the settlement of disputes under the current agreement is through
negotiation in the Joint Committee. In case the parties cannot reach
mutual satisfactory agreement, either party can take unilateral
action. Once China rejoins the GATT, the safeguard actions taken must
be within the GAU rules, and either party may also refer the disputes
regarding the safeguard action to the GATF. Last but not least, the
Community may have to revoke the discriminatory quantitative
restrictions against China depending on the outcome of the GATI'-China
negotiations. It is submitted that the EC should remove these
quantitative restrictions upon the development that China will move to
a more market-orientated economy and open up its own market to the EC.
Before that the community may remove the QRs gradually in line with
the steps of China's economic reform, at the same time, more safeguard
actions may be invoked by the EEC side in order to prevent possible
market disruptions.
IV POSSIBLE DIRECT EFFECT
The two Agreements concluded between China and the EEC in 1978
and 1985 respectively are important both politically and economically.
From the legal point of view, however, these two Agreements are very
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vaguely worded. It is submitted that it seems hardly possible to get
a positive ruling from the European Court of Justice concerning the
possibility of direct effect of these Agreements. According to the
Court rulings, the nature of an agreement may not be the decisive
factor in the consideration of direct effect but the specific purpose
of a particular provision may be vitally important. It is beyond
doubt that in order to be able to have a direct effect of a provision
in front of the European Court, a clear, unconditional right must be
created. The two Agreements, however, have failed to meet such a
condition in this respect. The 1978 Trade Agreement provides a basic
legal framework for bilateral trade and the 1985 Co-operation
Agreement is extended to cover economic co-operation. The terms in
the Agreements are flexible; each party can take unilateral action as
a last resort; no unconditional rights or obligations have been
created. Therefore, the European Court is unlikely to give these
direct effect.
On the other hand, the Chinese courts have not yet developed
rules governing the issue of direct effect of international
agreements, although paradoxically, the application of an
international treaty in China does not require a separate domestic
regulation to adopt it. Because of the special legal and political
system of China, the issue of direct effect of an international treaty
in front of the Chinese court has not arisen. However, in line with
the recent development of economic reforms and re-building the legal
system, the individuals, including foreign investors in China, may
raise this question in a Chinese court. The Chinese court therefore
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will have to develop rules and criteria in this regard. In the only
reported case involving the application of an international
convention, a local Chinese court simply applied the international
convention without giving any explanation of the condition or
criterion for direct effect of an international treaty in the Chinese
court. It seems that the Chinese court is adopting international
practice in dealing with the issue of direct effect.
V	 RULES OF CO-OPERATION
The basic legal character of economic cooperation between two
parties is that they have concluded a Cooperation Agreement in 1985
which only set out general legal framework for economic co-operation.
The Agreement identifies the objectives of economic co-operation and
lists the activities which the EC and China will try to promote to
attain their objectives, but left it to the countries and industries
concerned to decide on individual projects in co-operation. In
addition, the Agreement also provides for development aid from the EC
to continue its development activities in China.
EEC-China economic co-operation has developed steadily since the
conclusion of 1985 Co-operation Agreement. The co-operation is
conducted in a wide range of areas with various forms. Also, the
Community's development activities are undertaken in the areas of
agriculture, mining, environment and personnel training. The
EEC-China economic relations have therefore reached an advanced level
in comparison with trade relations.
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However, the legal framework provided in the 1985 Co-operation
Agreement lacks practical details, it also lacks any financial
commitment by both sides to support the co-operation scheme.
Consequently, the development of economic co-operation between China
and the EEC is very much dependent upon the development of the
political and economic relationship between China and individual
Member States and the Community itself. In this respect, the legal
framework provided in the 1985 Agreement is no more than an expression
of political goodwill. It is submitted that the economic co-operation
between two parties should be further promoted. The co-operation
should be supported by more detailed legal framework and more
commitment in a mutually desirable and beneficial way.
VI EC ANTI-DUMPING RULES RELATING TO CHINA
The Community's antidumping rules play an important role in its
trading with China. Since 1979 exports from China have been subject
to EC antidumping proceedings from time to time.
By way of enumerating a number of countries as non-market
economies for the purpose of antidumping, the Community applies a
separate rule against imports from the non-market economy countries.
China is classified as one of these non-market economy countries. The
concept of non-market economy is, however, no longer an accurate one
in describing the Chinese economic system. After few years of
economic reform, the State monopoly over foreign trade in China has
been dismantled to a certain extent. The economy is regulated both by
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the State plan and market forces, with a tendency for the latter to
play an increasingly important role. The Community's approach saves
the Commission from having to determine in each case whether it
regards the country concerned to be an NME. However, such an approach
gives no criteria as to why a country qualifies as an NIlE, and lacks a
careful analysis of a particular economy. Further, the country in
question does not even have a chance to contest this. Moreover, such
an approach is less flexible and less adaptable in reflecting changes
in the economic structure and economic system of the country
concerned, it is therefore a disincentive to countries which have more
market-oriented economies. It is submitted that the Community should
discard the concept of NIlE in relation to applying antidumping rules
against exports from China. As a first step, it can change its
enumerative approach, and give objective criteria of NIlE status, and
make it possible to apply market economy rules on a sectional or
regional basis.
The Community's methods of selection of analogue countries has
also proved to be problematic. The antidumping law itself gives
hardly any guidance, but in practice the Commission usually regards
two factors to be decisive in selecting the analogue country, ie the
structure of the manufacturing process and the competitiveness of the
market. The comparative levels of the economic development between
the non-market economy and the selected analogue country have not been
considered as a significant factor in the Commission's choice of an
analogue country. In practice, the selected analogue countries have
always been those having a much higher level of economic development
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than that of China. As a result, a positive finding of dumping is
more likely. An opinion given by an Advocate General of the Court,
however, has given indication that the economic development level is
one of the characteristics to be considered in determining the
analogue country, on a par with the competitiveness of the market and
the structure of the manufacturing process.
There are a number of difficult problems relating to the approach
of using the price of an analogue country as the normal value of
Chinese products. For example, the outcome of the process of
selection of an analogue country is unpredictable. As a result, the
Chinese exporters must know the prices or even the cost of production
of a similar product in some unidentified third country. It is not
commercially reasonable nor fair to the exporters. Also, the analogue
producers by definition are the competitors in the market. The
information supplied by them, therefore, may not be complete or even
trustworthy. Moreover, the analogue country approach has totally
rejected the possible comparative advantages China may have enjoyed.
Comparative advantage is the essence of international trade. In the
production of certain products, for instance, raw materials are only
available in China, or the raw materials in China have a much higher
quality. The EC rules failed to recognise any of such advantages.
If the Community is still using the NME concept in dealing with
China in antidumping proceedings, then the totally unpredictable
approach of analogue country should be replaced by a more predictable
and less discriminatory approach. For example, the normal value can
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be found in one of China's special economic zones, or can be
constructed in accordance with the market price in these special
economic zones, where the market forces play a dominant role. Before
the Community eventually moves to change some of the provisions, the
Commission (which has great administrative discretion in deciding the
analogue country) should follow the opinion of the Advocate General in
selecting the analogue country by giving consideration be given to the
comparable level of economic development "as one of the essential
characters", in order to reach a more equitable result.
VII EEC-CHINA TRADE IN TEXTILE
Textiles accounted for one-third of total exports from China into
the EEC, making China the Community's second largest external supplier
in terms of value in 1986. The trade in textiles between the two
parties is governed by separate arrangements.
In 1979, the EC and China concluded a 5-year agreement on
textiles. An Additional Protocol was concluded in 1984, when China
adhered to the MFA. The 1979 textile agreement granted significantly
increased access for textile products from China into the Community
market. When this agreement expired in 1984, the exports of textiles
from China reached over 3 times in terms of tonnages and over 5 times
in terms of value compared with the year before the agreement (1978).
However, the quotas arranged thereunder were considerably below what
China asked for, and, more importantly, the terms concluded in the
agreement was clearly well devised to protect the Community's
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interests. This is evidenced by the provisions included in the
agreement, for example the price clause, the basket extractor
mechanism, the half-way antisurge clause, the guaranteed raw materials
supply, and the imports into China formula and so on.
The increasing imports of cheap Chinese textiles into the EC
caused increasing concern both to the European textiles industry and
to the European authorities. The 1984 Additional Protocol, therefore,
has become more restrictive. It expanded the numbers of textile
products subject to quantitative restrictions. It also put more
products under various restrictions. Since 1984, the growth rate for
textile products into the Community has obviously slowed down.
The arrangements of textile trading between China and the EEC are
legalised under the GATT MFA aegis. However, the EC was the driving
force leading the industrialised countries to create the separate
legal regime of trading in textiles. Trade in textiles between
developing countries and the developed countries are under strict
control. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements in textiles are
far from comparable with ECts commitment to trade liberalism. This is
another example of self-contradiction in the EC's philosophy and its
practice in international trade. It is submitted that the
international trade is textiles should return to the GATT rules as
soon as possible. The EC can play a crucial role in this new
transformation. The restrictions on trade in textiles between the EC
and China should be gradually removed. On the other hand, the Chinese
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exporters should focus on improving the quality of their products
instead of increasing the quantity of the exports.
